NO TRESPASSING - violators will be bloged

building status

2006-12-30T17:12:00.000Z

building status

2006-11-22T09:30:00.000Z

building status

aa

2006-10-31T20:28:00.000Z

Tracking terrorists/criminals by geting a link

2006-09-07T12:04:00.000Z

What do you do with these suspects? Arrest or deport them immediately? No, we need to use them to discover more of the al-Qaeda network. Once suspects have been discovered, we can use their daily activities to uncloak their network. Just like they used our technology against us, we can use their planning process against them. Watch them, and listen to their conversations to see...
who they call / email
who visits with them locally and in other cities
where their money comes from
The structure of their extended network begins to emerge as data is discovered via surveillance. A suspect being monitored may have many contacts -- both accidental and intentional. We must always be wary of 'guilt by association'. Accidental contacts, like the mail delivery person, the grocery store clerk, and neighbor may not be viewed with investigative interest. Intentional contacts are like the late afternoon visitor, whose car license plate is traced back to a rental company at the airport, where we discover he arrived from Toronto (got to notify the Canadians) and his name matches a cell phone number (with a Buffalo, NY area code) that our suspect calls regularly. This intentional contact is added to our map and we start tracking his interactions -- where do they lead? As data comes in, a picture of the terrorist organization slowly comes into focus.

The list of TERROR

2006-08-29T11:50:00.000Z

15 May Organization
3rd October Organization
17 November Revolutionary Organization
Abu Nidal organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Action Directe
Aceh Merdeka
Ahl-e-Hadees
Aid for Northern Ireland
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Al-`Asifa
Al-Badhr Mujahidin
Al Faran
Al-Fatah
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya
Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
al-Jihad
al-Qa'ida (The Base)
Albanian National Army (ANA)
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
Algeti Wolves
Ali Suleiyman
Alliance of Eritrean National Force
Alliance pour la resistance democratique (ARD)
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
AMAL
Amn Araissi
Ansar al-Islam
Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)
Arab Revolutionary Brigades
Arab Revolutionary Council
Arewa People's Congress [Nigeria]
Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Armed Islamic Movement [AIM]
Armed Nuclei for Proletarian Autonomy
Armed Proletarian Nuclei
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (ARN)
Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR)
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
'Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo
Aum Supreme Truth
Azad Khalistan
Babbar Khalsa
Babbar Khalsa Force
Baader Meinhof Gang
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Bavarian Liberation Army
Bhinderanwala Tiger Force
Black Mamba
Black September
Breton Liberation Front
Breton Revolutionary Army
Brigades of the Martyr Abdallah Al Hudhaifi
Brigate Rosse
Cambodian Freedom Fighters
Caprivi Liberation Front
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF)
Cellules Communistes Combattantes
Chukaku-Ha
CNRM National Council of Maubere Resistance
CNRT Timorese National Resistance Council
Commandos of the November 95 Anarchist Group
Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights
Committee for Eastern Turkistan
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Conseil national pour la défense de la democratie (CNDD)
Dal Khalsa
Dark Harvest
Dayak
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Democratic Karen Burmese Army (DKBA)
Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)
Dev Sol
Direct Action Against Drugs (DADD)
Djibouti Youth Movement
Dukhtaran E Millat
Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA)
Ejercito Popular Boricua (Macheteros)
Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR)
ELA - Revolutionary People's Struggle
Ellalan Force
ELN - National Liberation Army -- Colombia
EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston)
ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo]
Eritrean Democratic Liberation Movement
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC)
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) - Basque Fatherland and Liberty
Executive Outcomes
FALINTIL National Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
FARC - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Fatah Revolutionary Council
Fatah Special Operations Group
Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT)
Fighting Islamic Group (FIG)
Force 17
Forces armees du peuple (FAP)
ex-FAR (Forces armees rwandaises)
Forces nationales de liberation (FNL)
Forces de liberation nationale (FALINA)
Forces pour la défense de la democratie (FDD)
Fraxia Midheniston
Free Aceh
Free Aceh Movement
Free Papua Movement
FPM - Morazanist Patriotic Front
FPMR - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
Front contre l’occupation tutsie (FLOT)
Front De La Liberation Nationale
Front Line
Front pour la liberation nationale (FROLINA)
Fuerzas Armadas Liberacion Nacional Puertoriquena (FALN)
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya
Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
God's Army
GRAPO - 1 October Antifascist Resistance Group
Gray Wolves [Sivi Vukovi]
Grey Wolves
Great East Islamic Raiders–Front (IBDA-C)
HAMAS
Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hawari Group
Hawari Special Operations Group
Hizballah Al Khalji
Hizballah [Bahrain]
Hizballa [Kuwait]
Hizballah [Lebanon]
Hizbullah [Turkish]
Hizb-i-Islami
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Hizb-i Wahdat
Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM)
Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin
Interahamwe
International Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders
International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders
International Justice Group
International Revolutionary Action Group
International Sikh Youth Federation
Iparretarrak (IK)
Iranian National Front
Iraqi National Accord (INA)
Iraqi National Congress
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Irish Republican Army (IRA) - Continuity
Irish Republican Army (IRA) - New
Irish Republican Army (IRA) - Provisional
Irish Republican Army (IRA) - Real
Isatabu Freedom Movement
Islamic Army of Aden
Islamic Group (IG)
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front
Jamat-E- Islami
Islamic Armed Group (GIA)
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade
Islamic Jihad [Egypt]
Islamic Jihad [Lebanon]
Islamic Jihad [Turkey]
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine
Islamic Liberation Army (AIS)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic Movement Organization
Islamic Movement for Change
Islamic Reform Movement
Islamic Resistance Movement
Islamic Salvation Army
Islamic Salvation Front / Movement (FIS)
Islamic Salvation Movement
Islamic Union (Al-Ittihad al-Islami)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jamat-e-Islami
Jamaat ul-Fuqra
Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadees
Jamiat ul-Mujahidin
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
Jihad Group
Kach
Kachin Defense Army (KDA)
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)
Kahane Chai
Khalistan Liberation Tiger Force
Khalistan Commando Force
Khalistan Liberation Front
Khalistan National Army
Khmer Rouge
Komala
Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]
Ku Klux Klan
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
La Cosa Nostra
Lashkar I Jhangvi
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL)
Lautaro faction of the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU/L)
Lautaro Popular Rebel Forces (FRPL)
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
Les mongoles
Liberation Army of the Islamic Sanctuaries
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Macheteros
Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services Office
Malaita Eagles Force
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)
Martyrs of Tal Al Za'atar
Mau Mau
Mayi-Mayi
Meccan Group
Middle-Core Faction
Minnesota Patriots Council
Mong Tai Army (MTA)
Mohajir Qaumi Movement [MQM]
Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF]
Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF]
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
Mothaidda Quami Movement (MQM)
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)
Mouvement de liberation congolais (MLC)
Movement for an Islamic State
Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)
Movimento Sociale Italiano
Movimiento De Liberacion Nacional
MRTA - Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
Muslim Brotherhood
Muslim Iranian Student's Society
Muslims Against Global Oppresion
Muttahida Jihad Council [MJC]
Muttahidda Quami Movement (MQM)
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)
National Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands (KKCMTSH)
National Council for Resistance (NCR)
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica
National Liberation Army (ELN) -- Bolivia
National Liberation Army (ELN) -- Colombia
National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA)
National Liberation Front Of Kurdistan (ERNK)
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
National United Front of Arakan (NUFA)
New Jihad Group
New Mon State Party (NMSP)
New People's Army (NPA)
New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party
Northern Alliance
Nucleus Faction
Orange Volunteers
Ordine Nuovo (New Order)
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)
Organisation of Iranian People's Fedaian (Majority) OIPFM
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth
Orly Group
Osama bin Laden
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Parti pour la liberation du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU)
Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario (PDPR)
Party of Allah
Party of Democratic Kampuchea
Party of God
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Ireland
People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (ARGK)
People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI)
People's Republican Army (PRA)
Peoples' War Group (PWG) [India]
Peoples' War Group (PWG) [Nepal]
Peuple en armes pour la liberation du Rwanda (PALIR)
Pirates
PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party
Popular Boricua Army (Macheteros)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)
Popular Liberation Forces
Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR)
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Prima Lina
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
Provos
Puka Inti
Rajneeshee
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD)
Real IRA
Red Army Faction (RAF)
Red Brigades
Red Hand Defenders
RENAMO - Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana
Recontra 380
Recontras
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Cells
Revolutionary Council of Nigeria (RCN)
Revolutionary Justice Organization
Revolutionary Left
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization 17 November
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Revolutionary Struggle
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Russian Organized Crime (ROC)
Rwandan Liberation Army
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
Saheed Khalsa Force
Sendero Luminoso (SL)
Serb Volunteer Guard [SDG / SSJ] "Tigers"
Serbian Radical Party [SRS]
Shan Democratic Union
Shining Path
Shora-e-Jehad
Sipah I Sahaba Pakistan
SLA - South Lebanese Army
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment
Students of the Engineer
Students of Yahya Ayyash
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)
Talaa' al-Fateh
Taleban
Terra Lliure (TL) (Free Land)
Territorial Anti Imperialist Nucleus
The Brotherhood
The Order
The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army
Turkish Hizballah
Turkish Islamic Jihad
Turkish Peoples Liberation Army
Uganda National Rescue Front
Uganda National Rescue Front II
Uganda Salvation Front/Army
Uighur militants
Ulster Defence Association (UDA)
UDT Uniao Democratica Timorense
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Union des forces vives pour la liberation et la democratie en RDC-Zaire (UFLD)
Union pour la liberation nationale (ULINA)
UNITA Union Nacional Por La Independencee Totale Do Angola
United Company of Jihad
United Jihad Council
United Liberation Front of Assam
United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)
United Wa State Army (UWSA)
Vanguards of Conquest
Vasat
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors
Weathermen
Weather Underground Organization
West Nile Bank Front [WNBF]
White Eagles
World Tamil Association (WTA)
World Tamil Movement (WTM)
Zapatista National Liberation Army
Zimbabwe African National Union
Sources and Resources
2005 Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. Department of State
Alphabetical Listing of All Blocked Persons, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Designated Narcotics Traffickers, and Others, Treasury Dept Office of Foreign Assets Control, Federal Register Notice, May 27, 2004.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Congressional Research Service, February 2004.
Foreign Terrorist Organization: Aliases and Additional Names, State Department notice, Federal Register, October 10, 2003.
Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, State Dept Notice, Federal Register, October 2, 2003
Left-Wing Extremism: The Current Threat, prepared for U.S. Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security, April 2001.
Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as of March 27, 2002.
Designations of Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, State Department, Federal Register, March 19, 2002.
Designation of 39 Organizations on the USA PATRIOT Act’s “Terrorist Exclusion List”, State Department release, December 6, 2001.
Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, Congressional Research Service.
Terrorism Threat Assessments

Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, U.S. State Department

Terrorism mooves in Georgia

2006-08-08T10:57:00.000Z

. • In the past two years, narcotics trafficking routes established in Georgia in the 1990s have seen an increased volume.
. • The narcotics trade in Georgia has been contested between conventional crime organizations and Chechen guerrilla forces; the latter group seems to have gained the advantage.
. • The Georgian government has offered increasingly ineffective resistance to narcotics trafficking.
. • Narcotics trafficking in Armenia and Azerbaijan has been less than in Georgia, but conditions exist for a substantial increase in both countries.
. • Recent events in Afghanistan have not reduced the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West.
. • Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus continue to diversify and expand, fueled by Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries.
. • Members of several ethnic groups are major participants in the narcotics trade emanating from Central Asia, and Russian criminal organizations appear to play a diminishing role.
. • The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is known to rely heavily on narcotics trafficking over a number of Central Asian routes to support its military, political, and propaganda activities. That trafficking is based on moving heroin from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, into Russia, and then into Western Europe.
. • As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has been able to adjust its military and trafficking activities to respond to interdiction in given areas.
. • The effect of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU’s narcotics activity is yet unknown, in part because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear.
. • The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. To this point, HT has relied on peaceful means to propagate its central idea of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia.
. • HT’s decentralized structure conceals its activities very effectively. Although HT has funded its widespread educational and propaganda network primarily from overseas contributions, individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking.
. • HT’s expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong base for potential terrorist activity, and ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive at least some parts of the organization to respond violently.

Belgium geographical terrorist activities

2006-08-01T09:11:00.000Z

Belgium occupies a prominent place in both the terror and criminal networks of Western Europe. There have been indications of ambivalence among government officials toward the international anti-terrorist campaign that was launched after September 11, 2002. A senior
515 Aaron. 516 Transparency International, “Global Corruption Report 2003.”
Belgian minister was quoted in 2002 as saying, “Bin Laden’s war is against America, not us.”A Belgian member of parliament described Belgium’s appeal as a base of operations: “We are not a target, but we are such a quiet country that we could be a good preparation country.”518 According to a 2002 confidential report, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, the Wahabi Tabligh, and the militant GIA splinter group called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) have established logistical support bases among the 350,000 Muslim inhabitants of Belgium. Reportedly the Saudi-backed Salafi movement has established a “state” in Belgium, which has its own Islamist police.
Conventional crime also has found a comfortable home in Belgium. United Nations arms specialist Johan Peleman has speculated that the status of Antwerp as an international diamond-trading center and Belgium’s post-colonial ties with Africa made Belgium a major arms-trafficking center during the Cold War. According to Peleman, the infrastructure established at that time now has fallen into the hands of private individuals and groups. Africa is the source of diamonds used in payment and the main marketplace for illegal arms shipments by these entrepreneurs.520 Until 2000, Belgium was the primary weapons source for the ETA, and it has been a staging point for high-volume arms smugglers such as Victor Bout, Leonid Minin, and Jacques Monsieur. Bout used Ostend, Belgium, as his base of operations until 1997, Minin was based in northern Italy and used documentation from Belgium, and Monsieur was based in Belgium and used documentation from Belgium. Although Bout has been described as a “merchant of death” and continues arms trafficking operations from his base in Bahrain, the international warrant for his arrest issued by Belgian authorities in early 2002 is not for arms crimes but for passing counterfeit currency. This fact may point to another reason that Belgium is favored by criminal groups: the judicial system is notoriously slow, allowing criminals to stay several steps ahead of law enforcement.

Sources
517 Marie Rose Armesto, “Europe’s Terrorist Incubator,” The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2002. 518 Diana Muriel, “Thwarting Terrorist Cells in Europe,” CNN.com War Against Terrorism report, 23 January 2002. 519 Daily Telegraph report, cited in Shape News Summary and Analysis, 4 June 2002. 520 Alain Lallemand, “Belgium: Hotbed of Arms Trafficking,” Le Soir [Brussels], 7 March 2002 (FBIS Document EUP20020307000027). 521 Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, “Following the Trail of Arms to Al-Qaida,” Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2002. http://www.nisat.org; Ian Traynor, “The Gunrunner,” The Guardian [Manchester], 9 July 2001; and Alain Lallemand, “A Belgian Angolagate?” Le Soir [Brussels], 16 June 2001 (FBIS Document EUP20010617000081).

The status of Antwerp as Europe’s main diamond trade center has attracted illegal activity besides arms trafficking. In 2001 Belgium’s General Intelligence Service reported that illegal diamond trafficking with the UNITA rebel organization of Angola was linked with narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The report cited the South African diamond giant DeBeers and intermediaries in Great Britain and Canada. Diamonds reportedly were smuggled from Angola to London and Antwerp via Tel Aviv.
Diamonds also have been instrumental in arms trafficking to other parts of the world; in 2000, Belgian authorities identified diamonds as the exchange currency in shipments to the Middle Eastern terrorist organization Hizballah. Although not specifically linked to the narcotics trade, such trafficking operations, which have stood the test of time and political change, also have the potential to diversify their clientele and the currency that they accept in payment. Several individuals have based especially lucrative arms smuggling operations in Belgium. Terrorist and criminal networks also have benefited from the ease with which Belgian identification papers have circulated; in 2000, some 19,000 passports were stolen. The presence of major international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also may reduce the level of identification inspections for entry into the country. A number of nonstandard forms of documentation issued by international organizations are allowed. Foreigners from 11 other European countries can enter Belgium with expired passports, and no passport is required for citizens of 17 other European countries. Several individuals arrested in conjunction with the events of September 11 were carrying forged or stolen Belgian passports. Ten suspected al Qaeda operatives currently are in jail in Belgium. Experts have speculated that the assassination of Afghan military leader Ahmed Shah Masood was planned in Belgium.

Let us know some terrorists

2006-07-21T09:28:00.000Z

Given the numerous similarities between drug-trafficking terrorist and extremist groups and drug cartels in methods of operation and sharing of resources, a drug trafficker who is enticed by intelligence agencies to cooperate, such as by a promise of immunity from prosecution, could likely serve as a valuable source of information about a particular terrorist group.
. • One of the most important means of combating terrorist networks appears to be through tracking and freezing the accounts or financing that make terrorism possible.
. • The war against al Qaeda provides a test case for expanding the counterterrorist war to other terrorist groups with transnational terrorist and criminal linkages. A Jane’s Intelligence Review report suggests that current strategies to defeat al Qaeda by targeting bin Laden's top-tier command will not be effective. Instead, the strongest actions are currently being taken by U.S. intelligence agencies. “The key to disrupting, degrading and destroying al Qaeda,” states the report, “lies in developing a multipronged, multidimensional and multinational strategy that targets the core and the penultimate leadership and the network's sources of finance and supplies.”177
. • Targeting a terrorist group’s sources of finance and supplies increasingly means also targeting the drug cartels with which they do business, whether as a source of revenue or weapons.
. • Targeting a terrorist group’s key leadership may be even more essential than targeting the leadership of a drug cartel; whereas the latter’s leadership can be easily and quickly replaced, the leadership of a terrorist or guerrilla group is not so easily replaced.
. • Athough insufficient information was found to document the suspected drug-trafficking activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in Latin America, the Islamic extremist groups operating in the region appear to derive large amounts of money from various illegal activities, such as extorting a “tax” on Muslim or Arab business people,

Some known terrorists

- Assad Mohamed Barakat, Hizballah military suspected of being a “high-ranking Hizballah chief in the Triborder Region military chief” who sends large amounts of Source: CNN.com, November 8, 2001 money to the Middle East.81 Assad Barakat left civil-war-torn Lebanon at age 17 and emigrated to Paraguay with his father, a taxi driver. After a few years as a street peddler, he opened a closet-sized Apollo Import-Export stall in the crowded and shabby Page gallery in Ciudad del Este. His four brothers and a sister in Lebanon later emigrated to Paraguay to join him. According to his Paraguayan passport, Barakat was last in the United States in April 2000, but his visa was revoked after his name appeared on the U.S. Department of State’s list of “suspected terrorists.” On September 12, 2001, a Paraguayan SWAT team raided Barakat’s stall in the Page shopping center, but Barakat, 34, was away on business and escaped arrest. The police confiscated more than 60 hours of videotapes and CD-ROMs. The latter show military marches and attacks with explosives in various parts of the world, as well as speeches by Hassan Nasrahhal, the main leader of the Hizballah.

- Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, who claims to be a Lebanese businessman but is widely reported to be a key Hizballah operative, was arrested on November 8, 2001, in the center of Ciudad del Este, as he fled from the Page Shopping Gallery after noticing that the police were approaching to arrest him.87 Fayad was arrested on the orders of Prosecutor Carlos Arregui on charges of being an alleged member of an organization that remits funds to the Islamic Middle East armed struggle. Documents that were found at the Apollo shop owned by Assad Barakat allegedly incriminate Sobhi Fayad. On the basis of the documents, it was alleged that Sobhi Fayad, who has not paid taxes since 1992, was sending large sums of money to banks in Lebanon almost daily. Sobhi Fayad was arrested reportedly because of his alleged ties with Assad Ahmad Barakat, who is at large and who has been alleged to be the head of the Hizballah military wing.

- Ali Khalil Mehri, 32, a newly naturalized Paraguayan citizen born in Lebanon, who was living in Ciudad del Este. Mehri was charged with selling millions of dollars of counterfeit software and funneling the proceeds to Hizballah. Police searched his home and confiscated videos and CDs of known suicide bombers rallying others to their cause. According to the police, a CD confiscated from his store in the Triple Frontier contained images of “terrorist propaganda of the extremist group Al-Muqawama,” which belongs to Hizballah. Other documents seized during the raid included fundraising forms for a group in the Middle East named Al-Shahid, ostensibly dedicated to “the protection of families of martyrs and prisoners,” as well as documents of money transfers to Canada, Chile, Lebanon, and the United States of more than $700,000.92 British intelligence subsequently identified Mehri as a potential al Qaeda financier, according to the Washington Post. Apparently aided by his large campaign contributions to powerful members of Paraguay’s ruling Colorado Party, Mehri escaped from prison in June 2000 and fled to Syria. One of Khalil Mehri’s main defenders and protectors was Paraguay’s Deputy Angel Ramón Barchini.

- Al-Sa'id Ali Hasan Mukhlis (also spelled Mokhles), 31, who has been identified as
having contacts with a group of bin Laden militants in the Triborder Region. Mukhlis, an Egyptian who had trained in Afghanistan and was a member of the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, was suspected of participating in the massacre of 62 tourists at Luxor, Egypt in 1997. A native of the coastal city of Port Said, Mukhlis left Egypt in the early 1990s, fearing random arrests of Al-Gama'a members.

- Yassine, Salah Abdul Karim (Hamas)
On November 28, 2000, Paraguayan authorities arrested Salah Abdul Karim Yassine, a Palestinian who had entered the country using false documents.96 He was captured on an estate in the city of Encarnación, on the border with Brazil. He claimed to be a Colombian and produced a passport that had expired in 1997 and contained the name of Jaime Yassine Uribe.97 Paraguayan authorities accused him of plotting to bomb the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Asunción. According to the Washington Post, he was allegedly securing $100,000 in financing attacks.

- Mohamed Abed Abdel Aal, a leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Jamaa Islamiyya), was arrested in Colombia in October 1998. He had been in Italy under “surveillance,” according to Colonel Germán Jaramillo Piedrahita, the head of Colombia's intelligence police, who was interviewed by Colombia's Radio Caracol on October 21, 1998. Abdel Aal is wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in two terrorist massacres of tourists: the Jamaa Islamiyya terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt on November 17, 1997, in which 62 people were killed; and in connection with an incident in which terrorists killed 20 Greek tourists by raking them with gunfire outside their Cairo hotel on April 18, 1996.

- Wahid Mugnie and Ali Makke—in Porlamar, Margarita, alleged to be members of Hizballah. They had departed Lebanon in early 1997, after being denied entry visas by the Venezuelan Consulate in Lebanon because of their suspected Hizballah affiliation. They arrived in Buenos Aires on January 6, passed through Maicao on January 26, and then, having obtained visas from Venezuela’s Directorate of Foreign Nationals, despite the Foreign Ministry’s explicit instructions not to issue them, were flown directly to Margarita from Paraguachon, Guajira Department. 116 Another Lebanese national with suspected terrorist ties arrived in Margarita in late September 2001 and was arrested by the National Guard at the Santiago Marino International Airport moments before he was to board a flight to Puerto España. The individual, named “Ali Mamad Aman,” was carrying a false Mexican passport.Venezuela’s Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), consisting of four members of the PTJ and the International Police (Interpol) began to investigate bank accounts in Zulia State that might be tied to extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, and that have financed terrorist actions, including the attacks on the United States on September 11.

- Mohamed Ali Farhad has been linked to a money laundering controlled cigarette smuggling in the 1990s through the Mansur Free Zone Trading Company N.V., with its main offices in the Netherlands Antilles.120 The Mansurs inherited a smuggling and drug trafficking empire established in the islands by the Cosa Nostra's Cuntrera-Caruana clan, when it began to work in Venezuela with Cali Cartel organizations.

- Tomás Medina Caracas (see image), two other Farc members, another Colombian, and three Brazilians. The indictment says “they sold cocaine for money and weapons, with the drugs bound for the US, Brazil, Suriname, Paraguay, Mexico, and Spain.” ELN’s involvement in narcotics was also presented to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 13, 2002. This view holds that the territories under ELN influence—primarily along Colombia's northeastern border with Venezuela and in central and northwestern Colombia—include cannabis and opium poppy-growing areas. Some ELN units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. Although some ELN units may be independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations, the ELN appears to be much less dependent than the FARC on coca and cocaine profits to fund its operations.

- Fernando Da Costa (“Fernandinho Beira-Mar”)as one of the major Brazilian mafia chiefs, with international connections in Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia. With the contacts that he made in Paraguay during his 13 years of residency in that country, Da Costa purchased arsenals there and brought them to Barranco Minas (Guainía). He maintained his base of operations in Paraguay until forced to move to Colombia. Brazilian authorities established that Da Costa had connections with 53 people in Brazil through bank accounts in different parts of the world.

-

Terrorist Groups - Central Asia

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The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Two major Islamic groups with extreme political programs have surfaced in Central Asia in the past ten years. The first, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was founded in 1998 by the charismatic Uzbek guerrilla fighter Juma Namangani (original name Jumaboy Hojiyev) and another Uzbek, Tohir Yuldeshev, who became the political leader of the organization. The proximate goal of the group was to overthrow the repressive regime of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, who had imprisoned many members of Islamic groups that were predecessors to the IMU. According to regional expert Ahmed Rashid, Namangani’s group has a close relationship with al-Qaeda: “In the IMU, [al-Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden cultivated a cultlike group that could act as a bridge to Afghanistan’s landlocked, mountainous neighbors—neighbors who were striking deals with American oil and gas companies and looking increasingly to Washington for assistance.” In 2000 and 2001, Namangani received an estimated US$35 million from al-Qaeda36 (including US$20 million given personally by bin Laden) to buy arms and equipment for his organization. According to Rashid, bin Laden also considered Central Asia as a prime source of new recruits to his cause, and the IMU as a prime instrument in the recruitment process.
An avowedly terrorist organization, the IMU has been especially active in areas adjacent to the Fergana Valley, which is the economic and natural resource center of Central Asia. The IMU aims to capture that critical region and establish an Islamic caliphate that would eventually expand to rule all of Central Asia. In 1999 and 2000, Fergana, which includes territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, was the scene of terrorist actions that included the Mariya Chernitsyna, “Can We Not Live without Drugs?” Moskovskiy Komsomolets [Moscow], 3 April 2002(FBIS Document CEP20020403000181). Tom Walker, “Passions Running at Their Height,” review of Ahmed Rashid’s Jihad in Sunday Times [London], 3February 2002. 36 Ahmed Rashid, “Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Aren’t Going to Go Away,” The New Yorker, 14 January 2002. Jonathon Curiel, “From the Cauldron’s Edge: Taliban Author Offers Rare Insight into Troubled Territories,” review of Ahmed Rashid’s Jihad in San Francisco Chronicle Sunday Review, 3 March 2002.
kidnapping of Japanese, Kyrgyz, and American citizens in Kyrgyzstan. In the same period, IMU fighters were training and recruiting with Taliban forces in Afghanistan, where IMU leaders had established close connections. Before September 11, the IMU was an active participant in the Taliban’s struggle to gain full control of Afghanistan against resistance forces in the northeast of that country. Under Namangani’s command, an IMU force reportedly 3,000 to 5,000 strong fought beside the Taliban regime against U.S. and Afghan forces in the campaign of late 2001 Some IMU forces reportedly remained with holdout Taliban forces in eastern Afghanistan as late as May 2002.39 Namangani’s reported death in the Afghan fighting had not been confirmed as of September 2002. According to a July report from the National Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, he had recovered from wounds sustained the previous winter and was gathering forces in the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan.
In 1999 stringent security procedures by the Uzbek armed forces, together with pressure from the Tajikistan government to vacate bases in that country, caused the IMU to begin a quiet infiltration into Kyrgyzstan.41 Kyrgyzstan also is a primary IMU target because it is the only Central Asian country to allow the activity of Christian missionaries, a policy that stirs resentment among Islamic fundamentalists. In 2001 the IMU mounted guerrilla attacks in southwestern Kyrgyzstan from sleeper cells already in that country, rather than by moving fighters across the border from Tajikistan as it had in the campaigns of 1999 and 2000. This new stratagem is significant because it reduced pressure on the IMU from the Tajikistan government and confirmed a permanent IMU presence in Kyrgyzstan.
Establishment of a beachhead in Kyrgyzstan has been facilitated by inept and uncoordinated border controls in the region where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan meet. According to Rashid, the mutual distrust among these three states and Uzbekistan’s unilateral mining of its portion of the border have increased the incidence of the smuggling activity that Armen Khanbabyan, “To the Evident Indifference of Moscow,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Moscow], 6 February2002, 5.39 Todd Zeranski, “Al-Qaeda Ally in Central Asia Poses Lingering Threat, Bloomberg News, 12 March 2002; reportin Izvestinya-Kazakhstan [Almaty], 15 May 2002 (FBIS Document CEP2002052000087). 40 RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 138, pt. 1 (25 July 2002). 41 Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” The WashingtonQuarterly, 25, no. 1 (2002).42 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 130. Rashid, Jihad, 181-82.
supports the IMU. It also has disrupted the legitimate trans-border trade that is the foundation of the region’s economy, thus exacerbating the poverty that fosters extremist recruitment. Throughout the summer of 2002, Kazakh and Kyrgyz newspapers reported a concentration of 1,500 to 5,000 IMU fighters in the valleys of the Alay Mountain chain just south of the Fergana Valley, presumably the result of successful regional recruiting in preparation for another summer offensive into the Kyrgyz and Uzbek parts of the valley.45 As of early September 2002, no such offensive had been reported.

Tri Border Terrorism

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Islamic Terrorist Groups and Activities in the Tri-Border Area (TBA)
This review of the available open-source information on Islamic terrorist group activities in Tri-Border Area (TBA) during the 1999 to 2003 period provides substantial evidence for concluding that various Islamic terrorist groups have used the TBA—where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet—as a haven for fund-raising, recruiting, plotting terrorist attacks elsewhere in the TBA countries or the Americas in general, and other such activities. Islamic terrorist groups with a presence in the TBA reportedly include Egypt’s Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad), al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Muqawamah (the Resistance; also spelled al-Moqawama), which is a pro-Iran wing of the Lebanon-based Hizballah. Islamic terrorist groups have used the TBA for fund-raising, drug trafficking, money laundering, plotting, and other activities in support of their organizations. The large Arab community in the TBA is highly conducive to the establishment of sleeper cells of Islamic terrorists, including Hizballah and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, as many as 11,000 members of the Islamic community in the TBA may have moved since late 2001 to other less closely watched Arab population centers in South America.
Hizballah clearly derives a quite substantial amount of income from its various illicit activities in the TBA, in addition to financial support from the government of Iran and income derived from narcotics trafficking in Lebanon’s Al Beqa’a Valley. Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being implicated in Hizballah-linked activities in the TBA since the early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government support of Hizballah activities in the region. Lebanese government political support of the sizeable Lebanese community in the TBA extends to Hizballah members in the region because of Hizballah’s influence in Lebanon’s politics and society.
News media reports in recent years of al Qaeda’s presence in the TBA and of cooperation between Hizballah and al Qaeda in the region first surfaced in mid-1999, based on reported identification of al Qaeda operatives in the TBA by Argentine intelligence. The conventional thinking is that the Sunni-oriented al Qaeda and the Shi’ite-oriented Hizballah would never cooperate, but it seems more likely that the reported cooperation is emblematic of a larger strategic alliance between the two organizations.1 News media reports since 1999 of foiled terrorist plots against U.S. embassies and the arrest of several terrorists linked to al Qaeda— including Ali Khalil Mehri, El Said Hassan Ali Mohammed Mukhlis, Marwan ‘Adnan al-Qadi (“Marwan al-Safadi”), and Mohamed Ali Aboul-Ezz Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman (also spelled Mohamad Ali Abao-Ezz El-Mahdi Ibrahim Suliman)—suggest that al Qaeda has a presence in the region. Al Qaeda may have begun to establish a network in the TBA when Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed reportedly visited the area in 1995. Al Qaeda’s activities in the TBA are reportedly linked to trafficking of arms, drugs, and uranium, as well as money laundering, in association with Chinese and Russian (Chechen) mafias.
If a Cable News Network (CNN) report is correct that an Islamic terrorist summit was held in the TBA in late 2002 to plan terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli diplomatic facilities in the South American region, then attacking these targets would appear to be a high priority for al Qaeda, Hizballah, and other Islamic terrorist groups that may have a presence in the TBA. Plotting by TBA-based terrorists linked to Hizballah and al Qaeda to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Asunción began in 1996. The embassy most likely remains one of the primary U.S. targets of Islamic terrorist groups in the region. In 2000-01, TBA-based al Qaeda operatives expanded their targeting to include the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Asunción and the U.S. embassies in Montevideo and Quito (Israel closed its embassy in Asunción in early 2002). The pattern of these foiled plots strongly suggests that TBA-based Hizballah and/or al Qaeda operatives will again attempt to carry out simultaneous terrorist attacks against two or more U.S. embassies or consulates in South America. Targets could also include hotels, tourism centers, airports, or multinational companies, especially those of Israeli, German, French, or U.S. origin.2

Organized Crime Groups and Activities in the TBA
In addition to Islamic terrorist groups, the TBA provides a haven that is geographically, socially, economically, and politically highly conducive for allowing organized crime and the
1 Hisham al-Qarawi, “Has Bin-Ladin Made An Alliance With Mughanniyah in Latin America?” Al-Arab al-Alamiyah [London-based Libyan daily providing independent coverage of Arab and international issues with a strong pro-Libyan, Arab nationalist, and anti-United States editorial line], November 14, 2002, 2, as translated from the Arabic for FBIS, “Article Views Possibility of Al-Qa'ida-Hizballah Alliance in Latin America,” November 14, 2002, FBIS Document ID: GMP20021114000092. 2 María Luisa Mac Kay, Clarín staff, Clarín (Internet version-www), October 18, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021018000021, “Argentina Put on Heightened Security Alert in View of Potential Terrorist Attack,” October 18, 2002.
corrupt officials who accept their bribes or payoffs to operate in a symbiotic relationship that thrives on drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and other lucrative criminal activities. As of 2001, money laundering in the TBA, aided by special CC-5 accounts for non-residents and other mechanisms, reportedly was averaging US$12 billion a year. Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu are the region’s principal money-laundering centers. Ciudad del Este was generating US$12 to US$13 billion in cash transactions annually, making it the third city worldwide behind Hong Kong and Miami. However, that figure may have fallen since then as a result of stricter Argentine and Brazilian customs systems.
Numerous organized crime groups, including the Lebanese Mafia, are known to use the TBA for illicit activities such as smuggling, money laundering, and product piracy. Although it is unclear whether the Lebanese Mafia and Hizballah are basically synonymous or entirely separate entities, there is probably a close relationship between them. In any case, the Hizballah organization in the TBA is known to collaborate with various mafias, including the Hong Kong Mafia.
Indigenous crime groups operating in the TBA include the Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan mafias. Non-indigenous mafias operating in the TBA reportedly include syndicates from Chile, China, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana, Libya, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia, and Taiwan. However, a review of open-source news media found information indicating activities mainly by the Chinese, Korean, Lebanese, and Taiwanese mafias. The thriving business of importing counterfeit Compact Disks (CDs) and CD-ROMs from Asia is linked to organized crime in Korea, Lebanon, Libya, and Taiwan. The Hong Kong Mafia is particularly active in large-scale trafficking of pirated products from mainland China to Ciudad del Este and maintains strong ties with Hizballah in the TBA. Unspecified Chinese mafias in the TBA are reportedly seeking to expand into Argentina in order to establish themselves into the duty-free zone of San Luis Province. At least two Chinese mafia groups in the TBA—the Sung-I and Ming families—engage in illegal operations with the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group).

Efforts to Counter the Use of the TBA by Organized Crime and Terrorist Groups
Cooperative and individual national efforts of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan security forces to fight illicit activities by organized crime and terrorist groups in the TBA appear to have constrained these activities since late 2001, but by no means eliminated them. Their efforts have been hindered by endemic corruption within the police, criminal justice systems, and governments of the TBA countries; poor pay; inadequate training, equipment, funding, law-enforcement techniques, and penal codes; poor organization; human rights abuses; weak anti-money-laundering laws and enforcement thereof; and secrecy provisions of banking laws (with the exception of Paraguay, whose problem has more to do with not reporting suspicious financial activities).

INTRODUCTION
Several free-trade Latin American areas with large Middle Eastern populations allow Islamic terrorist groups, organized crime mafias, and corrupt officials to thrive in a mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationship. These areas include Colombia’s Maicao, Venezuela’s Margarita Island, Chile’s Iquique, and the Tri-Border Area (TBA). This study focuses on the largest and most significant of these areas—the TBA, an enclave adjoining Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
Estimates of how much organized crime and corrupt officials profit from these duty-free zones are unavailable, but it is estimated that Islamic fundamentalist groups in the TBA and similar areas in Latin America are sending between US$300 million and US$500 million a year in profits from drug trafficking, arms dealing, and other illegal activities, including money laundering, contraband, and product piracy, to radical Islamic groups in the Middle East.3 The TBA’s Islamic extremist support networks include, in addition to Margarita Island and Iquique, various other centers of Arab population in the region, such as the Paraguayan city of Encarnación, on the border with Argentina, and the Uruguayan town of Chuy, on the border with Brazil.
3 “U.S. General: Islamic Rebels Get Cash from Latin America Gangs,” Orlando Sentinel, March 10, 2003, A9, citing General James T. Hill, commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami.
Hizballah clerics and members of other violent Islamic groups reportedly began planting agents and recruiting sympathizers among Arab and Muslim immigrants in Latin America in the mid-1980s, at the height of the Lebanese civil war. Hizballah cells began to form in the TBA as a result of Hizballah proselytizing in the Lebanese communities. Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya— Hamas), Hizballah, and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) actively use the TBA as a support base, and al Qaeda reportedly has been establishing a presence in the region since at least the mid-1990s. By mid-2000, an estimated 460 Hizballah operatives were thought to be living and working in the TBA.4 Numerous Lebanese and Palestinian extremists arrived in the TBA from Colombia in October 2000.5
With the help of organized crime and corrupt officials, these Islamic terrorist organizations use the TBA to raise revenues through illicit activities that include drug- and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forging travel documents, and even pirating software and music. In addition, they provide haven and assistance to other terrorists transiting the region. Al Qaeda reportedly also does considerable fund-raising in Ciudad del Este.6
Suspected Hizballah terrorists have also used the TBA as a base for carrying out two major terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s—one against the Israeli Embassy on March 17, 1992; and the other against a Jewish community center on July 18, 1994. Since the 1994 attack, Islamic terrorists in the TBA have largely confined their activities to criminal fundraising and other activities in support of their terrorist organizations, including plotting terrorist actions to be carried out in other countries.
This study has confirmed the likely close interrelation among Islamic terrorist fundraising and money-laundering activities, organized crime, and corruption of public officials in the TBA. All of the TBA’s terrorist and organized crime activities are facilitated by official corruption, which, in turn, is fueled by the profits of lucrative criminal activities, which are
4 Harris Whitbeck and Ingrid Arneson, “Terrorists Find Haven in South America,” CNN.com, November 8, 2001.[http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/11/07/inv.terror.south] 5 Their names, as published in the Paraguayan press, included: Abadia Abu Sakran, Ayman Taha, Baha El-Khatis, Samer Sweileh, Diban Abu Gamous, Asan Hamaida, Mohamed Minirouwi, Hamad Hamad, Ayman Abu Yin, SalahTinme, Wael Nasser, Sharif Tahayna, Abbas Ouweiwi, Nasser Saha Ane, Muhammad Moussa Hassan Gadalah, Rafat Rahdan Salem Abio, Brahim Un-Karim Bani-Uda, Mahmud Zakar Rages Zatma Adnan, and Mahimud JabberAlul. Bartolomé, 11, citing “Antiterroristas remiten las evidencias al fiscal” [Antiterrorists provide the judge withevidence], Noticias, December 5, 2000. 6 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” The New Yorker, 79, No. 32, October 28, 2002.
conducted like business enterprises by organized crime and terrorist groups. In effect, a mutually beneficial nexus exists among these three sectors. The TBA serves as a microcosm for examining this relationship.
GEOGRAPHY, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY

Geography
The TBA’s porous borders are defined by three closely grouped population centers, one in each of three countries: the Argentine city of Puerto Iguazú, the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu, and the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este (formerly Puerto Presidente Stroessner). The region’s most famous landmark is Iguassú Falls (Port., Iguaçu Falls), which straddles the Argentina-Brazil border in Brazil’s Paraná State and Argentina’s Misiones Province.
In the early 1970s, when Brazil and Paraguay were seeking to exploit the energy-generating and tourist potential of Iguassú Falls and to promote regional trade, government planners established a free-trade zone in the rapidly growing boomtown city of Ciudad del Este, thereby allowing Argentines and Brazilians to purchase cheap electronic products there.7 The TBA, with already more than half a million inhabitants, soon became a lawless jungle corner of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
Ciudad del Este
Ciudad del Este, located 330 kilometers to the east of Asunción, is the capital of Paraguay’s Upper Paraná Department and the country’s second-largest city. In 2003 Ciudad del Este had an estimated population of 239,500.8 Strategically located, Ciudad del Este is situated
7 Sebastian Junger, “Terrorism's New Geography,” Vanity Fair, No. 508, December 2002, 196, citing Brazilian journalist Jackson Lima. 8Stefan Helders, “Paraguay,” The World Gazetteer, 2003. [http://www.world-gazetteer.com/c/c_py.htm#pl_37]
on the Pan American Highway, which runs from Asunción, Paraguay, to Curitiba, Brazil, located near the port of Paranaguá.

Foz do Iguaçu
The Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu (formerly spelled Foz do Iguassú), Paraná State, has been recently described in news media as having a population of about 300,000. (According to the 1996 census, its population was 231,627.9) Many people leave Ciudad del Este at night and cross the 303-meter-long, concrete bridge, the Friendship International Bridge (Sp., Puente Internacional de la Amistad; or Port., Ponte Internacional da Amizade), to return to Foz do
Iguaçu, where the quality of life is better than in Ciudad del Este. Nevertheless, violent crime is a serious problem in Foz do Iguaçu, where 180 homicides were reported in 2000, 243 in 2001, and 275 in 2002.10 (By comparison, the number of homicides in the top-ranking
U.S. city in 2002, Washington, D.C., with about 2 ½ times the population, was 262.)

Puerto Iguazú
Argentina's Puerto Iguazú, with a population of approximately 29,000, is located at the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazú (Port., Iguassú) rivers in the northwest corner of Misiones
9 Demographia: Brasil [Brazil]: Cities (Municipalities) Over 100,000 Population: 1996. [http://www.demographia.com/db-brasil-city96.htm]10 “Homicide Rate Declines in Foz do Iguaçu,” A Gazeta do Iguaçu [Foz do Iguaçu; independent, largest-circulation daily in the TBA; offers balanced reporting and daily editorial comment], citing data released by the Legal Medical Institute (IML), as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20030606000016, June 5, 2003.
Province. The Atlantic Ocean can be accessed from Puerto Iguazú using small freighters. Although Puerto Iguazú is isolated from Ciudad del Este by the Paraná, Puerto Iguazú has access to Brazil’s Foz do Iguaçu across the Iguazú at the 489-meter-long Tancredo Neves International Bridge. The Arab immigrants of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este generally avoid visiting Puerto Iguazú because they reportedly do not feel welcome there and are regarded suspiciously by Argentine security officials.11
Society

The General Population of the TBA
By 2001, the TBA had a highly heterogeneous population of more than 700,000, including the area outside the three cities.12 Foz do Iguaçu’s population includes an estimated 65 different nationalities.13
The three main ethnic communities in Ciudad del Este are the Chinese, Lebanese, and Korean.14 In 2001, the city’s largest ethnic group was the Chinese, with about 30,000 members, of whom only about 9,000 may be registered legally.15 The Portuguese language predominates. Guaraní is generally spoken by the city’s poor Paraguayan residents. Arabic is heard as much as, or perhaps more than, Spanish. Chinese and Korean are also commonly heard.16 Ciudad del Este’s Chinese residents, mostly from China’s southern Canton region, prefer this city over Foz do Iguaçu.
11 Franco Iacomini, “Fronteira sem lei: A divisa com o Paraguai é a dor de cabeça do Mercosul” [Lawless Border: The Division with Paraguay and Mercosul’s Headache], Veja [São Paulo], No. 1541, April 8, 1998. [http://veja.abril.uol.com.br/080498/p_044.html]12 Mariano César Bartolomé, Amenzas a la seguridad de los estados: La triple frontera como ‘área gris’ en el conosur americano [Threats to the Security of States: The Triborder Region as a ‘Grey Area’ in the American Southern Cone]. Buenos Aires, November 29, 2001 http://www.geocities.com/mcbartolome/triplefrontera1.htm]; reprinted as Dr. Mariano César Bartolomé, “La triple frontera: Principal foco de inseguridad en el Cono Sur Americano” [The triborder: Principal focus of insecurity in the American southern cone], Military Review, July-August 2002 (Spanishedition). [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/spanish/JulAug02/indxjasp.asp]13 Bartolomé, 3, citing a 2001 estimate by Brazil’s Federal Police (Polícia Federal―PF).14 Ricardo Grinbaum, “In Paraguay, Smugglers' Paradise,” World Press Review, January 1996, 43, No.1, 25-6(reprinted from Veja).15 Bartolomé, 7.16 Franco Iacomini, “Fronteira sem lei: A divisa com o Paraguai é a dor de cabeça do Mercosul” [Lawless Border: The Division with Paraguay and Mercosul’s Headache], Veja [São Paulo], No. 1541, April 8, 1998. [http://veja.abril.uol.com.br/080498/p_044.html]

Muslim Population
The TBA has one of the most important Arab communities in South America. Of the Arab population in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, an estimated 90 percent is of Lebanese origin.17 Estimates of the size of the Arab community of immigrants in the TBA (mainly in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu) range from 20,000 to 30,000, with most residing in Foz do Iguaçu.18 Of these general figures, Foz do Iguaçu’s Arab population accounts for 10,000 to 21,000 Arabs of Palestinian and Lebanese descent.19
The Arab community in the TBA is tightly knit, with its own schools and clubs, making outside penetration very difficult. Most Arab immigrants in Foz do Iguaçu live in gated condominiums.20 The cultural
and social demographics of Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu make an ideal operations base for Arabic-speaking terrorist or criminal groups. A few extremists can get together, form a highly secure cell, carry out their mission, and return with alibis backed up by many in the community. Sympathizers of al Qaeda have allegedly been active
in the TBA for these reasons.
17 Bartolomé, 4.18 The New York Times reports that “more than 20,000 Middle Eastern immigrants, most from Lebanon and Syria, live in the area.” See Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32. Jane’s notes that the region’s 629,000 population includes 23,000 Arabs of Palestinianand Lebanese descent. See John Daly, “The Suspects: The Latin American Connection,” Jane’s Terrorism &Security Monitor, October 1, 2001. The 30,000 figure is cited by Marc Perelman, U.S. Joining Terrorism Probe Along Lawless Brazil Border: Hezbollah, Al Qaeda Links Sought. The Lebanese Foundation for Peace (LFP), December 13, 2002. [http://www.free-lebanon.com/LFPNews/2002/terrorprobe/terrorprobe.html] 19 A Gazeta do Iguaçu [Foz do Iguaçu], “Muslims Prevail Among Small Religions in Foz,” February 3, 2003, astranslated for FBIS, “Highlights From the Tri-Border Press for the Week 3-7 February,” February 11, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030211000124. 20 “Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil Step Up Search for "terrorists" in Triborder Area,” BBC Monitoring Service [UK], September 15, 2001.
Argentina’s total Muslim population is known to be approximately three times as large as its Jewish population. Estimates of the former range from 700,000 to 900,000, with the lower figure considered by some researchers to be more likely.21 The number of Jews living in Argentina is estimated to be about 250,000, of whom about 80 percent live in Buenos Aires.22 Argentina’s Jewish population has been the target of terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists and neo-Nazis.
Foz do Iguaçu reportedly has Brazil’s second-largest Arab community (São Paulo may have the largest).23 Nevertheless, Foz do Iguaçu’s Arab population seems relatively small in comparison with a reported 1 million Muslims who have Brazilian citizenship and live in Brazil. Most Brazilian Muslims came from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and other countries, but those in Foz do Iguaçu are mostly of Lebanese and Palestinian descent. Many members of the Arab population of Foz do Iguaçu and its surrounding hinterlands maintain commercial outlets in Ciudad del Este.

Economy
Ciudad del Este is an oasis for informants and spies; peddlers of contraband (largely cheap East Asian goods) and counterfeit products; traffickers in drugs, weapons, and humans (prostitutes, including women and children forced into prostitution); common criminals; mafia organizations; and undocumented Islamic terrorists. In Ciudad del Este, street merchants sell not only cheap trinkets and counterfeit products, but also items such as an AK-47 for US$375.24 Despite its seedy appearance, Ciudad del Este is a world-class center of commerce in terms of cash transactions. Thanks to the presence of organized crime, the city’s retail economy ranked third worldwide—behind Hong Kong and Miami—in volume of cash transactions, peaking at
21 Pedro Brieger and Enrique Herszkowich, “The Muslim Community of Argentina,”The Muslim World [Hartford], 92, Nos. 1/2, Spring 2002, 157-68. 22 Jacob Kovadloff, Crisis In Argentina. American Jewish Community [New York], circa June 2002. [http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=555]23 Gazeta do Iguaçu [Foz do Iguaçu], “Muslims Prevail Among Small Religions in Foz,” February 3, 2003, astranslated for FBIS, “Highlights From the Tri-Border Press for the Week 3-7 February,” February 11, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030211000124; and “Palestinian Community in Brazil,” Jornal do Iguaçu [Foz do Iguaçu],September 27, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights: Brazil - Paraguay Triborder Press 23-27 Sep 02,” September 30, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020930000045. 24 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” The New Yorker, 79, No. 32, October 28, 2002.
US$12 billion in 1994.25 In 2001 the estimated annual turnover in Ciudad del Este made the city’s economy larger than that of the rest of Paraguay.26 The relatively small Arab community in Ciudad del Este is among Latin America’s most prosperous and influential.
The region’s main economic dynamic is business between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu. On normal days, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people and 20,000 vehicles cross the Friendship Bridge between Brazil and Paraguay. Residents and tourists in Ciudad del Este also
regularly cross between Paraguay and Brazil on foot, often without documents. Border checks by authorities have generally been limited to simple spot-checks, and less than 10 percent of personal baggage or vehicle loads are checked. The traditional status of the TBA as a source of cheap goods has been severely restricted, however, by new regulations issued by Argentina and Brazil. After Brazil implemented an integrated customs system to combat smuggling, commerce between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu reportedly decreased by 90 percent.27 However, according to Mauro de Brito, head of the Federal Revenue Secretariat office in Foz do Iguaçu, it will take several years for the customs integration between Paraguay and Brazil to yield the expected
25Sebastian Rotella, “Jungle Hub for World's Outlaws,” Los Angeles Times, August 24, 1998, 1; and Ricardo Grinbaum, “In Paraguay, Smugglers' Paradise,” World Press Review, January 1996, 43, No.1, 25-6 (reprinted from Veja).26 Larry Rohter, “Terrorists Are Sought in Latin Smugglers' Haven,” New York Times, September 27, 2001, A3. 27 “Commerce between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu Drops by 90 Percent,” Vanguardia [highest circulation daily in Ciudad del Este; aligned with the national daily ABC Color, it offers moderate and balanced reporting and editorial comment, but is occasionally sensationalistic], December 3, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil-Paraguay Triborder Press Highlights: November 25-29, 2002,” December 3, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021203000105.
results. Referring to Paraguay’s “bribe culture,” de Brito attributed this delay to differences in legislation and in “culture” of customs agents.28
In an attempt to curb the loss of tax revenues, Argentina imposed limits of US$100 per month on nondurable merchandise and US$150 per month on durables that can be purchased in the region. In a similar measure, Brazilian authorities reduced from US$500 to US$150 the monthly amount that the sacoleiros (small-time Brazilian importers) can spend in the region.29 As a result of these and other measures, such as increased security, commercial activity in Ciudad del Este has declined considerably.30
Although Argentina’s Puerto Iguazú traditionally has had the least economic activity of the three TBA cities, the greatly reduced traffic across the Tancredo Neves Bridge during the 1999-2000 period is also indicative of the economic downturn.31 From 3.4 million people crossing in 1999, the number dropped to 1.4 million in 2000, while total vehicle passages declined from 350,751 in 1999 to 242,669 in 2000.32 Argentine sources estimated in October 2001 that 120,000 people annually, or 4,000 daily, were crossing the Tancredo Neves Bridge.33
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES BY ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE TBA

Background
The TBA cities of Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu have served as a base and a haven for Islamic terrorists for plotting and occasionally succeeding in carrying out terrorist attacks elsewhere in the Americas. Among the various Islamic fundamentalist groups reported to have a presence in the region are extremist cells tied to al Qaeda, Hizballah, Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and al-Muqawamah.
28 “Brazil, Paraguay Border Customs Integration Facing Problems,” Vanguardia, April 11, 2003, as translated by FBIS, “Highlights: Argentina-Brazil- Paraguay Triborder Media, April 11, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030411000098. 29 Bartolomé, 2.30 Bartolomé, 2.31 Bartolomé, 4, citing “Em Puerto Iguazú, a segurança é reforçada” [In Puerto Iguazú, Security Is Reinforced], O Estado de São Paulo, September 17, 2001. 32 Mendel, William W., Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). “Paraguay's Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity,” Military Review,” 82, No. 2, March-April 2002, 51-58. 33 Bartolomé, 2.
The bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, followed by the bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (Asociación Mutual Israeli-Argentina —AMIA), a Jewish community center, in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, focused the attention of the TBA countries, Israel, and the United States on the TBA because the investigation into both attacks led back to Hizballah operatives in the TBA.34 Since the Israeli Embassy bombing
in 1992, Imad Mughniyah (also spelled Mughanniyah
or Mugniyeh; alias ‘Hajji’), a Lebanese national and the head of the security service of Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), which is linked to the pro-Iranian Party of God, or Hizballah, has been a fugitive. In May 2003, Argentine prosecutors linked both Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu to the AMIA bombing and issued arrest warrants for two Lebanese citizens, Assad Ahmad Barakat (see Barakat, Assad Ahmad Mohamad, Appendix) and Imad Fayed Mugniyah, who at the time of the bombing were living in Ciudad del Este.35 According to the investigators handling the AMIA case in Buenos Aires, Barakat played a crucial Aftermath of the AMIA bombing in role in financing the bombing because he reportedly Buenos Aires, July 18, 1994
Source: AP, BBC Mundo, December had a cell that made arrangements to import all of the 23, 2000. materials related to the attack into the TBA. In the years since then, investigators have identified Barakat as not only Hizballah’s military operations chief in the TBA, but also as its chief
36
Southern Cone fund-raiser.It is not known what connection, if any, al Qaeda may have had with the AMIA attack, an action usually associated with Hizballah. Whether the AMIA bombing was collaboration
34 Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, No. 12, December 2001, 13-14; and Jack Epstein, “Where Tourism Meets Terrorism,” U.S. News & World Report, 117, No. 6, August 8, 1994, 38. 35 ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 28, 2003, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20030528000104, “Argentine Prosecutors Link Tri-Border Hizballah Leaders to AMIA Attack,” May 28, 2003. 36 “Government Keeps Watchful Eye on Paraguay’s Arab Community,” October 13, 2001, EFE News Services (FBIS Rec. No. OEF2C4F9D99922F0).
between Hizballah and another group is unclear. Argentina’s foreign ministry disclosed on October 18, 2001, that its embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, had received a telephone call on October 26, 2000, claiming responsibility for an unspecified “explosion” in Argentina. Argentine judicial sources believe that the callers to the Riyadh embassy were referring to the July 18, 1994, attack on the AMIA.37 In late January 2003, Argentina’s Secretariat for State Intelligence (Secretaría de Información del Estado—SIDE) presented President Eduardo Duhalde with a 500page report on the AMIA bombing that confirms Hizballah’s use of C4 plastic explosive, which arrived from Ciudad del Este along with the two or three suicide bombers, who came from Lebanon.38 As of mid-2003, Argentine courts had resumed the investigation of the attacks on the AMIA and the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and had determined that Assad Ahmad Barakat made suspicious trips to Teheran, Iran, between 1990 and 1991, and that he had also reportedly met with high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the same occasion, Barakat also traveled to Lebanon.39

The Islamic Terrorist Presence in the TBA, 1999-June 2003
There appears to be general agreement among U.S. counterterrorism officials that Islamic terrorist groups have a presence in the TBA, although some may be more skeptical than others that al Qaeda is included among these groups, much less cooperating with Hizballah in the region. Francis X. Taylor, the Department of State’s coordinator for counterterrorism, told Congress on October 10, 2001, that the TBA has “...the longstanding presence of Islamic extremist organizations, primarily Hizballah, and, to a lesser extent, the Sunni extremist groups, such as the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egyptian Islamic Group) and Hamas.”40 Taylor noted that the activities of these organizations include fund-raising and proselytizing among the zone’s Middle Eastern population, as well as document forging, money laundering, contraband
37 “Al-Qaeda and Argentina,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, October 26, 2001; Ed Blanche, “Al-Qaeda Link to BuenosAires Bombings Emerges; Phone Call to Embassy in Riyadh Opens Can of Worms,” The Daily Star [Beirut; Internet version-www], October 29, 2001, an transcribed by FBIS Document ID: GMP20011030000033, “Al-Qa'ida Link to Argentine Bombings Seen; Mughniyah ‘Ordered out of Iran’,” October 29, 2001. 38 Raul Kollmann, “Report on Interview with an Unidentified ‘Government Spokesman,’” Pagina/12 [Buenos Aires; Internet version-www], January 19, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Responsibility for Argentine-Jewish Center Bombing Attributed to Iran,” January 19, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030119000009. 39 ABC Color [Internet version-www], June 9, 2003, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20030609000051, “Paraguay: Argentine Courts Link Barakat to Iranian Leaders,” June 9, 200340Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay; Black Market Border Hub Called Key Finance Center for Middle East Extremists,” Washington Post, October 13, 2001, A21.
smuggling, and weapons and drug trafficking. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apparently shares that assessment. In the same hearing, a U.S. Congressman pointed out that “Open-source reporting indicates that the FBI claims that Islamic extremist cells linked with Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda are operating in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador.”41 Mark Davidson, spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Asunción, affirmed on May 22, 2002, that the TBA is indisputably an area from which Islamic terrorist groups are financed by means of
money derived from illicit activities, but he, like Taylor, omitted mention of al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda reportedly has had an interest and a presence in the TBA since at least the mid-1990s. Osama bin Laden reportedly visited Foz do Iguaçu in 1995 (the specific month is unclear), according to Veja, a leading Brazilian newsweekly. Veja, citing an anonymous high official of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência—Abin), reported that a 28minute videotape shows bin Laden participating in meetings at a mosque in the area during his visit.42 Al Qaeda’s Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is also believed to have visited the TBA that December.43 Mohammed also reportedly returned to the Foz do Iguaçu area in 1998.44
There have been indications that terrorist elements with possible al Qaeda connections
have used mosques in the TBA for plotting or recruitment purposes. CNN reported that two
41 “Prepared Statement of Representative Cass Ballenger, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
U.S. House of Representatives.” Transcript of House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing, October 10, 2001. Center for International Policy, Columbia Project. [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/101001.htm]42 “Bin Laden Reportedly Spent Time in Brazil in '95,” Washington Post, March 18, 2003, A24; “Bin Laden esteve em Foz do Iguaçu e até deu palestra em mesquita [Bin Laden Was in Foz do Iguaçu and Even Gave A Lecture in A Mosque], O Estado de São Paulo, March 16, 2003. [Estadao.com: http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/03/16/int026.html] ; and Policarpo Junior, “Ele esteve no Brasil” [He Was in Brazil], Veja on-line, no. 1,794, March 19, 2003. [http://veja.abril.com.br/190303/p_058.html] 43 Reuters, “Bin Laden Reportedly Spent Time in Brazil in ’95,” Washington Post, March 18, 2003, A24; and O Estado de São Paulo [Internet version-www], March 9, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohamed's Passage Through Brazil Reported,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20030308000052, March 9, 2003; and A Gazeta do Iguaçu, March 10, 2003, 2, as translated by FBIS, Document ID: LAP20030311000123 “Brazilian Police: Khalid Shaykh Visit to Tri-border in 1995 Unconfirmed,” March 10, 2003. 44 Kevin G. Hall, “Accused al-Qaida Terrorist Spent time in Brazil, Police Say,” Knight Ridder Tribune News Service [Washington], March 13, 2003, 1.
mosques in Foz do Iguaçu and one in Ciudad del Este are reportedly suspected by international and regional intelligence sources of involvement in terrorist activity and serving as revolving doors for Islamic extremists.45 Argentine intelligence documents show links between the mosques and various terror groups, including Hizballah and Egypt's al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad.46 Argentine security forces have identified Sheik Mounir Fadel, spiritual leader of Ciudad del Este's main mosque, as a senior Hizballah member.47
By mid-1999, the SIDE (Secretariat for State Intelligence) was investigating Islamic extremist groups in the TBA that allegedly were operating under the orders of Osama bin Laden.48 The SIDE investigation resulted from a shared belief that Iran was no longer the only concern in regard to terrorist cells operating in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu. That conviction was based on information from the SIDE’s own files and from other intelligence services, which reported that bin Laden’s al Qaeda had gained ground in the TBA as a result of Iran’s partial withdrawal from the important Arab community in the area, thanks to Iranian President Mohamed Khatami.49
In 1999 SIDE agents began taping telephone calls made by Islamic extremists in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu to the Middle East and secretly filming meetings of the Shi'ite and minority Sunni groups who were part of the huge Moslem population in the TBA.50 As a result of this surveillance, the SIDE reported that al Qaeda agents had been identified in the TBA.51 Coordinated police operations conducted in the three TBA cities on December 22, 1999, reportedly thwarted a plot by TBA-based terrorists under the control of Osama bin Laden and Hizballah leader Imad Mouniagh to stage simultaneous attacks on Jewish targets in Ciudad del Este, Buenos Aires, and Ottawa, Canada, in an attempt to undermine the Middle East peace
45 Harris Whitbeck and Ingrid Arneson, “Sources: Terrorists Find Haven in South America,” CNN, November 7, 2001. [http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/11/07/inv.terror.south/index.html]46 Whitbeck and Arneson. 47 Peter Hudson , “There Are No Terrorists Here,” Newsweek, November 19, 2001. 48 Daniel Santoro, Clarín [Buenos Aires; an Independent, tabloid-format daily; highest-circulation newspaper,Internet version], July 18, 1999, as translated for FBIS, “Bin Laden's Followers in Triborder Area Probed,” July 19, 1999 (FBIS, WA1907180899). 49 Santoro, Clarín. 50Daniel Santoro, Clarín, September 16, 2001, 8-9, as translated for FBIS, “Argentine Intelligence Services' 1999 Report on Usamah Bin-Ladin's Agents in Triborder Area Viewed,” September 16, 2001 (FBISLAP20010916000021). 51 Mario Daniel Montoya, “War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay’s Triple Border,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, No. 12, December 2001, 12; and Daniel Santoro, Clarín, September 16, 2001, 8-9, as translated for FBIS, “Argentine Intelligence Services' 1999 Report on Usamah Bin-Ladin's Agents in Triborder Area Viewed,” September 16, 2001 (FBIS LAP20010916000021).
process.52 Individuals rounded up but later released included operatives of Hamas and Hizballah, as well as a suspected Iranian intelligence agent. In order to escape the SIDE investigation, the top alleged Hizballah and al Qaeda agents involved—Hezballah’s Assad Ahmad Barakat and the Muslim Brotherhood’s or Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s Mohamed Ali Aboul-Ezz Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman—reportedly left Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, but both were later arrested.53
The SIDE also reported a significant shift in the Muslim terrorist groups in the TBA after 1999.54 Pro-Iranian Shi’ite terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese Hizballah faction, who had normally worked separately from the orthodox Sunnites and followed instructions from Iran, had begun to cooperate and maintain contact.55 This shift appeared to follow factional infighting among moderate and radical Hizballah adherents in the TBA and perhaps suggested that al Qaeda had taken advantage of the tensions to recruit new acolytes.56 As some of the influence of the Iranians and Hizballah on the various Islamic groups in the TBA faded, the smaller groups, according to the SIDE, began supporting bin Laden by collecting funds, indoctrinating others, giving refuge to fugitives, and offering basic military training, such as how to build homemade bombs.57 The SIDE’s reports reportedly were received with skepticism by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israel’s Mossad.58
One of the smaller Shi’ite extremist groups operating in the TBA is Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah, or Islamic Resistance. The shadowy Al-Muqawamah appears to be a principal pro-Iran section of Hizballah whose members live normal lives in sleeper cells but become
52 Special Correspondents Vladimir Jara Vera and Dany Ortiz, ABC Color [Asunción; Internet version; major daily, opposed to the González Macchi administration; owner Aldo Zuccolillo is an influential Oviedo Supporter of former General Oviedo], December 23, 1999, as translated for FBIS, “Police Conduct Operation to Intimidate Islamic Extremists,” FBIS ID: FTS19991223001521, December 23, 1999. 53 Jara Vera and Dany Ortiz, ABC Color. 54 Tânia Monteiro, DPA, EFE, and France Presse, “Tríplice fronteira tinha agentes sauditas, diz "Clarín" [TriBorder has Saudi agents, Clarín says], Estadão Website, September 17, 2001. 55Daniel Santoro, Clarín [Internet version], July 18, 1999, as translated for FBIS, “Bin Laden's Followers inTriborder Area Probed,” July 19, 1999 (FBIS, WA1907180899). 56 Comp. A. William Samii, “Competition Among South American Hizballah Resumes,” Iran Report [RFE/RL], July 17, 2000, 3, No. 27, citing ABC Color, July 12, 2000; Iran Report [RFE/RL], January 10, 2000; and“Competition Among South American Hizballah,” RFE/RL, February 6, 2002, translating ABC Color, January 5,2002; URL: http://www.rferl.org/iran-report/2000/01/2-100100.html. 57 Daniel Santoro, Clarín, September 16, 2001, 8-9, as translated for FBIS, “Argentine Intelligence Services' 1999Report on Usamah Bin-Ladin's Agents in Triborder Area Viewed,” September 16, 2001 (FBISLAP20010916000021). 58 Santoro.
combatants when mobilized.59 In early 2000, Brazilian and Paraguayan experts obtained photographs of Arab extremists taken at the Al-Mukawama training camp (see Fayad, Sobhi Mahmoud, Appendix), possibly located at a farm outside Foz do Iguaçu.60 The men in the photos included several businessmen. They were photographed beside an Iranian flag and a flag from al-Muqawamah, a shadowy pro-Iran wing of Hizballah. Another photograph is said to show a Hizballah leader reading a letter from Imad Mounigh, presumably wanted Hizballah activist Imad Mughniyah.61 Argentine intelligence officials reportedly believe that Hizballah runs weekend training camps on farms in the remote jungle terrain near Foz do Iguaçu, where young adults are recruited and given weapons training and children are indoctrinated in Hizballah
ideology.62
In late 2000, at least one known TBA-based terrorist
was involved in a plot to attack the U.S. and Israeli embassies
in Asunción along with 30 other Islamic terrorists, who would
carry out diversionary attacks elsewhere in the city in order to
distract security forces.63 On November 28, 2000, Paraguayan
authorities arrested Salah Abdul Karim Yassine, a Palestinian
and suspected Hamas explosives expert who had entered the
country using false documents and was living in Ciudad del
Este.64 Yassine was being investigated for his suspected
affiliation with an Egyptian terrorist organization.65 It was under arrest in Uruguay found that he was involved in the plot, and he was sentenced Source: Cromos [Bogotá],
September 24, 2001
59 Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace? Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army Wall College, August 2002. [http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:l1y-v-VhCqYJ:www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/hizbala/hizbala.pdf+al-Muqawamah&hl=en&ie=UTF-8]60 ABC Color [Internet version-www], January 16, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Court Investigates Hizballah Base Photos” (FBIS, LAP20020116000091). 61 London Bureau Roundup of Terrorism Issues/Developments in the Mideast/Islamic World and the Aegean derived from sources monitored by FBIS, “Latin America: Islamic Fundamentalists in Colombia, Paraguay,” January 10, 2002 (FBIS GMP20020109000400). 62 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” The New Yorker, 79, No. 32, October 28, 2002.63 Bartolomé, 11, citing “Un presunto jefe de grupo terrorista árabe fue detenido” [A presumed head of an Arabterrorist group was detained], Noticias, November 30, 2000.64 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2001; Nelson FredyPadilla, “Los hombres de Osama bin Laden en Colombia” [The Men of Osama bin Laden in Colombia] Cromos, No. 4, 364, September 24, 2001; and Pedro Doria, “Terrorismo aqui no lado” (Terrorism Here Next Door),www.No.com.br, November 30, 2000. 65 Bartolomé, 11.
to a four-year prison term on charges of possessing false documents and entering the country illegally.
Despite increased surveillance by security forces in the region, the TBA is probably still used by Islamic terrorist groups as a fund-raising center and as a base for plotting, coordinating, or otherwise supporting terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in the Americas. Al Qaeda operatives in the TBA reportedly were connected to a foiled al Qaeda plot to simultaneously attack the U.S. embassies in Montevideo, Uruguay, and Quito, Ecuador, in April 2001.66 On October 10, 2001, a group of ten terrorists identified as belonging to a Lebanese
Hizballah cell was reportedly caught in Mexico City on its way to assassinate President Vicente Fox and carry out a terrorist attack in the Mexican Senate.67 The terrorists reportedly reached Mexico from the TBA, following a training session. The description of one of the instructors resembled Imad Mughniyah, who, working from his bases in Iran and Hizballahcontrolled areas of Lebanon, reportedly directs the activities of Islamic terrorists in South America, including the TBA, in coordination with al Qaeda.68
U.S. authorities expressed concern in late 2001 over the possibility that lax immigration procedures in various Latin American countries have allowed terrorist “sleepers” to adopt new identities and to infiltrate into the United
66 Jose Meirelles Passos, "The Shadow of Bin Ladin in Latin America,” O Globo [Rio de Janeiro; Internet versionwww], October 29, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Daily Notes US Views Triborder as Al-Qa'idah Center for L.A.,” October 29, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011029000036). 67 DEBKAfile Exclusive, “New Direction in Search for Anthrax Culprit” [Jerusalem; DEBKAfile www], November 11, 2001, as transcribed by FBIS Document ID: MP20011111000147, “DEBKA Sources Say Iraqi Nuclear Devices Ready for Arming, View Bin Ladin Threat,” November 11, 2001. 68 Mike Boettcher, “South America’s ‘Tri-border’ Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, November 8, 2002, citing “coalition intelligence sources.” [http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror.triborder/] For discussions of al Qaeda-Hizballah links, see Yael Shahar, ICT Researcher, “Al-Qa'ida Links to Iranian Security Services,” Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism [Tel Aviv; Internet version-www], January 20, 2003; and Lenny Ben-David, “Sunni and Shiite Terrorist Networks: Competition or Collusion?” Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs [Jerusalem; Internet version-www], December 18, 2002, as transcribed by FBIS Document ID: GMP20021225000066, “Israeli Expert Says International Terror Breaches Secular-Religious Divide,” December 18, 2002.
States, especially from Argentina. By 2001, investigators had come to believe that numerous Islamic terrorist “sleeper cells” had been established in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, as well as Uruguay’s Chuy since the 1990s.69 Based on an examination of telephone records, Argentine investigators in 2002 found “evidence of coordination between the TBA and sleeper cells in Buenos Aires.” Two main centers of activity were cited: the principal mosque in Foz do Iguaçu and a travel agency there.70
Paraguay’s Vice Interior Minister Mario Agustin Sapriza affirmed on May 3, 2001, that the TBA serves as a base of operations for dormant Islamic extremist cells linked to international terrorism.71 Sapriza explained that Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations use this region to plan their actions, to obtain supplies, and to live for a certain period of time before launching new attacks in other countries.
Argentina and Brazil have been less forthcoming in acknowledging the existence of sleeper cells in the TBA. Brazil’s Justice Minister José Gregori said in October 2001 that he had no “conclusive information” on al Qaeda cells in Brazil.72 However, Judge Walter Fanganiello Maierovitch, a money-laundering expert affiliated with the Giovanni Falconi Brazilian Criminal Sciences Institute, expressed an opposite viewpoint regarding al Qaeda in making the following points in a September 2001 O Globo interview:73
. al Qaeda is establishing a base in the Arab community near Ciudad del Este.
. bin Laden is attempting to establish a presence in the TBA because al Qaeda’s terrorist activities are linked with the trafficking of arms, drugs, and uranium, as well as money laundering, in association with the Russian and Chinese mafias.
. bin Laden’s goal is to use religious entities as fronts for training terrorists and provide a hiding place for Islamic fugitives.
69 Bartolomé, 10, citing “Divergencias nas relações Brasília-Washington” (Differences in relations between Brasilia and Washington], Zero Hora, September 19, 2001; and La Nación [Buenos Aires], October 3, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “National Border Guard Commander: Tri-Border Area Hotbed of Sleeper Cells,” October 3, 2001, FBIS LAP20011003000015. 70 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32. 71 ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 4, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Vice Interior Minister Confirms Presence of ‘Dormant Islamic Terrorist Cells’,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20010505000002. 72 José Meirelles Passos, "The Shadow of Bin Ladin in Latin America,” O Globo [Internet version-www], October 29, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Daily Notes US Views Triborder as Al-Qa'idah Center for L.A.,” October 29, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011029000036). 73Germano Oliveira, O Globo, September 19, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil’s Former Drug Czar: Bin-Ladin Establishing Al-Qa’idah Cell on Triborder,” September 19, 2001 (FBIS Document ID: LAP200109119000051).
bin Laden is recruiting members of the Hizballah group that bombed the Jewish community center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires in 1994. In early 2002, further suggesting al Qaeda’s presence in the TBA, the Paraguayan press reported that al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups had established training camps and were
talking of holding a secret terrorist summit meeting in the TBA.74 In early February, Paraguayan and foreign security forces as well as Brazilian, Argentine, Israeli, and U.S. agents searched the TBA, especially Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, for five Afghan citizens who allegedly belong to the Taliban and are linked to al Qaeda, either as supporters or members.75 Each of the individuals allegedly was carrying three or four sets of different identity documents. Adding to concerns that Osama bin Laden's operatives were among those operating in the TBA, a map of the TBA was recovered from an al Qaeda safehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2002.76
One individual suspected of being linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda is Egyptian citizen Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, who was arrested on April 15, 2002, in Foz do Iguaçu, where he had been
74 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 3275ABC Color Website, February 5, 2002, as cited by “International Security Forces Search for Five Afghan Fugitives in Paraguay,” BBC Monitoring Service [UK], February 5, 2002. 76 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32
living for seven years.77 He was arrested under charges filed by the Egyptian government that he is a member of a terrorist faction, namely Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, that carried out deadly attacks in several countries. Soliman earlier had been arrested in Foz do Iguaçu in 1999 on charges of dealing in contraband merchandise.78
In April 2002, Paraguayan reporters linked Assad Ahmad Barakat to Osama bin Laden by pointing out that Barakat was the owner of the Mondial (World) Engineering and Construction company, with offices in Ciudad del Este and Beirut. This company was suspected of having made contributions to al Qaeda, using money obtained from real estate fraud.79 Barakat was allegedly using the company to collect funds for al Qaeda by selling apartments in Beirut.80 For example, unidentified intelligence sources cited an authorization by Barakat, dated February 14, 2002, in Foz do Iguaçu ordering the transfer of an apartment for US$120,000 in Lebanon.81 Other unspecified front businesses created by Barakat are reportedly designed to channel funds to Osama bin Laden, under the pretext of charitable contributions to orphanages. Journalist Sebastian Junger, citing unidentified Argentine intelligence sources, reported in late 2000 that Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the al Qaeda leader who was arrested in Pakistan in 2002, “has known, confirmed contacts with a Lebanese businessman working in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.”82 Whether Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who is in U.S. custody, has identified this businessman as Assad Ahmad Barakat is not known.
In July 2002, the Paraguayan police arrested a pair of Lebanese men, Ali Nizar Darhoug, owner of two shops in Ciudad del Este, and his nephew, Muhammad Daoud Yassine, who were said to be raising funds for al Qaeda. Ali Nizar Darhoug’s name was reportedly found in an address book belonging to Abu Zubaydah, one of the highest-ranking al Qaeda officials to be
77 Mauri Konig, “Egípcio preso em Foz do Iguaçu” [Egyptian Arrested in Foz do Iguaçu], O Estado de São Paulo, April 16, 2002 [http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2002/04/16/int002.html]; and Miriam Karam, São PauloValor [financial daily, published jointly by the Folha and Globo media conglomerates; Internet version-www], May20, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Federal Police Denies Presence of Terrorist Cells in Foz do Iguaçu,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20020520000040. 78 AJB, “Terrorismo: Egípcio é capturado pela PF” [Terrorism: Egyptian Is Captured by PF], Correiro Braziliense[Brasília], April 16, 2002. [http://www2.correioweb.com.br/cw/EDICAO_20020416/pri_ult_160402_259.htm] 79 Bartolomé, 16, citing “Triple frontera: Empresa sería de Al-Qaeda” [Triborder: Company is linked to al Qaeda], Ámbito Financiero, April 30, 2002, 14. 80 “Barakat Continues To Collect For Hizballah,” Última Hora [Asunción], May 1, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20020501000022, “Highlights: Paraguay Press,” May 1, 2002. 81 “Barakat Continues To Collect For Hizballah,” Última Hora [Asunción], May 1, 2002. 82 Sebastian Junger, “Terrorism's New Geography,” Vanity Fair, No. 508, December 2002, 196.
captured by the United States.83 Darhoug was wiring as much as US$80,000 each month to banks in the United States, the Middle East, and Europe.84
A spike in reports of al Qaeda in the TBA took place in October 2002. Argentina bolstered security measures in the region after several reports from Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad, warned of the presence of al Qaeda and Hizballah cells in Ciudad del Este.85 In late October 2002, Argentine intelligence informed the United States of an al Qaeda-Hizballah meeting that was held in the TBA. A CNN report of November 8, citing “coalition intelligence
sources,” also disclosed that a “terrorist summit to plan attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in the Western hemisphere” had taken place in Ciudad del Este and the surrounding area, and that the terrorists attending the meetings were representatives of Hizballah and organizations sympathetic to the al Qaeda network.86 CNN’s Middle East intelligence sources also indicated a new terrorist effort aimed at U.S. and Israeli interests and coordinated by Imad Mughniyah. CNN reported that Mughniyah, working from his bases in Iran and Hizballahcontrolled areas of Lebanon, was directing the activities of terrorists in South America and planning to hit U.S. and Israeli targets if the United States attacked Iraq, or if Israel was drawn into the conflict. The Paraguayan government denied the CNN report.87 Argentine intelligence sources reportedly also rejected the CNN report that the meeting was held in the TBA, claiming instead that it was held in another Latin American location.88
83 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” The New Yorker, 79, No. 32, October 28, 2002.84 Goldberg; and Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32 85 Clarín [Buenos Aires; Internet version-www], October 19, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021019000022, “Argentina: Newspapers Publish Contradictory Reports On Possible Attacks In Tri-BorderArea,” October 19, 2002. 86 Mike Boettcher, with Ingrid Arnesen, “South America's 'Tri-border' Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, November 8, 2002. [http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror.triborder/] 87 “Cabinet Members Refute TV Report and Deny Existence of Terrorist Activities,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], November 9, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights: Brazil - Paraguay Triborder Press 4-15 Nov 02,” November21, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021121000006. 88 La Nación [Buenos Aires], November 8, 2002, 3, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021108000038, “Argentine Intelligence Services Dismiss Report on Terrorist Powwow as Inaccurate,” November 8, 2002.
The potential for TBA-based terrorists acquiring powerful explosives was illustrated by an incident reported on June 4, 2003, when Alto Paraná Police recovered all nine boxes of dynamite stolen from a quarry in Hernandarias, a town neighboring Ciudad del Este, over the previous weekend. Police observed members of a well-known gang formed by Brazilian and Paraguayan criminals hanging around the neighborhood where four individuals were arrested. Given the destructive potential of the material, which was powerful enough to destroy the Friendship Bridge, police believed that the explosives could have been sold to terrorists.89
Terrorist Fund-Raising in the TBA
Narcotics Trafficking
A topic in itself, narcotics trafficking in the TBA, as it relates to the Lebanese Mafia, can only be briefly summarized here. It is clearly a major activity of the Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates operating in the region. With lax border controls and more than 100 hidden airstrips in the region, the TBA has long been popular with contraband smugglers, gunrunners, and drug traffickers. A large number of small airplanes take off from clandestine airstrips in Paraguayan territory and enter Brazilian air space. Many of them also cross Argentina’s Misiones Province. The TBA is reportedly a conduit for the smuggling of some drugs through Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which serve as transit countries for Andean cocaine (see Fig. 2, Drug-Trafficking Routes in the Tri-Border Area (TBA), Appendix).90 One route on the Bolivia-Paraguay-Brazil corridor goes through Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu to the ports of Paranaguá, Santos, and Rio de Janeiro on the Atlantic coast of Brazil.91
Despite the significant smuggling activity in the region, the TBA’s importance as a drug-smuggling conduit may have declined in recent years as a result of increased surveillance by security forces of the three TBA countries. The great majority of the cocaine smuggled out of Paraguay leaves the country through border towns to the north of the TBA (Pedro Juan Caballero
89 “Police Recover Explosives, Robbers Arrested,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], June 4, 2003, as translated byFBIS Document ID: LAP20030604000111, Tri-Border Media Highlights, June 4, 2003. 90 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report –2002. Washington: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2003. [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17952pf.htm] Paraguay is a transit country for between 40 and 60metric tons of Colombian, Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine that traverses its territory destined for Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Europe, and Africa, according to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report –2002. [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17944.htm] 91 “Brasil,” http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_4_BRESIL.html.
and Capitán Bado) and to the south of the TBA (Posadas). Apparently for this reason, drug-related border arrests at Puerto Iguazú have declined since 2000.92 Capitán Bado is a center for the production of marijuana and distribution of cocaine. The marijuana is transported to Brazil by land; most of the cocaine is flown in clandestine flights aboard small aircraft.93 Posadas is just across the Río Paraná from Encarnación, which has a large Arab population and is known as a main contraband center.
Despite the TBA’s relatively limited role as a drug-smuggling conduit, there is no question that narcotics trafficking remains a major activity in the region, and the Hizballah network and the Lebanese Mafia in general are heavily involved in it. Lebanese citizen Ali Assi was captured at Beirut’s airport with a 10-kilo shipment of cocaine in his two suitcases in May 2002. Assi had recently taken charge of running a coffee shop in the Islamic Welfare Center in
Ciudad del Este.94 Assi is the father-in-law of Ali Hassan
Abdallah (also known as Ali Asan Abadia and “Alito”), who
was, together with Assad Barakat, one of the principal
coordinators of a Hizballah financial network in the TBA. Ali
Hassan Abdallah had also been a trade partner in Ciudad del Este
of convicted Hizballah figure Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad.95 In May
2002, Ali Hassan Abdallah was considered a fugitive. By early
March 2003, he had been expelled from Angola and was
believed to be ordering electronic funds transfers (EFTs) to
Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East through his nephew,
Rayan Hussein Abdallah, in Ciudad del Este.96
92 Mendel, citing Gendarmería National, Escuadrón 13 'Iguazú': Estadísticas del funcionamiento del escuadrón 13 'Iguazu'. Puerto de Iguazú, Argentina: Gendarmería National, September 2001. 93 Clarinha Glock, “Brazil-Paraguay: A Full Plate for Journalists,” Inter American Press Association, July 19, 2001. [http://www.impunidad.com/atrisk/brasil_paraguay7_19_01E.html] 94 ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 28, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Daily Reports More Evidence of Barakat's Contributions to Hizballah,” May 28, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020528000073. 95 Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este; Internet version-www], May 23, 2002, “Paraguay: Triborder Daily Says US Has Not Shown Evidence Against Alleged Terrorist,” May 23, 2002, Document ID: LAP20020523000084; and “Paraguay: Lebanese Merchant Sought in Paraguay Expelled from Angola,” BBC Monitoring Americas – Political [London], March 14, 2003, citing ABC Color Website, March 14, 2003. 96 ABC Color [Internet version-www], March 14, 2003, citing "high-ranking" local police intelligence sources, in collaboration with their counterparts in Lebanon and the TBA, as translated by FBIS, “Paraguay Press Highlights,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20030314000106, March 14, 2003; and ABC Color, March 13, 2003, as translated by FBIS LAP20030313000120, “Angola Ousts Lebanese Fugitive Linked to Hizballah From Paraguay,” March 13, 2003.
Hizballah and the Lebanese Mafia continue to use Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este as transit points for smuggling Colombian cocaine. The arrest of an alleged Lebanese Mafia ringleader in São Paulo in January 2003 exposed an operation that was moving between 400 and 1,000 kilos of Colombian cocaine per month via Foz do Iguaçu, where it was then shipped to São Paulo.97 A prominent Lebanese businessman, Bassam Naboulsi, who resides in the TBA and is a cousin of Assad Ahmad Barakat, was arrested on January 29, 2003, in São Paulo, Brazil. Bassam Naboulsi was accused of ties with a group of drug traffickers, one of whose members, also residing in Ciudad del Este, was arrested in Beirut the week before.98 Bassam Naboulsi’s brother, Hassan Naboulsi, owns Hassan Internacional, located in Ciudad del Este’s Page shopping gallery. The operation led to the arrest of 14 men belonging to what the PF (Federal Police) refers to as the “Barakat clan,” among them Akram Farhat, who is the brother-in-law of well-known Ciudad del Este businessman Samir Jebai. PF authorities believe that this group, led by Assad Barakat from within the Brasília prison, could be shipping cocaine to Middle Eastern and European markets.
On May 10, 2003, Hassan Abdallah Dayoub, a Lebanese merchant who lives in Ciudad del Este, was arrested at Asunción’s Silvio Pettirossi Airport, while in possession of 2.3 kilos of cocaine hidden in an electric piano. High-ranking police sources connected with the investigation of Dayoub reportedly believe that his arrest constitutes overwhelming proof that Barakat’s Hizballah clan has a “wing of narcotraffickers.”99 This is because Dayoub is a cousin of Barakat. Investigators believe that Barakat himself hired Dayoub as a “mule” to market the drug in Damascus, Syria. Once in the Argentine capital, Dayoub intended to transfer to an Iberia flight to Madrid, whence he would proceed on to his final destination of Damascus.

Other Fund-Raising Activities
In addition to the estimated US$60 to US$100 million per year that it receives from Iran, Hizballah reportedly has also relied extensively on funding from the Shi'ite Lebanese Diaspora in
97 Marcelo Godoy, O Estado de São Paulo [Internet Version-www], January 24, 2003, as translated by FBIS, Document ID: LAP20030124000070, “Brazil: Lebanese Mafia Members in São Paulo Arrested, Drugs Seized,” January 24, 2003. 98 “Brazilian Police Arrest Lebanese Citizen,” ABC Color [Internet version-www], January 30, 2003, as translatedfor FBIS, January 30, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030130000073. 99 ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 12, 2003, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20030512000065, “Paraguayan Police Make Arrest , Seize Cocaine From Tri-border Hizballah Head's Cousin,” May 12, 2003.
West Africa, the United States, and most importantly the TBA.100 Islamic money laundering in the TBA is concealed by the common practice of the local Arab community of remitting funds to relatives in the Middle East. Some of these remittances are suspected of being directed to Arab terrorist organizations, particularly Hizballah.101 In late 2002, Argentine officials linked Lebanese terrorists in the TBA with money laundering, counterfeiting of U.S. dollars, and other illicit financial activities. As evidence, they cited “thousands of U.S. dollars bearing stamps from Lebanese currency exchange banks, tens of thousands of dollars in phony bills, and receipts from wire transfers made between the tri-border area and the Middle East.”102
Argentina’s Ramón Mestre, director of the Permanent Work Group (Grupo de Trabajo Permanente—GTP), founded to establish a coordinated common policy against terrorism in the countries that make up Mercosur (Common Market of the South), said in early December 2001 that the TBA had given “logistical support to terrorist organizations by providing money to groups that operate in other parts of the world.” He said that activities such as the illegal traffic of immigrants and drug trafficking in the region “are elements that are in some way linked to terrorism….”103
Brazilian authorities have estimated that more than US$6 billion a year in illegal funds is laundered in the TBA. Every evening, a dozen armored trucks loaded with laundered money leave Ciudad del Este for Foz do Iguaçu, the Brazilian town on the opposite side of the border. Paraguay’s Finance Ministry issued an order in January 2003 to suspend sending of dollars abroad, but a reporter found that it was apparently not being applied to armored vans or trucks leaving the TBA. One van known to be was carrying reais and dollars was observed crossing the Friendship Bridge into Brazil on January 20, 2003.104
During the 1999-2001 period, Islamic extremist groups, specifically Hizballah and Hamas, received a total of between US$50 million and US$500 million from Arab residents of
100 Blanca Madani, “Hezbollah's Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin [amonthly publication of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon], 4, No. 1, January 2002.101 Bartolomé, 9.102 Mike Boettcher, with Ingrid Arnesen, “South America's 'Tri-border' Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, November 8, 2002. [http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror.triborder/] 103 El País [Montevideo], December 1, 2001, translated in “Uruguay Press Highlights,” December 3, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011203000074). 104 “Paraguay: Lack of Control System on Border with Brazil Allows Currency Flight,” BBC Monitoring Americas
– Political [London], January 23, 2003, 1, citing ABC Color Website, January 22, 2003.
Foz do Iguaçu through Paraguayan financial institutions.105 An investigation begun in September 2001 also determined that a group of 42 Arabs in Ciudad del Este remitted abroad, mostly to Lebanon, approximately US$50 million, apparently during the 1997-2001 period. It is believed that these funds were derived from arms trafficking and other illicit activities.106
Argentine police and regional security organizations in general have described the Page shopping center, located in Ciudad del Este, as the regional command post for Hizballah. They have also linked Barakat to a Brazilian mosque that the police also described as a central Hizballah meeting place.107 On September 12, 2001, a Paraguayan SWAT team raided Assad Ahmad Barakat’s closet-sized shop, Casa Apollo, in this arcade. Barakat, who was away on business, escaped arrest. The police confiscated more than 60 hours of videotapes and CD-ROMs that show military marches and attacks with explosives in various parts of the world.108 The confiscated material also included professional training courses for suicide bombers. The SWAT team also seized boxes containing financial statements totaling US$250,000 in monthly transfers to the Middle East and descriptions of at least 30 recent attacks in Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories.109 The four principal individuals involved in the money remittance operations that were uncovered in September 2001 were Assad Ahmad Barakat and three of his principal Hizballah lieutenants in the Casa Apollo shop—Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, Mazen Ali Saleh, and Salhed Mahmoud Fayad (Sobhi’s brother).110 Paraguayan prosecutor Carlos Cálcena noted that Barakat and Saleh sent money to international terrorist bank accounts in various countries. Specifically, they sent half a million dollars to Canada, Chile, and the United States (New York), and banks drafts of US$524,000 to Lebanon. Paraguayan Police found a letter from the Hizballah commander congratulating Barakat for financing activities in the Middle East.111
105 Roberto Cosso, “Extremistas receberam US$50 mi de Foz do Iguaçu” (Extremists Received US$50 million fromFoz do Iguaçu), Folha de S. Paulo, December 3, 2001. 106 Bartolomé, 9, citing “Arabes envían US$50 milliones al exterior” [Arabs Send US$50 Million Abroad], October 3, 2001. 107 Jose de Cordoba, “Is Jungle Junction a Terrorist Hideaway?—In Nexus of Latin Nations Is Casbah...and More,Say the Local Police,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2001, A10. 108 José Maschio, “Paraguayan Court Evidence Cited on Hizballah Link at Triborder,” Folha de São Paulo [Internetversion-www], November 26, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011126000074); and Stan Lehman, “Wanted by Paraguay, Hezbollah Supporter Is Free in Brazilian Town Across the Border,” AP, December 12, 2001. 109 Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay; Black Market Border Hub Called Key Finance Center for Middle East Extremists,” Washington Post, October 13, 2001, A21.110 Godoy, O Estado de São Paulo. 111 Ricardo Galhardo Enviado, “Paraguai pede a prisão de libanês no Brasil” (Paraguay Sentences a Lebanese inBrazil to Prison), O Globo, November 6, 2001.
Argentine police also claimed that Barakat was involved in distributing US$60 million in counterfeit U.S. dollars printed in Colombia.112
On October 2, 2001, Mazen Ali Saleh and Salhed Mahmoud Fayad, both in their 20s, were arrested in Ciudad del Este, in possession of documents indicating regular remittances of between US$25,000 and US$50,000 to suspected Muslim radicals. Both were linked to Assad
113
Ahmad Barakat. The following day, Paraguayan police raided Casa Apollo for the second time in three weeks and this time arrested Barakat. Nevertheless, he escaped from prison and fled to Brazil, where, as a Brazilian citizen, he was not considered to be a security threat, at least until June 22, 2002, when he was arrested at his home in Foz do Iguaçu and imprisoned in Brasília. Barakat’s business and Hizballah partner, Salman Reda, who fled jail on the same day in October 2001 as Barakat, was charged in Argentina with transporting explosives used against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992.114
Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad was arrested in Ciudad del Este in late October 2001, after the prosecutor’s office found documents at Barakat’s shop indicating that Fayad had transferred large sums of money to banks in Lebanon and Canada.115 Brazilian security agencies claimed that the financial aid offered in 2000 by groups in the TBA to Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad, totaled US$261 million.116 Intelligence reports sent by Brazil to Paraguayan authorities between late 1999 and early 2000 reportedly mention three Hizballah leaders with whom Barakat allegedly met during trips to Lebanon that were at least annual.117
In late 2001, the Paraguayan intelligence services, which were collecting information on the activities of Lebanese citizens living in the TBA, reportedly found more evidence on how Barakat collected money for Hizballah. According to the evidence, he used blackmail and even
112 Cordoba, Wall Street Journal. 113 “Government Keeps Watchful Eye on Paraguay’s Arab Community,” October 13, 2001, EFE News Services (FBIS Rec. No. OEF2C4F9D99922F0). 114 Roberto Godoy, O Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo; Internet version-www], November 12, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Foreign Intelligence Agents Spying on Triborder Mosques,” November 12, 2001, Document ID: LAP20011112000016. 115 Kevin G. Hall, “Alleged Fund-Raiser for Hezbollah Arrested in Paraguay,” Night Ridder/Tribune News Service, November 1, 2002, K7344. 116 Riyadh Alam-al-Din, "Washington Begins the War on Hizballah in the Border Triangle," Al-Watan al-Arabi[Paris], December 21, 2001, 18-19, as translated for FBIS, “Report Says US Antiterror Campaign To Target Hizballah Network in S. America” (FBIS, GMP20011221000179). 117 Roberto Cosso, “Brazil: $50 Million Remitted to Terrorist Groups from Triborder Area,” Folha de São Paulo[Internet version-www], December 3, 2001, as translated by FBIS ID: LAP20011203000110, December 3, 2001.
death threats to force other Lebanese citizens to contribute to the Muslim fundamentalist group.118 In 2001 a prosecutor in Ciudad del Este named Basilisa Vázquez Román investigated a US$100 million transfer from two Ciudad del Este bank branches to Lebanon. Vázquez Román told Brazilian media that 10 Lebanese citizens who own businesses in Ciudad del Este but live in Foz do Iguaçu sent the money through banks in Miami and New York to Lebanese banks.119
In addition to activities such as money laundering and drug trafficking, Barakat collected money for Hizballah by selling huge quantities of pirated software smuggled into the TBA from Hong Kong. At the end of 2001, Paraguayan agents confiscated, in the Chaco (a semi-arid region of Bolivia and Paraguay), a shipment of 5,000 pirated Nintendo CDs valued at US$160,000. The seizure uncovered a new route for pirated video games used by Barakat: one part of the shipment arrived by sea and another by air in the Chilean port city of Iquique, where Barakat has several businesses. From there, the merchandise was brought by land to the lower Chaco region, and sent to Barakat’s shop, Casa Apollo, in Ciudad del Este.120
Another raid on October 31, 2002, in Ciudad del Este, found 4,600 falsified CDs and 80 copying machines capable of cloning up to 20,000 CDs per day in a clandestine lab operated by a Lebanese citizen known as “Samir.”121 The lab was located in the same building where Paraguayan authorities arrested Ali Khalil Mehri (see Mehri, Ali Khalil, Appendix) in his apartment in February 2000. Mehri was charged with piracy of computer programs and CDs and with selling millions of dollars of counterfeit software and funneling the proceeds to Hizballah.
118 “Barakat Resorted to Blackmail To Get Money,” Última Hora [Asunción, an independent, centrist daily, occasionally critical of the government, strongly anti-Oviedo], December 6, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Report: Media on Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financial Activity in Triborder Area,” December 10, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011210000096). 119 ABC Color, December 5, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “FBIS Report: Media on Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financial Activity in Triborder Area,” December 10, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011210000096).120 This incident is reported in ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 27, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay:Authorities Uncover New Route Used by Hizballah Leader Bakarat,” May 27, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020527000062. 121 The Ciudad del Este Chamber of Commerce [http://www.pamcham.com.py/mem-cde.html] lists Samir Ali Jaber as the owner of Centro de Pioner Import Export, an electronics business located in the Hijazi Shopping. Center [tel: (595) 61 512-321 511-085 502-212; Fax: (595) 512321; e-mail: pioneer@newnet.com.py. However, confirmation that the arrested “Samir” and Samir Ali Jaber are one and the same individual is lacking. Also see “Arab MerchantSells ‘Incinerated’ CD’s,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], February 6, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights From the Tri-Border Press for the Week 3-7 February,” February 11, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030211000124; and “Allegedly Incinerated CD's Sold in CDE,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], January 31, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Tri-Border Press for the Week of 23-31 January,” Tri-Border Press Highlights,February 4, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030204000134.
In 2002 and early 2003, Paraguayan authorities were investigating an East Indian merchant still at large, Rajkumar Naraindas Sabnani, who is allegedly in charge of raising funds for fundamentalist organizations and is linked to TBA extremists, including Barakat (see Sabnani, Rajkumar Naraindas, Appendix). According to regional security authorities, Sabnani serves as the middleman between the Hong Kong Mafia and Hizballah and its various companies in the TBA (see Figure 1, Contacts in the Page Gallery (C.D.E.—Ciudad del Este) and Others). Sabnani has directed huge profits from large-scale trafficking in pirated products from mainland China to Ciudad del Este to Assad Ahmad Barakat, under arrest in Brasília.122
Barakat’s fund-raising activities even reportedly included complicated swindling schemes
together with Ali Hussein Abdallah (“Ali Tawil”). The two would use a new modus operandi in which modest imports of goods from Asia were established over time.123 Once confidence was gradually gained with the importers, stings were done to the detriment of the wholesale merchants, who were cheated out of containers of merchandise valued at multimillion dollar sums.

TBA-Related Violence Against Local Officials
The governments of the three TBA countries and local TBA officials often emphasize that terrorism is not a problem in the region. For example, during the Third American Conference Against Terrorism, which met in El Salvador on January 22-24, 2003, representatives from Argentina and Brazil emphasized that no terrorist activity or dormant cells
122 ABC Color [Internet version-www], November 22, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: 'Strong Ties' Seen Between Hong Kong Mafia, Tri-border Based Hizballah,” November 22, 2002 (FBIS, LAP20021122000059). 123 “Barakat Held in Same Prison as “Beira Mar” Drug Smuggler,” ABC Color, June 24, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20020624000088, “Paraguay Press Highlights,” June 24, 2002.
had been detected in the TBA.124 TBA-based Islamic terrorist groups are not known to engage in acts of international terrorism within the TBA, which lacks high-profile targets other than foreign tourists visiting Iguaçu Falls.
However, unidentified groups have been carrying out unclaimed mafia- or Colombian-style attacks against local officials interfering in their fund-raising activities or against business people refusing to pay a “war tax,” which is used in financing terrorist operations in various parts of the world. Many businessmen in the TBA reportedly pay what amounts to a war tax to the armed Arab groups in the region.125 Others pay extortion to mafia groups. A number of businessmen who have refused to pay have been murdered. In one case, Armando Kassen, a Lebanese citizen who was president of the Paraguayan Arab Chamber of Commerce, fled to Beirut after being convicted of murdering a Ciudad del Este businessman, Ussein Mohamed Taiyen, who was president of the Ciudad del Este Chamber of Commerce.126 On November 2, 2001, Hizballah leaders in the TBA, reportedly concerned not only about losing members and influence to al Qaeda, but also about pressure being increasingly applied on them by security forces in the region, issued a fatwa authorizing the use of physical violence against traitors or enemies of the jihad.127
More recently, on October 21, 2002, local mafia organizations involved with smuggling and piracy activities in the TBA sent a clear message of their power beyond the region to Uruguayan Customs Director Víctor Lissidini.128 The TBA Mafia made telephone threats to Lissidini before he was shot at in his car by four armed gunmen on two motorcycles, in reprisal for the confiscation of a batch of counterfeit merchandise bound for Ciudad del Este.129 The constant seizure of pirate merchandise by authorities in Uruguay apparently provoked the attack.
124 Horacio Verbitsky, Pagina/12 [Buenos Aires; Internet version-www], January 26, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Argentine Bill To Empower Military To Fight Domestic, Foreign Terrorism Viewed,” January 26, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030126000047. 125 “Brazil: Report on Islamic Terrorism in Iguazu Triangle,” al-Watan al-'Arabi [Paris], January 9, 1998, 22-24, ascited by Estado de São Paulo. 126 “Mastermind of Taiyen's Murder Residing in Beirut,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], November 11, 2002, astranslated for FBIS, “Highlights: Brazil - Paraguay Triborder Press 4-15 Nov 02,” November 21, 2002, FBISDocument ID: LAP20021121000006. 127 Útima Hora, November 5, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “FBIS Report: Media on Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financial Activity in Triborder Area,” December 10, 2001 (FBIS LAP20011210000096). 128 “Ciudad Del Este Linked To Customs Director Attack,” Uruguay Radio Parque [Ciudad del Este], November 26, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil-Paraguay Triborder Press Highlights: November 25-29, 2002, December 3,2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021203000105. 129 “Justicia investiga atentado” [Justice Investigates Attack], El País [Montevideo], November 21, 2002; and“Atentado a la colombiana contra vehículo de Lissidini” [Colombian-Style Attack Against the Car of Lissidini], LaRepública en La Red, November 21, 2002, 12.
Prior to the attack on his car, mafia operating out of Ciudad del Este and involved with smuggling and pirating CDs and possibly financing Islamic terrorist groups made cellular phone threats to Lissidini and his subordinates. The callers specifically demanded that 2 million confiscated blank CDs belonging to the Piscis Import-Export Company located in Ciudad del Este be released.130 In another example, on February 24, 2003, two men riding a motorcycle in downtown Foz do Iguaçu shot and seriously wounded the president of the Foz do Iguaçu City Council.131 It was unclear whether the perpetrators were linked to a particular ethnic group.

Clandestine Terrorist Communications in the TBA
There have been open-source indications that the Islamic terrorist network in the TBA has maintained telephone communications with operatives worldwide, including in the United States. The FBI reportedly traced several telephone calls between the United States and at least one of the TBA cities immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Whether Islamic terrorists in the TBA played any role in the September 11 attacks in the United States is not known. Some al Qaeda operatives in the TBA may have known in advance about the September 11 attacks and discussed the plot in a mosque in Foz do Iguaçu. At least this is the contention of a Moroccan student, Gueddan Abdel Fatah, 27, who was arrested in early September 2001 in Brazil. Fatah maintains that he overheard Islamic extremists discussing the September 11 al Qaeda attacks against New York and Washington at a mosque in Foz do Iguaçu a week before the attacks took place. Brazilian press reports indicate that he contacted an attorney visiting his prison on September 5, 2001, and asked them to “urgently” deliver a letter to Brazilian, U.S., and Israeli authorities to warn them about an impending attack with “two explosions” that could take place in the United States.132
In 2001-02, Islamic terrorist groups reportedly were using the TBA as part of a clandestine communications network using a system known as PABX, which is designed to evade eavesdropping on telephone conversations by spy satellites by connecting various
130 “Threats to Lissidini Possibly Linked to Terrorism,” La República [Montevideo; unofficial newspaper of Uruguay's largest political party, the leftist Broad Front; Internet version-www), November 21, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021121000104, November 21, 2002. 131 “Foz City Council President Shot in Attack,” Itapiru Radio “Segunda Entrega de Noticias” newscast [Ciudad del Este], February 24, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Tri-Border Radio Highlights 24 Feb 03,” Radio Parque [Ciudad del Este], February 24, 2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030226000042. 132 John Daly, “The Suspects: The Latin American connection,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, October 1, 2001.
telephone networks. Calls from Saudi Arabia to Brazil, or from Brazil to Pakistan, for example, could be made without raising suspicions. In 2000 the Brazilian Police reportedly detected at least six clandestine communication bases near Foz do Iguaçu that were being used for making and receiving telephone calls to and from the Middle East and Afghanistan.133 Before the September 11 attacks in the United States, Brazilian investigators were suspicious of what was thought to be merely illegal schemes to reduce the price of telephone calls. After September 11, however, suspicions shifted to possible terrorist links because the illegal calls went to countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon.
Concerned about what it considered to be the action of Islamic extremist cells in the TBA, Brazil’s PF began to operate under cover in the region. Within weeks, the PF discovered various clandestine telephone exchanges suspected of links with Islamic extremism.134 In 2002, the Brazilian police closed a dozen telephone switching operations in Foz do Iguaçu and in other nearby cities that could have been used to evade U.S. satellites monitoring telephone traffic.135
While living in Foz do Iguaçu in 1999-2001, Lebanese businessman Afif Najib Eid contracted operators of the equipment for clandestine telephone switching operations.136 Eid, who owns an electronic products store in Ciudad del Este, migrated from Lebanon to Foz do Iguaçu in 1989. Phone records indicate that much of the traffic involved countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.137 In late 2001, police in Foz do Iguaçu arrested at least one of the clandestine operators, a Lebanese named Muhamed Hassan Atwi and a Brazilian named Paulo César Caramori. Atwi was suspected of operating the illegal telephone services in Paraná State and another in Rio de Janeiro. In the apartment used by the two men, police found a computer and false passports (see Hassan, El Hadi Haha Mohamad).138
133 Mario Daniel Montoya, “War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay’s Triple Border,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, No. 12, December 2001, 13. 134 Expedito Filho and Sílvio Ferreira, with Patrícia Cerqueira, “Rede de clandestinidade” [Clandestine Network],OnlineÉpoca Editora Globo], No. 179, October 22, 2001; João Naves de Oliveira, “Central telefônica leva três à prisão em MS” (Telephone Exchange Takes Three to Prison in MS), Estado.com.br, October 12, 2001; and “Árabes teriam financiado centrais telefônicas piratas no PR” (Arabs Had Financed Pirated Telephone Exchanges in PR), Estadao.com.br, terra.com.br, October 11, 2001. 135 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32. 136 “O terror por aqui” (The terror at Home), OnLine Epoca, O Globo.com, No. 179, October 22, 2001.137 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32. 138 Rohter, New York Times.

TBA-Linked Islamic Terrorist Activities Elsewhere in the Southern Cone
The TBA’s Islamic extremist and organized crime networks cannot be examined in isolation because they are linked to wider networks in the Latin American region and the world in general. Moreover, Islamic extremists who had been based in the TBA have been spreading out and establishing new support networks, apparently in places also popular with organized crime groups. In late 2002, unidentified TBA intelligence officials commented about two trends regarding the movements of Islamic extremists who had been based in the TBA.139 It was noted that these extremists were dispersing to smaller towns within the region. For example, they had been seen in towns such Uruguaiana, a Brazilian town on the border with Argentina south of Ciudad del Este; Cascavel in Brazil’s Ceará State; and Pedro Juan Caballero in Paraguay, renowned for its potent marijuana crops and scarcity of police.140 The TBA’s Islamic extremists, like mafia members and corrupt officials, also are being attracted to the money-laundering centers along the 1,290-kilometer-long Brazil-Paraguay border. These include, in Brazil, Ponta Porã and Coronel Sapucaia in Mato Grosso do Sul State, as well as Cascavel; and, in Paraguay, Pedro Juan Caballero and Capitán Bado.141
Intelligence officials also noted that Islamic extremists were branching out into nearby countries with established Arab or Muslim communities, such as Iquique, Chile; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Maracaibo, Venezuela. There are also indications that Islamic extremists are also moving to São Paulo. As a result of increased security measures implemented in the TBA in the 1999-2002 period, a so-called “second tri-border area” was reportedly developing in the region between Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.142
139 Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A, 32. 140 Rohter, New York Times. 141 Clarinha Glock, “Brazil-Paraguay: A Full Plate for Journalists,” July 19, 2001, Inter American Press Association [http://www.impunidad.com/atrisk/brasil_paraguay7_19_01E.html], citing PF (Federal Police) reports; and Pedro Oviedo, “En la Triple Frontera se lavan doce mil millones de dólares al año del narcotráfico, según un informe official” [In the Triple Border US$12 billion Is Laundered Per Year From Narcotics Trafficking, According to An Official Report], www.MisionesOnLine.net, No. 745, July 8, 2001 [http://misionesonline.net/paginas/action.lasso?-database=noticias3&-layout=web&-response=noticia.html&id=11349&autorizado=si&-search], citing Dr. Guido Rauber Lavado de Dinero: Triple Frontera —Work Paper Nº 1, Prevención de Adicciones y Control de Drogas [Subsecretary of Drug Control and Prevention of Addictions], Ministry of Public Health of Misiones Province, Argentina, updated version of December 31, 2000 (original date, August 2, 1999). 142 Marcio Aith, Folha de São Paulo [São Paulo; Internet version-www], November 8, 2002, as translated for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), “Argentine Intelligence Chief Says Terrorism Seeking New 'Triborder' Area,” November 8, 2002 (FBIS Document ID: LAP20021108000025), citing Miguel Angel Toma, chief of
Chuy, Uruguay, and Chuí, Brazil
A month after the bomb attack against the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in July 1994, Brazilian government suspicion began focusing on the city of Chuí in the southern part of Brazil, at the border with Uruguay. Chuí is the other half of Chuy, which is on the Uruguayan side. It is easy to reach Buenos Aires from Chuí by sea, thereby avoiding border controls. The city has a total of about 1,500 Arab residents.
In about 1994, a Hizballah network reportedly was initially detected using the Chuí zone as a point of distribution of military weapons such as M-16 and AR-15, grenades, and rocket launchers.143 These groups undoubtedly are linked to those in the TBA. More recently, in 2001, Uruguayan investigations uncovered a cocaine trafficking operation in Chuy that was linked to the Arab and Lebanese Mafias. A Brazilian Federal Police document reportedly states that, “The money obtained from the sale of the product would be used to finance international terrorism.”144
The Chuí connection to the TBA came into clearer focus in 2001, when a Lebanese named Al-Sa'id Ali Hasan Mukhlis (also spelled Mokhles) was identified as having contacts with Saudi Arabian members of a group of Osama bin Laden militants in the TBA (see Mukhlis, El Sa’id Hassan Ali Mohamed (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya), Appendix). The mayor of the Brazilian border town of Chuí, Mohammed Kasim (also spelled Kassem) Jomaa (“Mohamed Yoma”), allegedly helped al Said Hassan Hussein Mukhlis’ family after Mukhlis was arrested in Chuí on February 27, 1999, following a call by the CIA to detain him on charges of having participated in the Luxor terrorist attack.145 Mayor Jomaa has been described as the presumed chief of the emerging “Arab Mafia,” an organization involved in arms and drug trafficking, money laundering, and exploitation of undocumented workers.146
Argentina’s Secretariat for State Intelligence (Secretaría de Información del Estado—SIDE), in response to a telephone interview question.143 Brazilian Officials Warn Uruguay About Islamic Groups at Border,” JPRS-TOT-94-036-L, September 1, 1994,
16. 144 Sérgo Gobetti, “PF investiga ligação de prefeito con Bin Laden” (PF Investigates Mayor’s Links with bin Laden”), Oestadao.com.br, September 12, 2001.145 John Daly, “The Suspects: The Latin American connection,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, October 1,2001. 146 Enrique Medeot, “El alcalde brasileño que jura no ser amigo de Bin Laden” (The Brazilian Mayor Who Swears That He Isn’t A Friend of bin Laden), Clarín.com, September 16, 2001; and New York Times, September 27, 2001

Iquique, Chile
Islamic terrorist ties are believed to exist between the TBA and Iquique in Chile.147 Iquique is an attractive location for Islamic money launderers and smugglers operating in the TBA. The attraction is partly explained by the fact that Chile has become the fastest-growing hub in South America after Brazil for international narcotics transshipments and money-laundering enterprises.148 In addition, as pressure from security authorities has increased in the TBA, a number of Islamic militants reportedly have moved to Iquique.
On November 8, 2001, the Chilean government confirmed that it was investigating an alleged Arab financial network with terrorist links that may be engaging in money laundering in Iquique, Chile.149 It involved Assad Ahmad Barakat and his fellow countryman Kalil Saleh, who established two import and export firms in Iquique in early June 2001. Investigators confirmed that the money allegedly laundered in Iquique came from Ciudad del Este, and that Barakat’s businesses were being used as fronts. The amount laundered was estimated to be several million dollars.

OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES IN THE TBA
As suggested in the earlier discussion of TBA-related violence against local officials, Islamic terrorist group activities in the TBA and organized crime activities in the region often cannot be distinguished clearly. In the case of Hizballah, for example, the distinction between Hizballah and the Lebanese Mafia is not at all clear based on the limited amount of material covered in this study. If Hizballah and the Lebanese Mafia are not interconnected, then they probably at least cooperate closely. In addition to unclaimed acts of occasional violence against business people and local officials, the Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime groups in the region engage in illicit activities such as drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and
147Fernando Tejeda and Javier Méndez, “Nexo entre la Triple Frontera e Iquique” [Nexus between the TripleFrontier and Iquique], El Mercurio [Santiago], October 13, 2001. [http://www.emol.com/noticias/detalle/detalle_diario.asp?idnoticia=0113102001001A0050001]148 “New Drug Gangs Spreading in Colombia,” The Global Intelligence Report (Stratfor), April 3, 2002, citing El Tiempo. 149 Estrategía [a Santiago financial daily, Internet version-www], November 9, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Chile Confirms Alleged Terrorist-Linked Financial Network Under Investigation,” November 9, 2001 (FBIS,LAP20011109000089); “Chilean Police Investigate Terrorist Financial Network,” Santiago Times, January 8, 2002; and Héctor Rojas and Pablo Vergara, La Tercera de la Hora [Santiago; a conservative, pro-business, top-circulation daily, Internet version-www], November 8, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Chilian Police Examine Link to Alleged Triborder Hizballah Financial Network,” November 8, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011108000085).
product piracy. Instead of always pursuing these activities separately, however, the Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime groups in the TBA may collaborate whenever collaboration better serves their mutual interests. Examples of this reported collaboration in the TBA include Hizballah’s ties with groups such as the Hong Kong Mafia and the Argentine “Local
Connection,” al Qaeda’s ties with the Chechen and Chinese mafias, and the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s ties with the Chinese Mafia.
In addition to Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime groups, a third type of group is found in the TBA: corrupt government or security force officials. Corruption at all levels of
Sacoleiros (bag carriers) carry contraband,
such as cigarettes and fake watches, across government allows the Islamic terrorist and
the Friendship International Bridge. organized crime groups to operate in the TBA
Source: Página/12.com.ar, October 30, 2001.
and elsewhere in the TBA countries with considerable impunity (see TBA-Related Governmental Corruption).
Indigenous Organized Crime Groups
Argentina
Organized crime in Argentina reportedly is in an incipient stage and is regional rather than international in scope, thriving on the socioeconomic and political conditions prevalent in the country.150 Furthermore, the only form of organized crime in Argentina that is linked to international cartels is said to be drug trafficking, although the narcotraffickers also traffic in children and women; smuggle and market stolen cars; and engage in tax evasion, embezzlement, fraud, insider trading, and financial swindles.151 The TBA is of particular concern to the Argentine government in this regard because it serves as a gateway for organized crime to migrate south into the rest of the country.
The Islamic fundamentalists in the TBA reportedly are closely linked to a growing mafia in Argentina that provided important assistance in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
150 Hugo Antolin Almiron, “Organized Crime: A Perspective from Argentina.” Chapter 14 in Jay S. Albanese, Dilip
K. Das, and Arvind Verma, eds., Organized Crime: World Perspectives (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 320. 151 Almiron, 329.
Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center (AMIA) in that capital. As the economic and political crisis in Argentina continued in 2002, a criminal group known as “Local Connection,” made up of corrupt politicians and former members of the military regime, was reportedly prospering.152 As a result of its unique organizational relationship between common criminals and public figures, the Local Connection, unlike other Argentine gangs, has enjoyed impunity. It reportedly controls much of what are now major industries in Argentina, including arms and drug trafficking, kidnappings, and Argentina’s flourishing industry of dismantling stolen cars for spare parts. The Local Connection is organized like the Italian Mafia in small units, or families, linked to a boss, generally a corrupt police official or someone who served in the military regime. Its members are linked to the fundamentalist Islamic movements that are active in the TBA. The Connection bosses use code names when contacting the fundamentalists in Foz de Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este.
In late 2001, a change of strategy in arms trafficking reportedly took place amid the political and economic crisis that overtook Argentina.153 Until then, the Local Connection was involved only in big arms deals, such as providing military equipment to groups fighting civil wars, but in late 2001 it began to sell contraband. Since then, Argentina reportedly has been taking the place of Paraguay in smuggling weapons into Brazil, even arms used exclusively by the Argentine armed forces.

Paraguay
Families that began smuggling activities in the TBA, particularly the Morel family, have developed ties with international mafias and have acquired increasing political power and influence in other regions of Paraguay. The Morel clan began a war with the organization of Luiz Fernando da Costa (“Fernandinho Beira-Mar”), when he moved into the Paraguayan border region with Brazil after escaping from prison in March 1997. The two Morel brothers were killed in January 2001, and the clan’s patriarch was killed in a Brazilian jail a week later, reportedly at
152 This paragraph is based entirely on Carlos Wagner, special envoy in Buenos Aires, Zero Hora [Porto Alegre],November 10, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021111000047, “Brazil: Argentine Crime Group“Local Connection” Said To Have Ties to Terrorists in Tri-Border,” November 10, 2002.153 Wagner, “Local Connection.”
the orders of Beira Mar.154 The Paraguayan drug families have branched out into lucrative activities such as arms trafficking, mainly to supply organized crime groups in Brazilian cities. Elvio Ramón Cantero Aguero, based in Pedro Juan Caballero, heads one criminal organization operating in the Ciudad del Este area.155
Brazilian and U.S. officials generally consider former General Lino César Oviedo to be head of the so-called Paraguay Cartel. He reportedly has amassed at least US$1 billion, including numerous properties in the TBA.156 At the time of his arrest in June 2000, Oviedo was using Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este as a base of operations for laundering money.

Non-Indigenous Organized Crime Groups
Crime syndicates from China, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Lebanon (see Islamic Terrorist Group Activities in the TBA), Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and Taiwan are known to have operated in the TBA. A number of these groups are reportedly associated with corrupt Paraguayan business executives, politicians, and military officers tied to the ruling Colorado Party.157 They even reportedly control some news media directors.158 The influence in the TBA of non-indigenous organized crime networks reportedly is strengthening. These groups are active in Paraguay and along the drug-trafficking route from Colombia to the United States and Europe. Most of these clandestine operations reportedly take place in Ciudad del Este, which is considered a regional center for drug trafficking and arms smuggling. The transactions mostly involve bartering drugs for weapons from Colombian armed rebel groups.159
154 Mike Ceaser, “Libre comercio de drogas” [Free Trade of Drugs], Noticiasaliadas.org, November 15, 2002. [http://www.lapress.org/Summ.asp?lanCode=2&couCode=19]155 “Tri-Border Press Highlights,” December 2-6, 2002, as translated for FBIS, December 12, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021212000099; Cesar Palacios and Oscar Florentín, Noticias [Asunción], December 6, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Police Confiscate Arsenal from Gangster's Home,” December 6, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021206000030. 156 This paragraph is based entirely on “El Caso Lino Oviedo y su conexión con la Argentina” [The Lino Oviedo Case and Its Connection with Argentina], Página12 [Buenos Aires], 2001, citing an Argentine Chamber of Deputies report on money laundering. [www.pagina12.com.ar/2001/suple/carrio/cap11.pdf]157 Jack Sweeney, “DEA Boosts Its Role in Paraguay,” Washington Times, August 21, 2001. 158 “Dicen que directores de medios están vinculados con la mafia” [Some Media Directors Are Said To Be Linked to the Mafia], ABC Color [Paraguay], April 3, 2002. [http://www.una.py/sitios/abc] 159 Riyadh Alam-al-Din, "Washington Begins the War on Hizballah in the Border Triangle," Al-Watan al-Arabi [Paris], December 21, 2001, 18-19, as translated for FBIS, “Report Says US Antiterror Campaign To Target Hizballah Network in S. America” (FBIS, GMP20011221000179).
The Colombian, Italian, and Nigerian mafias have been singled out as the main transnational mafias operating in Brazil, but without headquarters in that country.160 Brazil’s Federal Police reported in late 1999 that the Nigerian Mafia operates in various Brazilian cities, including Foz do Iguaçu.161 According to Uruguayan authorities, these and other principal organized crime groups, including the Japanese yazuka (the Japanese word for gangsters) all have a presence in Ciudad del Este, where they have an established criminal structure that is linked to international terrorism.162 However, if the Italian and Nigerian mafias are active in the TBA there does not appear to be much news media reporting on their activities in the region.
The Chinese
The cultural and social demographics of Ciudad del Este make it an ideal city for the operations of Chinese-speaking criminal groups. In the 1990s, Chinese mafias such as Fuk Ching, Big Circle Boys, Flying Dragons, and Tai Chen, mostly from mainland China, established a presence in Ciudad del Este in order to profit from the city’s Asian imports.163 They are considered by authorities to be especially dangerous because they are young groups that do not follow traditional rules, such as staying in their own world and not bothering authorities or diplomats.164
Some of these Chinese mafias are called Triads; they specialize in providing “protection” to local Chinese business people and in imposing “taxes” on the containers imported by the Chinese businesses from Asia. When the mafia directly imports goods from Asia, the Chinese business community is obligated to purchase that merchandise, or suffer the consequences of not doing so.165 As of 2000, at least six Chinese Triads existed in the TBA and were vying for the 7,000 Chinese businesses in Ciudad del Este, from whom they collect up to US$30,000 a month
160 Ruy Gomes Silva, Effective Measures to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in Criminal Justice Processes, December 2001, 165. 161 O Estado de Sao Paulo [Internet version], November 23, 1999, as translated by FBIS Document ID: FTS19991123001608, “Federal Police Links Local Companies With Nigerian Mafia,” November 23, 1999. 162 “Ciudad del Este: Centro internacional de mafias, a una hora de vuelo de Uruguay” [Ciudad del Este:International Mafia Center, A One-Hour Flight from Uruguay], La Onda Digital, September 25, 2001.[http://www.uruguay.com/laonda/LaOnda/Entrevistas/Diputado%20Alberto%20Scavarelli.htm] 163 Rotella. 164 Rotella. 165 Bartolomé, 7, citing XIV Seminario de Fronteras: Los Desafios a la Seguridad y Delitos del Siglo XXI, Escuela Superior de Gendarmería, Buenos Aires, 1996, 13-16.
by exporting “protection” money.166 These groups reportedly originated in Hong Kong,
Mainland China, and Taiwan.167 These groups can be summarized as follows: The members of the "Fuk Ching" (also spelled "Fuchien" or “Fu Chin”) Triad came
from China during the Stroessner regime.168 They are headed by A. Sahi o Sain ("Mayo") or Feng Cheng Cui. In 2000 this was the most powerful group and consisted of 30 assassins of between 20 and 30 years of age, who also were operating in Foz do Iguaçu.169 Fuk Ching monopolizes the umbrella market in the TBA.170
. "Pac Lun Fu" dominates electronics contraband and athletic items in the TBA. It is supported by Brazilian and Paraguayan delinquents who specialize in extorting “protection” money. Anyone who refuses to pay is likely to be murdered.
. The "Tai Chen Saninh” Group originated in Hong Kong. It has been fighting to displace the other Triads in the TBA.171 A Tai Chen boss in Ciudad del Este was shot to death in 1998 after attempting to extort US$200,000 from a Taiwanese immigrant building an industrial park in the city.172
. The "Continental" Group has been seeking to control the wall-clock market in the TBA.
. Along with the Chinese Triads and the Japanese yakuza, the Big Circle Boys is one of the most prominent types of groups involved in Asian-based transnational crime.173 Big Circle Boys (Dai Huen Jai, or BCB) is a loosely affiliated group of gangs operating independently and cooperating only when necessary. Although not a Triad, the BCB’s operations are considered to be nearly as sophisticated as those of the
166 Tripartitite Command of the Three Borders, Base de Datos SER en el 2000 [Regional Strategic Sercurity Database in 2000]. [http://www.ser2000.org/protect/docs-sobresalientes/triplef.htm] 167Rotella, citing Paraguayan police archives. 168 For background, see James O. Finckenauer, “Chinese Transnational Organized Crime: The Fuk Ching,” (undated) National Institute of Justice International, U.S. Department of Justice [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/ctoc.html], citing Chin, Ko-lin, Chinatown Gangs (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996). 169 Tripartitite Command.170 “Taiwanese Mafia Boss Arrested,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], November 28, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil-Paraguay Triborder Press Highlights: November 25-29, 2002,” December 3, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021203000105. 171 Tripartitite Command.172 Rotella. 173 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), “Transnational Criminal Activity,” November 1998. [http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/back10e.htm]
Triads. BCB members are active in drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and large-scale credit card forgery and fraud. BCB is believed to be working with a variety of transnational crime syndicates, including the Russian/Eastern European Mafia, and outlaw motorcycle gangs.174
. The Flying Dragons appears to be an affiliate of the same overall organization as New York’s Flying Dragons, a vicious Chinese street gang, which is the enforcement sector of the Hip Sing Triad, a Fukienese Triad.175
Although the Chinese Mafia in the TBA is characterized by internecine rivalries, it is known to collaborate with the Islamic terrorist groups in the region. At least two organizations— the Sung-I and Ming families—have engaged in illegal operations with the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya.176 The Sung-I family, which is based in the Paraguayan town of Hernandárias, used three photography and electronic businesses located in Ciudad del Este as fronts for its activities. In December 2000, Sung-I sold a shipment of munitions to the Islamic Group, sending it to Egypt by ship as “medical equipment.” The Cameroon-flagged vessel was intercepted in the Cypriot port of Limasol. The Ming family managed Islamic Group funds from Ciudad del Este in the financial circuit that includes Guyana and the Cayman Islands.177An example of collaboration between the Chinese Mafia and Islamic terrorist groups in the TBA is the distribution chain for counterfeit manufacture of mass-market items, such as toys, running from Hong Kong to Hizballah extremists.178
The Chinese community in Ciudad del Este has such a dynamic trade in illicit Asian contraband that the Taiwanese Chinatrust Bank established its only Latin American branch in the city.179 The significance of the Chinese Mafia threat in the TBA appeared to be confirmed by the
174 For additional information, see Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CSIS), “Asian-Based Organized Crime,” 1998. [http://www.cisc.gc.ca/AnnualReport1998/Cisc1998en/asian98.htm] 175 Amy O'Neill Richard, “International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestationof Slavery and Organized Crime,” An Intelligence Monograph of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, April 2000, U.S. Department of State Website[http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/traffic/report/homepage.htm#contents], based on interview with INS, New York, May 1999. 176 Bartolomé, 8; and ABC Color, February 24, 2003, as translated by FBIS LAP20030225000094, “Chinese Mafia Linked to Islamic Fundamentalists,” in “Paraguay Press Highlights,” February 25, 2003.177 Bartolomé, 8, citing Roberto Godoy, “Tríplice Fronteira é vigiada há 20 anos,” O Estado de São Paulo, November 11, 2001. 178 ABC Color (Internet version-www), November 22, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Hong Kong Mafia Linked toHizballah in Tri-Border Region,” Document ID: LAP20021122000047. 179 Bartolomé, 7, citing “The Bank in the Future of South America,” Taipei Today, 18, No. 2, March-April 1999.
formal demand made in 2001 by a group of 15 Taiwanese industrialists who are members of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. The industrialists conditioned their proposal for establishing their industries in the Eastern Industrial Park of Ciudad del Este on the eradication of the Chinese Mafia in the TBA by local authorities.180
Reportedly, the Hong Kong Mafia engages in large-scale trafficking in pirated products from mainland China to Ciudad del Este and maintains strong ties with the pro-Iranian Hizballah in the TBA.181 Ayrton Nascimiento Vicente, who was chief of Brazil’s TBA Command, an organization created by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to control the zone, confirmed that Chinese and Korean mafias have been identified in the TBA, including in Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este.182
As a result of the Chinese groups’ ability to bribe Paraguayan judges, they have been able to operate with impunity, according to the consul general of Taiwan in Ciudad del Este.183 In 2001 the Paraguayan government made an effort to neutralize the activities of the Chinese mafias, but only minor successes were reported. In July 2001, authorities in Ciudad del Este arrested Chinese citizen Wu Wen Huan, one of the mafia capos in the TBA. Local Chinese business people denounced him for his extortion tactics. Between 1997 and 2000, Wu Wen Huan’s company, Floresta SA, had registered more than 600 untaxed imports.184 And that October, Paraguayan police arrested Cheng Tin Tsang, one of the new Chinese Mafia capos in the TBA, along with two other Asian criminal suspects. The three were residing in Foz do Iguaçu and using North American and European passports to avoid being detained as Asians.185
180 Bartolomé, 8, citing “Empresarios taiwaneses piden erradicación de la mafia china,” Noticias, November 18, 2001. 181 ABC Color [Internet version-www], November 22, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: 'Strong Ties' Seen Between Hong Kong Mafia, Tri-border Based Hizballah,” November 22, 2002 (FBIS, LAP20021122000059). 182 Bartolomé, 5, citing “Afirman que es imposible la vigilancia en la Triple Frontera” [Affirmation That Vigilance in the Triborder Region Is Impossible], La Nación [Buenos Aires], April 2, 2000; and Aloisio Milani, “Máfia chinesa extorque e executa em São Paulo” [Chinese Mafia Extorts and Executes in São Paulo], Jornal-laboratório da Faculdade de Comunicação Social Cásper Líbero, No. 28, December 2001. [http://biondi.fcl.com.br/facasper/jornalismo/esquinas/noticia.cfm?secao=4&codigo=87] 183 Bartolomé, 16, citing “Mafia, amparada por la justicia” [Mafia protected by justice], ABC Color, September 28, 2001. 184 Bartolomé, 7-8, citing “Procesarán por evasion a supuesto capomafioso,” ABC, September 17, 2001; “TrialBegins for 'Mafia Boss' Chinese Citizen,” ABC Color, November 29, 2002, as translated for FBIS Document ID: LAP20021129000064; and “Taiwanese Mafia Boss Arrested,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], November 28, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil-Paraguay Triborder Press Highlights: November 25-29, 2002,” December 3, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021203000105. 185 Bartolomé, 8, citing “Detienen a chinos e indagan possible nexo con la mafia,” Noticias, October 26, 2001.
Another alleged chief of Chinese organized crime in the TBA, a young woman named Chia Hui (“Erica”) Pai, was arrested in late 2002. According to ABC Color, Chia Hui was accused of being the mastermind in the torture and attempted murder of Chinese businessman Guillermo Lin, who survived being shot in the head and thrown into the Río Paraná.186 Lin later pressed charges and testified against his alleged torturers, among them Shih Soung Mou (“Roberto Shih”).187 People connected to the Chinese Mafia in Ciudad del Este reportedly paid US$12,000 to obtain the release of Chia Hui on bail.188
Instead of having their operations disrupted by these occasional arrests, the Chinese Mafia groups appear to be using the TBA as a base for expanding their thriving businesses into
Argentina and Brazil. An investigation by Argentina’s National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional), a paramilitary force, found that members of the Chinese mafias enter Argentine territory with tourist visas issued by the Paraguayan consulates of the TBA’s Puerto Iguazú or nearby Eldorado (an Argentine town in the department adjacent to Iguazú Department). The objective of these Chinese criminals is to establish themselves in the duty-free zone of Argentina’s San Luis Province.189

The Colombians
Although the Colombian drug cartels are known to have been operating in Brazil and Paraguay for years, information on their activities in the TBA is not readily available in news media. In the case of Colombia’s principal guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC), there appears to be a direct connection between the TBA’s function as a drug-trafficking outlet and the FARC. The FARC derives much of its operating funds from drug-related activities and is known to do business with the Brazilian, Colombian, and Russian mafias. Little substantive information on FARC activities in the TBA has been reported in news media, but links between crime
186 “Captured Chinese Mafia Boss To Be Freed,” ABC Color, December 13, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20021213000113, “Highlights: Paraguay Press,” December 13, 2002. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Bartolomé, 8, citing “Investigan a la mafia china en Misiones,” La Nación [Buenos Aires], October 24, 1999.
syndicates in Ciudad del Este and the FARC reportedly date at least from the mid-1990s, when General Oviedo protected Brazilian drug trafficker Luiz Fernando Da Costa (“Fernandinho Beira Mar”). Da Costa was captured in southern Colombia in April 2001 in the company of FARC rebels.190
The FARC’s guerrilla elite actually has a haven located not far from the TBA. Of three known FARC havens in Brazil, the biggest of them is located in the small city of Guaíra in the southern part of Brazil’s Paraná State at the Paraguay border, only 100 miles (161 kilometers) north of Foz do Iguaçu (see Figure 3, The FARC’s Havens in Brazil). It is located on a 6,000-
hectare ranch belonging to businessman Ahmad Mohamad, a Lebanese naturalized in Paraguay and arrested by Brazil’s Federal Police in September 2002.191

The Russians
In about 1996, members of the Russian Mafia reportedly began exploring Paraguay, as they did Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil.192 Russian Mafia groups reportedly were seeking out contacts with the mafia of countries belonging to the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), principally those operating from the drug-trafficking zones of Pedro Juan Caballero-Ponta Porã and Ciudad del Este-Foz do Iguaçu on the Paraguay-Brazil border. The intention of the Russians reportedly would be to ally themselves with the capos of the South American mafias in
190 Strafor Global Intelligence Update, “Paraguay Drug Trade and U.S. American Facilities, Personnel at Greater Risk,” August 14, 2001. [http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n1499/a06.html]191 Roberto Godoy, “As Farc usam Brasil para abrigar elite da guerrilha” [FARC uses Brazil to shelter the guerrilla elite], O Estado de São Paulo [Internet version: Estadao.com.br], March 1, 2003. [http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editorias/2003/03/01/pol024.html] 192 “Paraguay es uno de los países explorados por mafia rusa” [Paraguay is one of the countries explored by theRussian mafia], ABC Color, October 16, 1997.
order to maximize the distribution of cocaine in Europe. They began by seeking to oust the Brazilian and Nigerian cartels based in border towns such as Pedro Juan Caballero.193 However, if the Russian Mafia has a growing presence in the region and is working with bin Laden in an attempt to establish an al Qaeda presence in the TBA, as claimed by Judge Walter Fanganiello Maierovitch in 2001, this is not evident from the very limited news media reports on the subject.194
According to political scientist Bruce Michael Bagley, the Russian Mafia presence in Argentina, specifically Chechen gangs, has been linked primarily to the use of Argentina as a transit country for Andean cocaine shipments to Europe, arms trafficking to Brazil and Colombia, and money laundering. Bagley notes that Argentine intelligence sources have detected contacts between Chechen separatist groups and Islamic terrorists in the TBA and suspect Chechen use of these networks for arms-smuggling purposes.
TBA-Related Governmental Corruption

Argentina
The convergence of interests among corrupt government officials and members of organized crime and terrorist groups operating in the TBA is illustrated by the revelations in July 2002 made by a witness in the case of the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA in Buenos Aires. The witness, Abdolghassem Mesbahi, a former Iranian intelligence officer, testified to Argentine investigators that the Iranian government organized and carried out the attack and then paid then-president Carlos Saúl Menem US$10 million to cover it up.195 The charges against Menem have never been substantiated, and he vigorously denies them. However, Menem acknowledged that he has had a bank account in Switzerland since 1986.196 As president, Menem, whose parents migrated to Argentina from Syria, appointed a Syrian army colonel to be customs overseer at
193 “Temen que mafia rusa ofrezca armas a cambio de cocaína en la frontera” [Fear that the Russian mafia offers arms in exchange for cocaine at the border], ABC Color, November 3, 1997; and Guaracy Mingardi, “Money and the International Drug Trade in São Paulo,” International Social Science Journal, No. 169, September 2001, 383. 194 Germano Oliveira. 195 “Slow-Motion Justice in Argentina,” New York Times, March 11, 2003, A24; and Larry Rohter, “Iran Blew UpJewish Center In Argentina, Defector Says,” New York Times, July 22 2002, A1, A6.196 Larry Rohter, “World Briefing Americas: Menem Acknowledges Swiss Account,” New York Times, July 25,2002, 9.
Buenos Aires’s Ezeiza International Airport, which has been described as “a major hub for smuggling in South America.”197

Brazil
A 1,198-page report by the Drug Traffic Investigating Commission of Brazil’s Congress released in November 2000 accuses 827 individuals—including two federal deputies (congressmen), two former state governors, 15 state deputies, and scores of mayors, judges, police officers, lawyers, and even officials from the neighboring countries of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Suriname—of organized crimes ranging from drug trafficking to arms trafficking to tax evasion.198 The report concluded that drug-related corruption is so widespread that it is
impossible to clean up in the short term without calling in the military and restructuring and rearming the country's police. Another Brazilian congressional report released in mid-2002 on the nationwide surge in highway robberies of truck cargo called for the indictment of 100 politicians, police, and entrepreneurs allegedly involved in the theft of cargo199 As a money-laundering center, Foz do Iguaçu plays an important role in this widespread corruption (see Money Laundering, Foz do Iguaçu).
Mato Grosso mafia figure João Arcanjo Ribeiro, with US$50 million in Swiss banks and a hotel in Miami valued at US$50 million, was sought by the PF and Interpol in more than 100 countries on charges of heading a ring linked to arms trafficking and diamonds, money
197 Martin Edwin Andersen, “Al-Qaeda Across the Americas,” Insight on the News, 17, No. 44, November 26, 2001, 20-21.198 Andrew Downie, “Corruption's Roots Deep and Wide-reaching in Brazil,” Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 2000; “Investigation Shows Pervasive Impact of Drug Trade in Brazil,” America's Insider, 1, No. 9, December 8, 2000, 6. 199 Raymond Colitt, “Brazil Tracks Down the Real Culprits Behind Surge in Highway Robberies,” Financial Times[London], May 2, 2002,10.
laundering, and a series of assassinations.200 He has also been linked to the TBA-based CC-5 accounts scheme and to money-launderer Alberto Yussef.201 Arcanjo Ribeiro was captured in Montevideo, Uruguay, in early April 2003, and subsequently was seeking to avoid extradition to Brazil.

Paraguay
Corruption, an old tradition in Paraguay, has reached all the way up to the presidency. The former regime of Alfredo Stroessner was reportedly involved in drug trafficking.202 More recently, President Raúl Cubas was forced to resign as a result of a drug-related scandal. It was widely believed in Paraguay that Cubas had a hand in the assassination of his political rival, Vice President Luis María Argãna, who was gunned down on the streets of the capital, Asunción, on March 23, 1999, by hired assassins in camouflage gear.203 In October 2000, José Tomas Centurion was sentenced to seven years in prison for corruption during his tenure as chief of the counternarcotics secretariat.204
Governmental, political, and diplomatic corruption in Paraguay and the TBA allows individuals associated with organized crime and terrorist groups to bribe judges, purchase entry visas, and engage in any number of other criminal activities that might overlap with legitimate economic activities. An investigation conducted by Paraguayan authorities found that an average of 570 foreigners annually enter the country through the Ciudad del Este Airport using irregular documents, after paying bribes averaging US$5,000.205
200 Source: Istoé OnLine, No. 1740, February 5, 2003.201 Amaury Ribeiro Jr. e Sônia Filgueiras – Foz do Iguaçu (PR), “Ralo da impunidade” [Used-Up Impunity], IstoéOnLine, February 2, 2003. 202 See, for example, Kai Bird and Max Holland, “Paraguay: the Stroessner Connection,” The Nation, Vol. 241, October 26, 1985, 401.203Tim McGirk, “Assassination!,” Time International, 153, No. 13, April 5, 1999, 34[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/intl/article/0,9171,1107990405-23175,00.html]; “Paraguai: Estava no Brasil: General Oviedo é preso em Foz do Iguaçu” [Paraguay: He was in Brazil: General Oviedo Is Captured in Foz doIguaçu], Veja, No. 1,654, June 21, 2000 [http://veja.abril.com.br/210600/p_055a.html]; “Paraguay Vice-President's Killers Jailed,” BBC News, October 25, 2000 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/989401.stm]; and “Brasil amenaza extraditar a Lino Oviedo” [Brazil Threatens to Extradite Lino Oviedo], Clarín [Buenos Aires], July 16, 2002 [http://www.clarin.com/ultimo_momento/notas/2002/07/16/m-416641.htm]; and “Oviedo Denies Ties ToBrazilian Drug Smuggler,” Avance [Ciudad del Este; Internet version-www], June 26, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay Press Highlights,” June 26, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020626000113. 204 “Paraguay: Political Rights and Civil Liberties,” Freedom in the World, 2001-2002, Freedom House, 2002. [http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/paraguay2.htm]205 Bartolomé, 18, citing “Comando terroristas se refugian en la Triple Frontera” [Terrorist commandos seek haven in theTriborder Area], El País, November 9, 2001.
Reports of this criminal enterprise began surfacing in mid-1998, when Squadron 51 of Argentina’s National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional) detained a Paraguayan woman in Chaco Province in possession of 13 false passports (seven Lebanese and six South Korean). She was also carrying an official Paraguayan “This visa was issued by judicial order” seal and visas applications.206 Argentine and Paraguayan authorities determined that the interim Paraguayan consul in Salta, Juana Maidana de Villagra, belonged to an illicit group specializing in illegal documents. In six months, this consul issued more than 500 illegal visas, collecting US$900 for each.207 She received a two-year prison sentence.
In early November 2001, Paraguay’s judge Carlos Cálcena charged that some of Paraguay’s consulates had been converted into veritable offices for falsifying documents.208 That year, the Directorate of Legal Affairs in Paraguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also identified as “vulnerable” the consulates in Santa Cruz, Bolivia; Salta, Eldorado, and Buenos Aires, Argentina; Iquique, Chile; and São Paulo, Foz do Iguaçu, Ponta Porã, and Curitiba, Brazil.209
Post-September 11, 2001 investigations carried out in the TBA found that numerous Lebanese citizens residing in Ciudad del Este had entered Paraguay with illicit visas. The most well-known case was that of Assad Ahmad Barakat, who was able to enter Paraguay in 1989 using a visa obtained from the Paraguayan Consulate in Panama, which was not authorized to issue visas.210 Until he was arrested and recalled on September 26, 2001, the Paraguayan consul in Miami, Carlos Weiss, had allegedly sold more than 300 passports, visas, and shipping documents to individuals heading to the TBA since June 1999. His customers for visas or passports included about 20 Lebanese, three of whom were on the FBI terrorist watch list, but who had never been in the United States, and terrorist suspects from Egypt and Syria, all of whom were planning to move to Ciudad del Este.211
206 Bartolomé, 17, citing “Apresan con pasaportes a una mujer” [Woman apprehended with passports], La Nación[Buenos Aires], June 24, 1998; and “Investigan si hay una red que tramita pasaportes a libaneses” [Existence of anetwork trafficking in Lebanese passports being investigated], La Nación, June 25, 1998. 207 Bartolomé, 17, “Ordenan la captura de otros 17 árabes” [Another 17 Arabs ordered captured], Noticias, September 27, 2001. 208 Bartolomé, 17-18, citing “Comandos terroristas se refugian en la Triple Frontera” [Terrorist commandos findsafehaven in Triborder Area], El País, November 9, 2001. 209 Bartolomé, 18, citing “La frontera es el punto clave” [The border is the key point], Noticias, October 7, 2001. 210 Bartolomé, 17.211 Mendel, citing Bill Rogers, “Arabs Accuse Paraguay Police of Extortion,” Voice of America (VOA.com) [Internet, www.voanews.com, accessed October 18, 2001]; and Larry Rohter, “Terrorists Are Sought in Latin Smugglers’ Haven,” New York Times, September 27, 2001 [ http://www.nytimes.com]; and Bartolomé, 17, citing
Money Laundering

TBA in General
Although the extent of narcotics trafficking in the TBA is unclear, criminal elements in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu specialize in the laundering of drug money. As of 2000-01, the amount of money being laundered in the TBA reportedly was averaging US$12 billion per year, but estimates of the amount of money laundering in the TBA vary widely and cannot be considered reliable (see Table 1).212 Foz do Iguaçu appears to be the principal money-laundering center, followed by Ciudad del Este. In any case, the amounts laundered in the TBA probably are in the billions of dollars per year. Until about 2000, the most popular financial mechanism for
laundering money in the TBA appeared to be the CC-5 account, which is an account that belongs to someone residing outside the country.213 It is often opened with false identity documents, making investigations difficult (see TBA-Related Governmental Corruption, Brazil). By 2000 the TBA mafiosi—better known as dollar exchangers—reportedly were laundering billions of dollars through new mechanisms that had superceded the CC-5 accounts.214
“Fiscala imputa a Weiss por la concesión irregular de visas” [Judge reprimands Weiss for the irregular issuance of visas], ABC Color, September 27, 2001. 212 Oviedo, citing Dr. Guido Rauber Lavado de Dinero: Triple Frontera —Work Paper Nº 1, Prevención de Adicciones y Control de Drogas [Subsecretary of Drug Control and Prevention of Addictions], Ministry of Public Health of Misiones Province, Argentina, updated version of December 31, 2000 (original date, August 2, 1999). 213 The CC-5 account is a special account created by the Central Bank of Brazil, supposedly for foreigners, in order to allow Paraguayan money to be more cheaply and quickly converted to dollars and deposited on the same day in local Brazilian banks. 214 Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, “Brasil prepara ‘el mayor juicio del mundo’” [Brazil Prepares the World’s Greatest Trial], talcualdigital.com, ABC Color, August 8, 2001. [http://www.talcualdigital.com/ediciones/2001/08/08/p22s2.htm]
Table 1. Amounts of Money Reported Laundered in the Tri-Border Area (TBA), 19922001 (in US dollars)
Period
Amount
TBA Location of Activity
2000-01
$12 billion per year215
TBA in general
2000
$25 billion216
TBA in general
2000
$5 billion annual average217
Ciudad del Este
1998-99
$12 billion total218
Foz do Iguaçu
1996-97
$18 billion total219
Foz do Iguaçu
1992-98
$70 billion total220
Foz do Iguaçu
1992-98
$30 billion total221
Foz do Iguaçu

In comparison with Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, Puerto Iguazú is not known as a
major money-laundering center. Instead, the third most important money-laundering center in the
TBA appears to be the popular tourist destination known as Iguaçu Falls, which has many
foreign exchange bureaus. After receiving large deposits from various parts of Brazil, the
exchange shops of Iguaçu Falls forward the money to nonresident CC-5 accounts in Paraguay. In
mid-2001, Brazil’s Public Prosecutor's Office, specifically the Organized Crime and Special
215 Pedro Oviedo, “En la Triple Frontera se lavan doce mil millones de dólares al año del narcotráfico, según un informe official” [In the Triple Border US$12 billion Is Laundered Per Year From Narcotics Trafficking, According to An Official Report], www.MisionesOnLine.net, No. 745, July 8, 2001 [http://misionesonline.net/paginas/action.lasso?-database=noticias3&-layout=web&-response=noticia.html&id=11349&autorizado=si&-search], citing Dr. Guido Rauber Lavado de Dinero: Triple Frontera —Work Paper Nº 1, Prevención de Adicciones y Control de Drogas [Subsecretary of Drug Control and Prevention of Addictions], Ministry of Public Health of Misiones Province, Argentina, updated version of December 31, 2000 (original date, August 2, 1999). 216 Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, “Brasil prepara ‘el mayor juicio del mundo’” [Brazil Prepares the World’s Greatest Trial], talcualdigital.com, ABC Color, August 8, 2001. [http://www.talcualdigital.com/ediciones/2001/08/08/p22s2.htm]217 “Paraguay: Lack of Control System on Border with Brazil Allows Currency Flight,” BBC Monitoring Americas
– Political [London], January 23, 2003, 1, citing ABC Color Web site, January 22, 2003. 218 Policarpo Junior, “Tem famosos no meio: Polícia apura um bilionário esquema de remessa ilegal de dinheiro aoexterior e já tem nomes de gente graúda” [They Have Famous People Among Them: Police Expedite a Billion-Real Scheme for Remitting Illegal Money Abroad and Already Have the Names of Big-Shots], Veja on-line, No. 1,755, June 12, 2002. [http://veja.abril.com.br/120602/p_046.html]219 Amaury Ribeiro Jr. and Sonia Filgueiras, “Sieve of Impunity,” Istoé [Internet version-www], February 5, 2003,as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Federal Police, FBI Unveil $30 Billion Money Laundering Scheme,” February 5,2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030203000075. 220 This paragraph is based entirely on Oviedo, citing Dr. Guido Rauber Lavado de Dinero: Triple Frontera —WorkPaper Nº 1, Prevención de Adicciones y Control de Drogas [Subsecretary of Drug Control and Prevention ofAddictions], Ministry of Public Health of Misiones Province, Argentina, updated version of December 31, 2000 (original date, August 2, 1999). 221 Marcelo Aguiar, with Mauri König, “Cascata de Dólares” [Cascade of Dollars], Dinheiro na Web [SãoPaulo],April 6, 2001. [http://www.terra.com.br/dinheironaweb/189/financas/189_cascata_dolares.htm]221 “Quadrilha lava R$ 30 bilhões em dois anos” [Gang Launders 30 Billion Reais in Two Years], Correiro Braziliense [Brasília], November 16, 2000. [http://www2.correioweb.com.br/cw/2000-11-16/mat_17077.htm]
Investigation Division of the Federal Police (Polícia Federal—PF), was investigating 212 cases involving capital flight from Iguaçu Falls totaling more than US$100 million.222

Ciudad del Este
In the assessment of the U.S. Department of State, Paraguay is a principal money-laundering center. Money laundering in the country is facilitated by the fact that the multi-billion
dollar contraband re-export trade is centered in Ciudad del Este, which is outside the government’s regulatory scope.223 There are no controls on the amount of currency that can be brought into or out of the country, and there are no cross-border reporting requirements. Little in the way of personal background information is required to open a bank account or to make financial transactions in Paraguay; therefore, there is a high incidence of money-laundering activities. Narcotics trafficking generates an estimated 40 percent of money laundering in Paraguay.
Carlos Altemburger, chief of Paraguay’s antiterrorist unit, acknowledged in September 2002 that terrorists use the TBA to finance their operations by remitting large amounts of dollars from Ciudad del Este to the Middle East.224 A minimum of US$5 billion, equivalent to 50 percent of Paraguay’s gross domestic product, is reportedly laundered annually in Paraguay, practically all of it in Ciudad del Este.225 Money laundering is facilitated in Ciudad del Este by the existence of more than 20 illegal foreign-exchange shops (Casas de Cambio, which are concentrated near the Friendship Bridge).226 At least half of them have no name, other than a sign “foreign exchange.” The shops trade only dollars, reais, and guaranies. An estimated 50 percent of all banking transactions registered in Ciudad del Este belong to the category of illicit
222 Clarinha Glock, “Brazil-Paraguay: A Full Plate for Journalists,” Inter American Press Association, July 19, 2001. [http://www.impunidad.com/atrisk/brasil_paraguay7_19_01E.html] 223 This paragraph is based in part on U.S. Department of State, ISCSR-2002.224 “Entrevista: tráfico en la "triple frontera" [Interview: Traffic in the “Triple Border], BBCMundo.com, September 3, 2002. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/2001_-_11_de_septiembre_-_2002/newsid_2234000/2234706.stm]225 Oviedo. 226 “Paraguay: Lack of Control System on Border with Brazil Allows Currency Flight,” BBC Monitoring Americas
– Political [London], January 23, 2003, 1, citing ABC Color Web site, January 22, 2003.
transactions, in violation of Law 1025.227 US$3 billion is reportedly laundered annually in Ciudad del Este from five principal sources: contraband, fraud, assaults, tax evasion, and trafficking of drugs and weapons.228

Foz do Iguaçu
The exchange-evasion model used by Brazilian money launderers in the TBA consists of making deposits in exchange houses in Foz do Iguaçu, from where they are distributed into CC-5-type accounts in exchange houses in Ciudad del Este.229 Foz do Iguaçu reportedly had 13
exchange houses in late 2000, after 20 were closed on March 31, 2000, for operating illegally and engaging in laundering activities.
A Foz do Iguaçu prosecutor affirmed in early June 1999 that a mafia operates in Foz do Iguaçu, where 40 percent of the local companies are fronts created only to launder money and to send it abroad.230 Brazil’s PF found that Brazilian industrialist Sílvio Roberto Anspach, one of the biggest money launderers in Brazil’s history, centered his money-laundering activities in Foz do Iguaçu.231
The TBA and its CC-5 accounts played a central role in a major money-laundering scheme uncovered by Brazilian and U.S. investigators in 2000 and involving many Brazilian government officials. In early 2002, a Brazilian police chief and two experts in Foz do Iguaçu money laundering traveled to the United States to investigate the Banestado bank.232 At the end of the investigation, they had uncovered 135 accounts controlled by 12 Brazilian dealers who between 1996 and 1997 had
227 Bartolomé, 9.228 Bartolomé, 9, citing Camarasa and a statement made in 2000 by the head of Holland’s ABN’s bank branch inCiudad del Este. 229 Bartolomé, 9.230 Mario Osava, “Ciudades de América Latina/Brasil: Lavado y fuga de capitales en la frontera con Paraguay” [Cities of Latin America/Brazil: Laundering and Flight of Capital on the Border with Paraguay], Inter-Press Service, June 6, 1999. [http://ips.org/Spanish/mundial/indices/Correo/cor0606051.htm]231 “Quadrilha lava,” Correiro Braziliense.
remitted US$18 billion that were deposited into tax havens by means of 35,000 accounts. In the operation, known as the CC-5 accounts scheme, the investigators learned that the same account holders had sent more than US$12 billion to the same accounts in 1998 and 1999.233
One can easily use the CC-5 account to launder money by opening an account in Ciudad del Este in the name of a fictitious person and having the amount transferred back to Brazil. During the 1996-99 period, the scheme mounted by Banestado helped hundreds of politicians, traffickers, and smugglers to send, through the Brazilian dollar dealers, US$30 billion to Switzerland and other tax havens.
The Foz do Iguaçu CC-5 accounts scheme had six steps, as follows:234 The individuals who wanted to send money abroad using irregular methods opened contact with a group of 12 money exchangers in Foz do Iguaçu;
. The 12 money exchangers, all of whom own exchange houses based in Paraguay, opened accounts in five banks in Foz do Iguaçu, depositing a total of 12 billion reais. The accounts were opened using about 2,000 phony names.
From the five banks in Foz do Iguaçu, the money was remitted abroad through CC-5 accounts; In the Banestado branch in New York, the money was deposited in 137 accounts, all in the name of companies registered in off-shore havens;
. After closing the 137 accounts in New York, the money was remitted to the accounts of 35,000 final beneficiaries, most of them held by juridical people, also located in off-shore havens.
In early 2003, approximately 200 police inquiries into CC-5 accounts were frozen awaiting a decision as to who is competent to continue the investigations.235 Of a total of about
232 Amaury Ribeiro Jr. and Sonia Filgueiras, “Sieve of Impunity,” Istoé [Internet version-www], February 5, 2003,as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Federal Police, FBI Unveil $30 Billion Money Laundering Scheme,” February 5,2003, FBIS Document ID: LAP20030203000075. 233 Policarpo Junior, “Tem famosos no meio: Polícia apura um bilionário esquema de remessa ilegal de dinheiro aoexterior e já tem nomes de gente graúda” [They Have Famous People Among Them: Police Expedite a Billion-Real Scheme for Remitting Illegal Money Abroad and Already Have the Names of Big-Shots], Veja on-line, No. 1,755, June 12, 2002. [http://veja.abril.com.br/120602/p_046.html]234 Policarpo Junior, “Tem famosos no meio: Polícia apura um bilionário esquema de remessa ilegal de dinheiro aoexterior e já tem nomes de gente graúda” [They Have Famous People Among Them: Police Expedite a Billion-Real Scheme for Remitting Illegal Money Abroad and Already Have the Names of Big-Shots], Veja on-line, No. 1,755, June 12, 2002. [http://veja.abril.com.br/120602/p_046.html]
700 police inquiries concerning money laundering, illegal remittances, and tax evasion, 500 cases remained within the jurisdiction of Foz do Iguaçu. Although the investigations focus on who are involved in the scheme, the ultimate objective is to trace some US$15 billion that left Brazil through CC-5 accounts in Foz do Iguaçu. Brazil’s Office of the Attorney General estimates that more than 3,000 people are involved in the so-called Foz do Iguaçu CC-5 accounts scheme.
Other Organized Crime Activities in the TBA

Automobile Smuggling
Smuggling stolen cars is a booming business. Cars are stolen in Brazil and Argentina and taken to Paraguay, and then to Bolivia and beyond. In mid-2001, an Argentine security official stated that an average of 6,000 automobiles are illegally taken out of Argentina every year, and for the most part are sent to Bolivia and Paraguay, specifically Ciudad del Este.236 The cars arrive in Ciudad del Este no more than 15 hours after being stolen in Buenos Aires. The business in stolen cars, most of which are luxury models, is facilitated not only by lax border controls but also by Paraguayan legislation. Private contracts are accepted as valid instruments under Paraguayan law and can be legalized through a letter-writing procedure, without any requirement for prior documentation. As a result, one can purchase a stolen Mercedes Benz worth US$50,000 for only US$10,000 in Ciudad del Este, or a BMW valued at US$40,000 for only US$7,000.237 According to Paraguayan authorities, more than half of the 450,000 vehicles registered annually in Paraguay were acquired illegally. In addition, automobile theft in Brazil is under the jurisdiction of the State Police, which apparently is not very effective in countering it.238
The TBA’s two principal centers of reception of stolen vehicles and smuggled goods are Iguaçu Falls on the Brazilian side and Ciudad del Este. They are also a corridor for trafficking in drugs and arms. Some of the illicit cargo passes along an illegally opened road crossing the
235 “Investigation on CC-5 Accounts Paralyzed,” Cascavel Hoje [Foz do Iguaçu], February 5, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights From the Tri-Border Press for the Week 3-7 February,” February 11, 2003, FBIS Document ID:LAP20030211000124. 236 Bartolomé, 6.237 Bartolomé, 6 238 Silva, 163.
Iguazú National Park, known as Rodavía del Colono.239 The Asunción-Paranaguá Highway, which passes near the falls, is also presumably used by smugglers (see Figure 4, Tri-Border Area and Key Roads Leading to It from Major Cities).
Counterfeiting and Piracy of Products

Argentina and Brazil
Argentina and Brazil are on the Priority Watch List of the copyright-oriented International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) as a result of intellectual property (IP)
239 Clarinha Glock, “Brazil-Paraguay: A Full Plate for Journalists,” Inter American Press Association, July 19, 2001. [http://www.impunidad.com/atrisk/brasil_paraguay7_19_01E.html]
infringements.240 Both countries have had repeated problems with copyright protection and enforcement. Street vendors selling fake products and pirated copies of goods ranging from designer-label sneakers to auto parts have long been a part of life in Brazil in particular. More than half of the business software and music CD market in Brazil is pirated, and as much as 40 percent of the cigarettes consumed in Brazil come from the black market. Industry experts also estimate that one-fifth of the drugs on pharmacy shelves is produced illegally.241 Many of the products being sold in Brazil are known to come into the country from the porous TBA.242
Brazilian officials have reported that the power behind the black market is organized crime and international terrorism. The Arab community in the TBA has been tied to the black market trade in pirated goods, particularly CDs. In a series of probes, Paraguayan prosecutors have alleged that pirated CDs were a main funding source for Islamic extremist groups, such as Hizballah and Hamas (see Hizballah Fund-Raising in the TBA, Software Piracy, below).243

Paraguay
Paraguay, with a thriving industry of pirated products, limited government support for enforcement, an obstructionist judiciary, and ineffective customs, is considered a nightmare for copyright and trademark owners. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) identified Paraguay as a priority foreign country in 1998. Since then, imports of counterfeit CDs and CD-ROMs from Hong Kong, Macau, Thailand, and Malaysia have only increased, making Ciudad del Este the pre-eminent route into Latin America for counterfeits. In February 2000, the IIPA identified Paraguay as the Latin American country causing the most serious problems relating to intellectual property (IP) infringements.244 It became the only country to rank with China as an IP violator.245 Paraguay earned this status because it serves as a major transshipment point for pirated visual media products from Asia and also produces pirated products, with organized crime elements controlling aspects of production and distribution. In 2000-02, the
240 James Nurton, “Goodbye to A Difficult Year: The World's Leading IP Practices,” Managing IntellectualProperty [London], June 2002, 56-70; IIPA 2002 “Special 301” Recommendations. [http://www.tetratel.com/custom/downloads/2002_Feb14_PIRACY%20LOSSES.pdf] 241 Patrice M. Jones, Chicago Tribune, “Pirated Goods Cripple Brazil's Economy, But Solutions Seen as Weak,” Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, November 4, 2002, 1. 242 Patrice M. Jones. 243 Patrice M. Jones. 244 James Nurton, “Goodbye to A Difficult Year: The World's Leading IP Practices.” 245 IIPA 2002 “Special 301” Recommendations. [http://www.tetratel.com/custom/downloads/2002_Feb14_PIRACY%20LOSSES.pdf]
pirates' strategy changed, with increasing imports of blank recordable CDs and local burners. The IIPA estimates that 104 million recordable CDs were imported in 2001 alone. Many of these discs turn up as pirated music in Brazil.
Total losses from product piracy in Paraguay in 2002 amounted to an estimated US$223.2 million.246 This figure reflects a nearly twofold increase since 1996, when U.S. companies lost US$117.1 million in 1996 in piracy of products in Paraguay. Much of this criminal activity has been linked to organized criminals based in Korea, Lebanon, Libya, and Taiwan, and the local press has uncovered numerous examples of corruption.
A significant part of the contraband in Ciudad del Este originates in Asia, especially Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia. These pirated products carry first-line brand names of U.S. or Japanese companies. Three levels of falsification are used depending on the hierarchy of the brand name concerned. For example, the same videocassette recorder can be purchased in Ciudad del Este under the names Panasonic, Sony, or Aiwa.247 Most of the contraband merchandise leaves Ciudad del Este along the same air, ground, or water routes that were used to enter the city, that is, through Argentine and Brazilian territory. In the case of Brazil, one of the main smuggling routes is along the illegally opened Rodavía del Colono, which cuts through Iguazú National Park. Brazilian authorities have noted the existence of about 100 clandestine airstrips in Paraguay adjacent to the border that are used for contraband and other smuggling to Argentina and Brazil. An estimated US$1.5 billion worth of goods are moved annually.248
Contraband transported by boat toward Argentina and Brazil from Ciudad del Este crosses the Rio Paraná and Itaipú Reservoir, which is the 1,350 square-kilometer artificial lake on the Brazil-Paraguay border created by the Itaipú Dam. The contraband across the Paraná consists of general merchandise, whereas the contraband transported across the lake consists of stolen automobiles, drugs, and weapons.249
Many Brazilian tourists visit Ciudad del Este to purchase cheap consumer goods. Although an estimated 90 percent of the products sold in Ciudad del Este, such as CDs and videos, are counterfeit, their cheap prices make them popular. Contraband and counterfeiting of
246 STR 2002 “Special 301” Decisions and IIPA Estimated US Trade Losses Due to Copyright Piracy. [http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_Jul11_Americas_LOSSES.pdf] 247 Bartolomé, 6, citing Jorge Camarasa, “Declina la capital del contrabando,” La Nación [Buenos Aires], April 2,2000. 248 Bartolomé, 6, citing Global Crime: International and Regional Cooperation Among Governments and Gangs Alike, Transnational Communities Programme, 1998. 249 Bartolomé, 6.
products in the TBA is centered on about a dozen categories, including electronic equipment, music CDs, videos, computers, athletic shoes, soft drinks, games, jewelry, textiles, perfume, and cigarettes.250 By 1999, São Paulo tobacco companies had lost an estimated US$600 million as a result of counterfeiting and contraband in Ciudad del Este of Brazilian cigarettes.251
The pirating and commercialization of contraband merchandise in Ciudad del Este is facilitated by Paraguayan legislation, which permits the patenting in the National Brand Register of international brand names that are not based in the country.252 For example, a former minister of industry and commerce patented “aspirin” under his own name and sued the multinational Bayer company when it used the word.253
Internet Crime
According to a survey done by the British consulting firm mi2g, a company that serves large banks and insurance companies by monitoring the actions of hackers on the worldwide network of computers, in November 2002 Brazil became the world’s largest "exporter" of Internet crimes, including identity theft, credit card fraud, violations of intellectual property (piracy), and the invasion of sites for political protests.254 Foz do Iguaçu is regarded by Brazilian authorities as one of the main centers of Brazilian Internet crime.255

COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE TBA
The general security forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay have all been involved in efforts to counter the use of the TBA by organized crime and terrorist groups. On May 31, 1996, the three TBA nations established a “Tripartite Command of the Tri-Border” in an effort to better control commerce and the large transient international population. The command draws on members of the Paraguayan National Police, Argentina’s National Gendarmerie or border patrol,
250 Bartolomé, 5.251 Bartolomé, 5, citing “Brasil, inquieto por el contrabando” [Brazil: Concerned About Contraband], La Nación[Buenos Aires], March 4, 2000. 252 Bartolomé, 6, citing Jorge Camarasa, “Declina la capital del contrabando,” La Nación [Buenos Aires], April 2,2000. 253 Bartolomé, 6, citing Jorge Camarasa. 254 Marcelos Starobinas, Text Folha de São Paulo [São Paulo; Internet version-www; a center-left daily, critical of government in general; top-circulation newspaper], November 20, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Study Reveals ThatBrazil is World Leader in Internet Crimes,” November 20, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021120000057. 255 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2003 Special 301 Report: Brazil, 2003, 62. [http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2003/2003SPEC301BRAZIL.pdf]
Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval), and Federal Police units, as well as representatives from the SIDE, the Argentine Consul's Office in Foz do Iguaçu, the National Aeronautical Police, and the Misiones Provincial Police; and the PF (Brazilian Federal Police), Mountain Infantry Battalion no. 34, the State Intelligence Department, and the Brazilian Consul's Office in Ciudad del Este. In 1998 the Tripartite Command was augmented with a security agreement among the three countries to intensify their fight against terrorism, smuggling, money laundering and drug trafficking.256
Despite this joint force, efforts by the TBA governments to counter organized crime and terrorist groups in the TBA have been hindered by institutional problems of corruption, inadequate funding and investigative capabilities, poor training, lack of motivation, inadequate penal codes, and so forth. These factors, which are summarized below, help to explain how organized crime and terrorist groups have operated so profitably in the TBA.
Security Forces
Argentina
Argentina’s principal law enforcement agency is the Argentine Federal Police, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior and is involved in countering drugs.257 The mission of the Argentine National Gendarmerie includes combating drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.258 The SIDE (Secretariat for State Intelligence) also appears to play a key role in countering terrorist activities. Traditionally, the fight against organized crime is carried out by a special operations unit within the security police and the Judicial Police.259 The latter operates under the authority of the court prosecutor in each province.260
256 Mendel, citing Gendarmería Nacional, Escuadrón 13 'Iguazú': Estadísticas del funcionamiento del Escuadrón 13 'Iguazú.' (Puerto de Iguazú, Argentina: Gendarmería Nacional, September, 2001); and "Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil Sign Border Agreement," Press Summary, March 27, 1998, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center Herzlia [Internet, http://www.ict.org.il ] ; and RLG’s Eureka World Law Index. [http://eureka.rlg.org/cgi-bin/zgate2.prod]257 Scott D. Tollefson, “National Security,” Chapter 5 in Rex A. Hudson, ed., Argentina: A Country Study(Washington: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1999), unpublished. 258 The Argentine National Gendarmerie. [http://www.gendarmeria.gov.ar/ingles/texto/ing2.htm]259 Antolin Almiron, 320.260 Kozameh, Ernesto Nicolás, Julio O. Trajtenberg, C.P. Nicolás Kozameh Jr., and Ezequiel Trajtenberg. Guide tothe Argentine Executive, Legislative and Judicial System, July 15, 2001. [http://www.llrx.com/features/argentina.htm]
As a highly bureaucratic organization within the executive branch of government, with the exception of the Judicial Police, Argentina’s police system, including the special unit, is generally inefficient, and its investigative function is relegated to second place, after maintenance of public order.261 Lacking, in addition, any special incentives, the police are ineffective in combating organized crime. Even the relatively autonomous but inadequately trained Judicial Police have been unsuccessful in the fight against organized crime.
Occasional combined forces operations in the TBA appear to have caused only a temporary inconvenience for organized crime. For example, in February 2000, Argentina’s Secretariat of Internal Security sent 1,000 police officers and four boats of the Naval Prefecture to the TBA to combat contraband.262 The next month, the Argentine Air Force conducted a surveillance operation that confirmed, within only three days, at least 15 illegal airstrips in the northern Argentine provinces of Misiones and Corrientes. In addition, about 30 unidentified flights mostly coming from Paraguay were detected.263 Apparently, none were intercepted.
A 28-member Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Información Financiera—UIF), under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, began operating in June 2002 as an additional interagency unit to prevent, control, and fight illegal asset laundering activities related to drug and arms trafficking.264 The establishment of the UIF and the strengthening of anti-money-laundering mechanisms better positioned Argentina to prevent and combat money laundering more effectively, in the assessment of the U.S. Department of State.265 Despite these measures, however, the Central Bank reportedly has been totally ineffective in prosecuting money laundering.266
261 This paragraph is based in part on Antolin Almiron, 322-27. 262 Bartolomé, 7.263 Bartolomé, 7.264 “Ley 25246 Creación de la Unidad de Información Financiera” [Law 25246, Creation of the Financial Information Unit], Boletín Oficial [Buenos Aires], May 10, 2000. [http://www.imolin.org/argtlaw2.htm] 265 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report –2002 (INCSR-2002). Washington: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2003.[http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17952pf.htm]; U.S. Department of State, ISCSR-2002. 266 Pedro Oviedo, “En la Triple Frontera se lavan doce mil millones de dólares al año del narcotráfico, según uninforme official” [In the Triple Border US$12 billion Is Laundered Per Year From Narcotics Trafficking, Accordingto An Official Report],www.MisionesOnLine.net, No. 745, July 8, 2001[http://misionesonline.net/paginas/action.lasso?-database=noticias3&-layout=web&-response=noticia.html&id=11349&autorizado=si&-search]; and “The Fight Against Money Laundering,” La Nación[Buenos Aires; Internet version-www], February 24, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Argentina: Daily Calls for Full Support of Agency Created to Fight Money Laundering,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20030224000052, February 24, 2003.
Corruption is a serious problem at all levels of the Argentine Police.267 Police are poorly paid, with a starting salary of around US$400 (400 pesos) a month rising to about US$2,000 (2,000 pesos) a month for a captain. For the past 20 years, the Argentine police reportedly have been involved in organized crime. For example, the white van used in the AMIA attack was traced to Police Commissioner Juan José Ribelli, who had long been suspected of using his position to traffic in stolen automobiles to Paraguay.268 In 2002, a lawyer at the Center for the Prevention of Police Repression (Coordinadora Contra la Represión Policial e Institucional— Correpi), stated that “in the last decade, there has not been any major illegal business without police participation, from prostitution to gambling, robbery, or kidnapping.”269
The inadequacy of Argentina’s penal code for combating organized crime seems typical of the three TBA countries. Argentina’s Penal Code has not defined organized crime legally; its penal law is, in fact, “typical,” meaning that criminal behavior must be exactly defined in the Penal Code.270 Judicial and legal analogy in penal matters is forbidden. The Penal Code lacks the necessary doctrine of “illicit association,” which defines organized crime, such as a conspiracy by three or more persons to commit offenses through an organization. With the exception of laws related to drug matters, Argentina does not have special laws to fight against organized crime.271

Brazil
Public security in Brazil is largely the responsibility of state governments. In contrast with its Argentine counterpart, Brazil’s PF (Federal Police) force is very small and primarily investigative.272 It plays only a minor role in routine law enforcement. Its purpose is to investigate criminal offenses of an interstate or international nature; to prevent and suppress
267 This discussion is based in part on “Argentina,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001. Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2002. [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8278.htm]268 Junger, 199. 269 “Delinquent; Politics in Argentina (Argentina's Crime Wave),” The Economist [UK], October 5, 2002.270 This paragraph is based in part on Hugo Antolin Almiron, “Organized Crime: A Perspective from Argentina.” Chapter 14 in Jay S. Albanese, Dilip K. Das, and Arvind Verma, eds., Organized Crime: World Perspectives (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 318-19. 271 Antolin Almiron, 327.272 This discussion is based in part on Scott D. Tollefson, “National Security,” Chapter 5 in Rex A. Hudson, ed.,Brazil: A Country Study (Washington: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1998), 400-02; and “Brazil,”Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -2001. Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2002. [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8305.htm]
illicit traffic in narcotics and related drugs; to perform the functions of a coast guard (enforcement only), air police, and border patrol; and to perform the functions of the judicial police.273 A task force made up of the Civil and Military Police, the PF, the Federal Highway Police, the Municipal Guard, and, in some cases, the Armed Forces has operated in Foz do Iguaçu since April 2001.274 The frequency of money laundering around the region of Foz de Iguaçu is of concern to the Brazilian government because of the TBA’s high occurrences of intellectual property violations and illicit commerce, and because the TBA is believed to be a haven for smuggling and arms trafficking.275
Although some Brazilian police forces are known to be highly professional, a December 2000 Argentine report indicates that a supposed connection has been established between the Civil Police of Foz do Iguaçu and a narcotics network that operates in the Brazilian and Paraguayan parts of the TBA. The chief of Civil Police of Foz do Iguaçu, who has been suspended, was involved.276 The effectiveness of Brazil’s police forces in fighting organized crime and terrorist groups in the TBA is hindered by a general lack of respect for human rights (which makes much of the population fear the police at least as much as most Brazilians fear the criminals), widespread corruption and involvement in crime, and a general failure of the Brazilian government to address its serious problems.
The Brazilian government’s attitude toward the existence of a terrorist problem in the TBA is also a factor. The government has insisted that there is no evidence of terrorist financing in the area, and it has been generally dismissive of reports of terrorists operating in the area.277
273 Silva, 169. 274 Miriam Karam, São Paulo Valor [financial daily, published jointly by the Folha and Globo media conglomerates; Internet version-www], May 20, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Federal Police Denies Presence of Terrorist Cells in Foz do Iguaçu,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20020520000040. 275 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report –2002. Washington: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2003. [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17952pf.htm]276 Oviedo, citing Dr. Guido Rauber Lavado de Dinero: Triple Frontera —Work Paper Nº 1, Prevención de Adicciones y Control de Drogas [Subsecretary of Drug Control and Prevention of Addictions], Ministry of Public Health of Misiones Province, Argentina, updated version of December 31, 2000 (original date, August 2, 1999). 277 For example, see “Brazil: Minister Denies Existence of Terrorist Cell in Triborder Area,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political [London], November 9, 2002, citing text of report by Edson Luiz published by Brazil’s Agencia Estado, November 9, 2002; Carmen Gentile, UPI, “Brazil Denies Terror Groups in Region,” The Washington Times, November 11, 2002 [http://www.washingtontimes.com]; Hala Kilani and Cilina Nasser, “Brazil Dismisses US-Israeli Terror Claims; Ambassador Says ‘Tri-border Area' Is Well Policed,” The Daily Star [Independent Beirut paper; Internet version-www], February 14, 2003, as transcribed for FBIS, “Brazilian Ambassador to Lebanon Denies Terrorist Activities in Tri-Border Area,” February 14, 2003, Document ID: GMP20030214000022.
Nevertheless, Article 4 of Decree 3,755, issued on February 19, 2001, blocks all funds from being sent from Brazil to Osama bin Laden or to companies, associations, or people linked to him. At least three of the decree’s articles refer to the Arab terrorist threat.278
In March 1998, Brazil’s Congress adopted a law authorizing the shooting down of intercepted airplanes that fail to obey signals of the intercepting pilots who patrol the border with Paraguay, but the measure has yet to be implemented. In May 2001, in an effort to interdict contraband, the PF established an air base in Foz do Iguaçu, from where its aircraft patrol the Rio Paraná and the Itaipú Reservoir.279 On August 22, 2002, in an effort to strengthen border controls, the PF began suppressing illegal activities in the TBA’s Friendship Bridge area, specifically along the Paraná.280 The operation was aimed at preventing smugglers and traffickers from using the river for their operations after customs officers increased the traffic
control on the head of the bridge. Joaquim Mesquita, chief of the Foz do Iguaçu PF, reported that the main PF drug enforcement actions in 2002 in the TBA included the confiscation of 12.7 tons of marijuana and of 30 kilograms of cocaine mostly coming from Bolivia and Colombia.281 Undoubtedly, those seizures constitute only a small fraction of the drug traffic. In late 2002, Brazilian authorities reinforced security controls in the Friendship Bridge area by installing two 360-degree panoramic vision surveillance posts (POVs) and by posting 70 agents to the area.282
278 Edson Luiz, “Brasil bloqueou bens de Bin Laden antes dos EUA” [“Brazil Blocks bin Laden Funds Before theUSA”], Oestadao.com, Setembro 24, 2001. [http://www.estadao.com.br /agestado/noticias/2001/set/24/305.htm]279 Bartolomé, 7.280 “Brazilian Federal Police (PF) Launches Gigantic Operation—Ciudad del Este,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este], August 26, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights: Brazil - Paraguay Triborder Press 26-30 Aug 02,” Tri-BorderPress Highlights, September 2, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020902000038. 281 “Federal Police's Annual Report,” A Gazeta do Iguacu [Foz do Iguaçu], January 24, 2003, as translated for FBIS, “Tri-Border Press for the Week of 23-31 January,” Tri-Border Press Highlights, February 4, 2003, FBIS DocumentID: LAP20030204000134. 282 “Surveillance System on Friendship Bridge,” A Gazeta do Iguaçu, November 6, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Highlights: Brazil - Paraguay Triborder Press 4-15 Nov 02,” November 21, 2002, FBIS Document ID:LAP20021121000006.

Paraguay
Information on capabilities of the 200-member Paraguayan police force in Ciudad del Este is lacking, but it is clearly not an effective force, and it is suspected of corruption.283 A general lack of confidence in the local police may be reflected by the fact that the city’s 6,000 shops, 36 banks, and 15 money exchanges all have their private guards. By October 2001, as authorities in Paraguay increased surveillance of the country's Arab immigrants, there were charges that police were extorting large sums of money from some merchants in the TBA in return for not detaining them.284
At the national level, the Secretariat for Prevention and Investigation of Terrorism in Paraguay (Secretaría de Prevención e Investigación del Terrorismo de Paraguay—Seprinte) has been in the forefront of operations and arrests carried out in the Paraguayan sector of the TBA since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. This relatively small antiterrorist organization is a department of the police and works with anti-money-laundering agencies, including the Financial Analysis Unit (Unidad de Análisis Financiera—UAF).285 The establishment of the UAF under the Attorney General’s office in July 2002 was expected by the
U.S. Department of State to enhance cooperation at the working level and to improve the Attorney General’s ability to investigate money laundering and terrorist financing.286 The UAF, which is recognized by the U.S. government and the Egmont Group as a financial intelligence unit, has purview only over financial institutions.287
In addition to establishing the UAF, the Paraguayan government has carried out limited efforts to combat terrorist financing. Nevertheless, Paraguay has limited resources to investigate and prosecute money-laundering cases. Investigations are carried out by a small financial crimes investigative unit, the Unit for Investigating Financial Data (Unidad de Investigación de Datos Financieros—UIDF). Because there are only about 200 prosecutors nationwide for a population of 5.5 million, money-laundering investigations in Paraguay are assigned to a single prosecutor.
283 This paragraph is based in information from Ricardo Grinbaum, “In Paraguay, Smugglers' Paradise,” World Press Review, January 1996, 43, No.1, 25-6 (reprinted from Veja).284 Bill Rogers, “Arabs Accuse Paraguay Police Of Extortion,” Middle East News Online [Durham, North Carolina], October 4, 2001. 285 Location: Juan E. O’Leary 165, esq Benjamín Constant, Asunción (Tel.: (+595) 21 452 411/412; Fax: (+595) 21451 635; E-Mail: seprelad@conexion.com.py). 286 This paragraph is based in part on U.S. Department of State, ISCSR-2002.287 This paragraph is based in part on U.S. Department of State, ISCSR-2002.
Furthermore, government corruption is an ongoing problem related to Paraguay’s money laundering and money-laundering investigations.288
Other than the draft Antiterrorist Law that was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 and remains under consideration, the Paraguayan government currently has no specific laws criminalizing terrorism or terrorist financing.289 Paraguay has adopted provisions to cover conduct that would be considered terrorist acts, but most of these acts do not carry a sentence of more than five years, nor are they considered predicate offenses for money laundering. Although some existing legislation allows for counterterrorist police operations, the lack of any legislation specifically targeting terrorist activities has greatly impeded the efforts of the Paraguayan Antiterrorist Police. Paraguay also lacks the investigative capabilities to track the terrorists’ financial transactions.

The TBA’s Immigration Control Problem
The TBA is known for its lax immigration controls. It is common knowledge that anyone in the region can easily obtain a false passport, birth certificate, driver’s license, and other documents through corrupt officials. Relatively few members of the Asian, Arab, and other ethnic communities in the TBA are believed to be legally registered. Paraguay’s Vice Interior Minister Mario Agustin Sapriza pointed out on May 3, 2001, that the Immigrations Department is where most difficulties are found in preventing the TBA from being used by Islamic extremists.290
Arrests in Ciudad del Este in 2001 showed how typical it is for suspected Islamic extremists in the TBA to be without valid identity documents. One individual arrested in May by Paraguay’s Federal Police at the Ciudad del Este Airport had 17 fake Lebanese passports in his possession.291 On September 21, Paraguayan police carried out two operations in Ciudad del Este and nearby Encarnación in which 17 Arabs were arrested, all of whom had false identity
288 This paragraph is based in part on U.S. Department of State, ISCSR-2002.289 “Paraguay: US Official Says Tri-border Area Source of Islamic Terrorism Funding,” BBC Monitoring Americas – Political [London], May 25, 2002, citing ABC Color Website, May 23, 2002. 290 ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 4, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Vice Interior Minister Confirms Presence of ‘Dormant Islamic Terrorist Cells’,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20010505000002. 291 Mario Daniel Montoya, “War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay’s Triple Border,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, No. 12, December 2001, 13; and “Policiais viajam em vôos internos argentinos” [Police fly on internal Argentine flights], Oestado.com.br, September 19, 2001. [http://www.estadao.com.br/agestado/noticias/2001/set/19/207.htm]
documents and had no entry documents registered by the Department of Immigration.292 The FBI identified three of arrested individuals as having close ties to Hamas and the Lebanese Al-Kaffir group. Reportedly, they collected funds for these terrorist groups to support terrorist plots against the United States.293 Another who escaped the police round-up in Encarnación is the Egyptian Khaled Ta Qe El Din, who is an important figure in the Arab community of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este and believed to be a bin Laden follower and a member of an Egyptian terrorist organization.294
In early October 2001, high-level sources in Argentina’s Ministry of Interior called Brazil's immigration control system for the TBA a problem.295 Argentina places its emphasis on immigration control at the border crossings, while Brazil's control operations are located somewhat deeper inside its territory. In 2002, Brazilian authorities established controls on the roads several kilometers from Foz do Iguaçu.
CONCLUDING POINTS

The TBA as a Haven and Base for Islamic Terrorist Groups
This assessment of open sources pertaining to the TBA during the 1999-June 2003 period concludes that:
. various Islamic terrorist groups, including the Egyptian Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad) and Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), Hamas, Hizballah, and al Qaeda, probably have a presence in the TBA;
. Hizballah and al Qaeda are probably cooperating in the region, but definitive proof of this collaboration, in the form of a specific document, did not surface in this review;
292 James Mack, Deputy Assistant for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Providing Support to Counternarcotics and Other Anti-Crime Efforts,” Testimony Before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Washington, October 10, 2001 [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/2001/sep_oct/6215.htm]; and Bartolomé, 14, citing “Juez confirmó la prisión de los 13 árabes” [Judge Confirms Prison for the 13 Arabs], Noticias, September 25, 2001. According to the list released to the press, the 11 who were charged included: Mohamed Jassin, Yehya Hamed Kaddoura, Abdel Nasser Waked, Assen Mohammed Waked, Yazzed Khalil Abu El Hawa, Rateb Ahmad Ayoub, Samir Nazih Jbara, Jehya Fallez Hussein, Hassan Abdalah Halawi, Kassen Mohamed Fawaz, and Sufián Asfour Mahamad Asfour. 293 Bartolomé, 15, citing “Paraguay lanza operativo contra el terrorismo” [Paraguay launches operation against terrorism], El Nuevo Herald [Miami], September 23, 2001. 294 Bartolomé, 15, citing “Egipcio está sendo investigado pela PF” [Egyptian is being investigated by PF], O Estado de São Paulo, September 24, 2001. 295 La Nación [Buenos Aires], October 3, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “National Border Guard Commander: Tri-Border Area Hotbed of Sleeper Cells,” October 3, 2001, FBIS LAP20011003000015.
. Islamic terrorist groups are using the TBA for purposes of safe haven, fund-raising, money laundering, recruitment, training, plotting, and other terrorist-related activities;
. terrorism within the TBA by Islamic terrorist groups has been limited to selective, mafia-like assassinations of business or community leaders who may be opposing their interests;
. the Islamic fundamentalist groups’ activities in the TBA are in support of their international organizations and the Islamic jihad against the United States and U.S. allies;
. Hizballah has reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from narcotics and arms trafficking, product piracy, and other illicit activities in the TBA;
. a substantial number of members of the Islamic terrorist groups in the TBA have probably moved out of the region since late 2001 to other areas of South America, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, where they may be under less pressure by security forces than in the TBA; and
. if TBA-based Hizballah and al Qaeda operatives are plotting any anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, their most likely targets would be U.S. embassies and consulates in South America.

The TBA as a Center for Organized Crime
This assessment also concludes that:
. the TBA is highly popular with other organized crime groups, which use the region to launder billions of dollars every year and to earn multi-million-dollar profits by engaging in narcotics and arms trafficking and other illicit activities;
. an informal tripartite alliance exists among the Islamic terrorist groups, the organized crime mafias, and the many corrupt government or police officials in the TBA and elsewhere in the TBA countries;
this informal alliance appears to be primarily oriented toward reaping multi-million-dollar profits from illicit activities; various Chinese Mafia groups operate in the TBA and are attempting to expand their activities into Argentina and elsewhere;
the Chinese and Russian (Chechen) mafias reportedly are collaborating with the Islamic terrorist groups in the region, especially with al Qaeda; the Hong Kong Mafia, which has close relations with the Hizballah network in the TBA, is particularly active in the product-piracy business; and indigenous Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan mafia groups are also actively involved in the TBA.

Efforts to Counter Organized Crime and Terrorism in the TBA
This assessment also concludes that:
. widespread corruption at all levels of government and police in the three TBA countries is facilitating the activities of the Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime in the TBA;
. the capabilities of the security and investigative forces in the TBA are inadequate for ridding the region of the Islamic terrorist groups, organized crime mafias, and corrupt officials who do business with them; and
. laws for combating terrorist fund-raising, money laundering, organized crime activities in general, and official corruption are also inadequate.
APPENDIX Alleged Operatives of Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in the TBA
Barakat, Assad Ahmad Mohamad (Hizballah)
Assad Mohamed Barakat, 37, is generally identified as Hizballah’s military (i.e., terrorist) operations chief in the TBA, as well as its chief fund-raising officer in the Southern Cone. The
U.S. Department of State has also reportedly identified him as connected to the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egyptian Islamic Group).296 He is also believed to be heavily involved in Hizballah
funding operations in the region. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, an international arrest warrant was issued for his arrest, and as a result Barakat fled the TBA in October 2001. He was indicted in Paraguay on charges of association for criminal purposes, abetment of crime, and tax evasion.297 Brazilian authorities arrested Barakat in Foz do Iguaçu on June 22, 2002, and imprisoned him in Brasília, where he has been awaiting a decision from the Federal Supreme Court on an extradition request from Paraguay.298 In mid-December 2002, the plenum of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled to extradite Barakat to Paraguay.299
296 “Barakat To Be Extradited: Slippery Barakat Caught by Federal Police Hands,” Última Hora, June 24, 2002, as translated by FBIS Document ID: LAP20020624000088, “Highlights: Paraguay Press,” June 24, 2002. 297 “Another Serious Charge Pending Against Barakat,” Vanguardia [Ciudad del Este; Internet version-www], June 26, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay Press Highlights,” June 26, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020626000113; and Héctor Rojas and Pablo Vergara, La Tercera de la Hora [Santiago; a conservative, probusiness, top-circulation daily, Internet version-www], November 8, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Chilean Police Examine Link to Alleged Triborder Hizballah Financial Network,” November 8, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011108000085). 298 Jose Maschio, reporting on telephone interview between Assad Ahmad Barakat and Agencia Folha on November 18, 2002, from his prison cell in Brasilía, Folha de São Paulo (Internet version-www), November 19, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Brazil: Barakat Denies Involvement in Terrorism; Views 'Economic Plot' Against Him,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20021119000039. 299 “Brazilian Federal Supreme Court Rule To Extradite Barakat,” ABC Color [Internet version-www], December 20, 2002, as translated for FBIS, December 20, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021220000015.
A Lebanese by birth, Barakat left civil-war-torn Lebanon at age 17 and emigrated to Paraguay with his father. After a few years as a street peddler, he opened Apollo Import-Export, a stall in the Page shopping gallery in Ciudad del Este. Since then, he reportedly has accumulated numerous companies, including the Mondial (World) Engineering and Construction company,
with offices in Ciudad del Este and Beirut, as well as numerous properties. Ahmad is the brother of priest Akraam Ahmad Barakat, who reportedly is also a high-ranking leader of Iran's Hizballah.300
Barakat’s Paraguayan passport reportedly indicates that he was last in the United States in April 2000. His visa was revoked after his name appeared on the U.S. Department of State’s list of “suspected terrorists.” Barakat has acknowledged owning businesses in Chile and the United States (Miami and New York).301 Iguaçu Source: Istoé August 11, 2001

Fayad, Sobhi Mahmoud (Hizballah)
Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, who claims to be a Lebanese businessman but is widely reported to be a key Hizballah operative, was arrested at the Page shopping gallery in Ciudad del Este on November 8, 2001, on charges of being an alleged member of an organization that remits funds to the Islamic Middle East armed struggle.302 Documents found at the Apollo shop owned by Assad Ahmad Barakat allegedly incriminate Sobhi Fayad. On the basis of the documents, it was alleged that Sobhi Fayad, who had not paid taxes since 1992, was sending large sums of money to banks in Lebanon almost daily. He remained under arrest in the Special Operations Police Force unit in Asunción, together with his brother Salhed Fayad, until he was released on bail in early October 2002. On November 21, 2002, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad submitted to public trial for
300 Special Correspondents Vladimir Jara Vera and Dany Ortiz, ABC Color [Internet version], December 23, 1999, as translated for FBIS, “Police Conduct Operation to Intimdate Islamic Extremists,” December 23, 1999 (FBIS ID: FTS19991223001521). 301 La Tercera de la Hora [Internet version-www], November 14, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Hizballah-Linked Businessman Acknowledges Having Businesses in Chile, US,” November 14, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011114000075200). 302 ABC Color [Web site], November 9, 2001, as cited by “Paraguay: Lebanese Man with Alleged Hezbollah Links Arrested in Ciudad del Este,” BBC Monitoring, November 9, 2001.
tax evasion. He was indicted for running a business without accounting books, using falsified public documents, and tax evasion in 1998 and 1999.303
Paraguayan authorities reportedly believe that Sobhi Fayad, along with Barakat and fugitive Ali Hassan Abdallah, are the coordinators of a Hizballah financial network in the TBA. In addition, Fayad is a brother of an important Hizballah member in Lebanon. Authorities regard Fayad as one of the main Hizballah chiefs assigned to the TBA.304 Police found in his possession
documents for funds sent to Canada and Lebanon. Fayad’s influence within the Lebanese community in the TBA was emphasized by reports that he was seen in the company of the new Lebanese ambassador in Paraguay, Hicham Hamdam, who presented his credential in Asunción in October 2001, on various occasions when the diplomat attended local activities. A letter that Fayad received from Lebanon allegedly proves that in 2000 alone he sent more than US$3.5 million to the “Martyr” Social Beneficent Organization, which is linked to the Hizballah and which looks after children whose parents died at the service of the Hizballah and who are considered martyrs.305 Investigators confirmed the presence of Fayad at an Al-Mukawama operations center. According to Interior Ministry sources, he appears in one of the surveillance photos chatting with Iman Tareb Khasraji (on left in photo) in early November 2001.306
Fayad initially became a fugitive in October 1998.307 Paraguayan authorities had arrested him in 1998, while he was
303ABC Color [Internet version-www], November 22, 2002, as translated for FBIS, Document ID: LAP20021122000047. 304 Libanês preso no Paraguai é "peso pesado" do Hezbollah, diz polícia” (Lebanese Imprisoned in Paraguay Is aHizballah Heavyweight, Police Say), estadao.com.br [Website of O Estado de São Paulo], November 9, 2001. 305 Roberto Cosso, “Extremistas receberam US$50 mi de Foz do Iguaçu” (Extremists Received US$50 million fromFoz do Iguaçu), Folha de S. Paulo, December 3, 2001; and ABC Color [Internet version-www], May 28, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Daily Reports More Evidence of Barakat's Contributions to Hizballah,” May 28, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020528000073. 306 ABC Color [Internet Version-www], January 16, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: Court Investigates Hizballah Base Photos” (FBIS, LAP20020116000091). 307 Bartolomé, 15.
observing the U.S. Embassy in Asunción, either before or after requesting an appointment in the facility. He was later released after cooperating with authorities.308 In October 1999, Fayad was again arrested in front of the U.S. Embassy in Asunción, after having requested a visa. On that occasion, he was questioned on the basis of the suspicions of U.S. officials, but he was later again released for lack of evidence against him.

Mehri, Ali Khalil (Hizballah)
The relationship between the TBA underworld and Middle East terrorism became clearer in February 2000, when Paraguayan authorities arrested Ali Khalil Mehri, 32, a newly naturalized Paraguayan citizen born in Lebanon. Considered one of the principal Hizballah fund
raisers in the TBA, Mehri was arrested during a police raid of his apartment at the Panorama II building in Ciudad del Este on February 25, 2000. Shortly thereafter, he escaped and has eluded Interpol’s attempt to capture him.309 At the time that Mehri disappeared, Argentine authorities were interested in questioning him in connection with the two unsolved bombings of Israeli targets in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s—that of the Israeli Embassy on March 17, 1992, and a Jewish community center (AMIA) on July 18, 1994.310
Reportedly, Merhi had access codes to restricted Web sites that promote international terrorism, and when they raided his apartment, police found software that he allegedly was distributing to raise money for Al-Muqawamah.311 The software features film footage of terrorist attacks and interviews with suicide bombers before they died. It also provides a bank account number in Lebanon, where money could be sent to support Al-Muqawamah. In a certified
308 “Libanês preso no Paraguai.” 309 ABC Color, November 5, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Barchini's Calls Under Scrutiny, New Antiterrorist Officials,” November 5, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011105000019). 310 Kevin G. Hall, “Officials Link Pirated Goods in Paraguay to Terrorism: Money Sent on to Hezbollah,” San Diego Union –Tribune, April 15, 2001, A19.311 Hall, San Diego Union –Tribune.
translation of the CD's Arabic contents, an unidentified radical leader exhorts listeners to strike at the United States and Israel.312
Other documents seized during the raid included fund-raising forms for a group in the Middle East named Al-Shahid, ostensibly dedicated to “the protection of families of martyrs and prisoners,” as well as documents of money transfers to Canada, Chile, Lebanon, and the United States of more than US$700,000.313 British intelligence subsequently identified Mehri as a potential al Qaeda financier.314 Paraguayan authorities charged Mehri with piracy of computer programs and CDs and with selling millions of dollars of counterfeit software and funneling the proceeds to Hizballah. Apparently aided by his large campaign contributions to powerful members of Paraguay’s ruling Colorado Party, Mehri escaped from prison in June 2000 and fled to Syria.315 In late September 2001, he was located in Syria, and Paraguay asked Interpol to arrest him, but he managed to escape.316

Mukhlis, El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya)
Argentina’s Secretariat for State Intelligence (SIDE) has investigated the Egyptian Al-Sa'id Ali Hasan Mukhlis (also spelled Mokhles), 31, who has been identified as having contacts with Saudi Arabian members of a group of Osama bin Laden militants in the TBA. Mukhlis, an Egyptian who had trained in Afghanistan and lived in Saudi Arabia and was a member of the Islamic fundamentalist group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, was suspected of participating in the massacre of 62 foreign tourists at Luxor, Egypt, on November 17, 1997. A native of the coastal city of Port Said, Mukhlis left Egypt in the early 1990s, fearing random arrests of Al-Gama'a members.
312 Hall, San Diego Union –Tribune. 313 “Comandos terroristas se refugian en la triple frontera” (Terrorist "Commandos" Hide in the Triborder Region), El País [Colombia], November 9, 2001. 314 Roslyn A. Mazer, “From T-Shirts to Terrorism: That Fake Nike Swoosh May Be Helping to Fund Bin Laden's Network,” Washington Post, September 30, 2001, B2. The U.S. Embassy cancelled the visa issued to Deputy Angel Ramón Barchini to enter the United States because of his alleged links with suspicious Arab extremists, including Mehri, whose escape he allegedly abetted. See ABC Color, November 5, 2001, as translated for FBIS, “Barchini's Calls Under Scrutiny, New Antiterrorist Officials,” November 5, 2001 (FBIS, LAP20011105000019). 315 Roslyn A. Mazer, “From T-Shirts to Terrorism: That Fake Nike Swoosh May Be Helping to Fund Bin Laden's Network,” Washington Post, September 30, 2001, B2. 316Bartolomé, 11, citing “Detectan en Siria presencia de megapirata libanés prófugo” [Lebanese megapirate fugitive detected in Syria], ABC, September 27, 2001.
Argentine security suspected that the detonators used in the 1994 AMIA attack were secured in the TBA and linked Mukhlis to that operation. Argentine security believed that Mukhlis established terrorist cells in Foz do Iguaçu to raise funds, to manufacture counterfeit documents, and to maintain contact with Hamas and Hizballah sympathizers. After living with his family in Foz do Iguaçu in 1998, Mukhlis was arrested at a border control station in El Chuy, Uruguay, on the Brazilian-Uruguayan border on January 26, 1999, as he tried to leave Brazil
using a fake Malaysian passport. Contacted by border-control authorities, the CIA reportedly requested that he be detained on charges of having participated in the 1997 terrorist attack that killed 62 U.S. and European tourists in Luxor. At the time of his arrest, Mukhlis was allegedly en route to Europe for a meeting with another al Qaeda terrorist. Egypt immediately began a lengthy
El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed Mukhlis legal struggle to extradite Mukhlis. In mid-1999 Egypt Source: CANAL 10 [Montevideo], demanded that Uruguay extradite Mukhlis on the Edición Internet, March 22, 1999. accusation in absentia of having participated in the Luxor attack. Uruguay’s Supreme Court approved the extradition request in early May 2003. Mukhlis’ wife, Sahar (Sarrah) Mohamed Hassam Abud Hamanra, was arrested along with her husband in 1999 but immediately released. At the time of her arrest in Uruguay, Hamanra produced Brazilian documentation that Brazil’s Federal Police (PF), which had already investigated her for one month, declared false. She is on the list of 100 people that the FBI wanted to interview after September 11. Just hours after the hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the FBI reportedly requested South American security services to intensify efforts to locate Mukhlis’ wife. Law enforcement sources were quoted in the report as saying that Hamanra could be the contact between al Qaeda and the Arab community in the TBA.317 According to official sources, citing the SIDE, Mukhlis received military training in Afghanistan from Al-Jama'at al-Islamiyah in the 1980s. He was later sent to Foz do Iguaçu by bin Laden. In that Brazilian city, Mukhlis allegedly “formed terrorist cells to collect funds for the
317 Martin Arostegui, “Search for Bin Laden links looks south,” www.autentico.org [UPI via COMTEX], October 12, 2001.
Middle East and to conduct logistical support activities, such as forging passports or other documents. That false documentation was meant for activists in the Islamic Jihad.” Furthermore, officials asserted that “he had a mission to make contact with Hamas and Hizballah sympathizers” in Ciudad del Este, Foz do Iguaçu, and São Paulo.
In a ruling made public on October 5, 2001, an Uruguayan appeals court approved the extradition of Mukhlis, conditioning its approval on commitments from Egypt to not apply the death penalty, to respect due process, and to not try him on the charge of falsification of documents, for which he was already convicted in Uruguay. However, an appeal of the ruling to the Supreme Court was expected to take another 12 months. The appeals court reportedly indicated that Mukhlis was trained in Afghan camps commanded by Osama bin Laden.318

al-Qadi, Marwan ‘Adnan (“Marwan al-Safadi”) (Hizballah)
Marwan ‘Adnan al-Qadi (“Marwan al-Safadi”), 40, participated in the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. He was arrested in November 1996 in connection with a plot by Islamic groups in the TBA to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Paraguay that month. Police who raided his apartment in Ciudad del Este found it filled with explosives, pistols equipped with silencers, double-barreled rifles, false Canadian and U.S. passports, and a large amount of cash. Al-Qadi fled to Asunción, where Paraguayan police detained him. Two days later, U.S. officials escorted him to the United States.319
Although extradited to the United States and sentenced to 18 months in prison, al-Qadi was deported to Canada, where he received a nine-year prison sentence for drug trafficking. Al-Qadi escaped from Canada’s prisons three times and finally succeeding in escaping from prison in Montreal, with the help of Hizballah elements in that area, and fleeing to South America with a false passport. Arrested by Brazilian authorities, he again escaped three times from prison in Brazil before reaching Ciudad del Este.320
318 El Nuevo Herald [Miami], October 6, 2001, from AFP; New York Times, November 27, 2001, citing a report published on October 5, 2001, in the Uruguayan daily El Observador. 319 Humberto Trezzi, “EUA pressionam Brasil a colaborar” [USA pressures Brazil to collaborate], Zero Hora, September 19, 2001. 320 Trezzi, Zero Hora.

Sabnani, Rajkumar Naraindas
In November 2002, investigations were focused on a fugitive Hong Kong businessman named Rajkumar Naraindas Sabnani, who is reportedly linked to Hizballah and in charge of raising funds for fundamentalist organizations.321 Sabnani, who is an Indian citizen, has commercial ties with Hizballah supporters, who have customarily gathered at the Page shopping gallery in Ciudad del Este. His contacts reportedly include the head of Hizballah military operations in the region, Assad Barakat, who, in late 2002, was in custody in Brasília. Sabnani was reportedly receiving US$200,000 daily from profits stemming from deals involving pirated products shipped from Hong Kong and is the main liaison with "importers" of pirated products in Alto Paraná Department.322
Inner City Press’s Finance Watch reported on January 13, 2003, that three persons connected to Tsim Sha Tsui businessman Rajkumar Sabnani had been under house arrest in Ciudad del Este on suspicion of terrorism, money laundering and tax evasion since July 2002.323 One is Sabnani's business associate, Haresh Jamnadas Chandnani; another is his employee, Sunil Jamanand Turani; and the third is his niece Israni Muskan Kamlesh. As of late November 2002, none of them had been charged and no warrant had been issued for Sabnani's arrest. Prosecutors explained that a raid on their house in July 2002 uncovered bomb-making materials, a fax order for AK-47 assault rifles with Sabnani's name on it, and authorization from unknown persons for him to use US$30 million (HK$ 234 million), allegedly to trade in arms. The items seized also included a black briefcase containing an Israeli-made hand grenade, two balaclavas, explosive materials and a set of photographs of weapons and ammunition, the report said.324 Authorities said they had evidence that large amounts of money were being sent off-shore to organizations with terrorist connections, according to the report, but cited no sources or details about the alleged recipients of the money.
During the week of December 16, 2002, one of India's top diplomats in South America, Rinzung Wangdi, New Delhi's ambassador to Argentina, flew to Ciudad del Este and intervened
321 ABC Color [Internet Version-www], November 22, 2002, as translated for FBIS, “Paraguay: 'Strong Ties' Seen Between Hong Kong Mafia, Tri-border Based Hizballah,” November 22, 2002 (FBIS, LAP20021122000059). 322 “Paraguay: 'Strong Ties' Seen,” ABC Color. 323Finance Watch/Inner City Press, January 13, 2003. [URL: http://www.innercitypress.org/finwatch.html]324 Agence France-Presse, “HK Businessman's Associates Investigated in Paraguay for Terror Links,” ClariNet Hot News, November 23, 2002. [http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/dn/Qhongkong-paraguay-crime.RHk3_CNO.html], citing Sunday Morning Post [Hong Kong].
in an attempt to get Rajkumar Sabnani’s relatives and associates released from house arrest. The threesome have denied all the allegations against them, which they claim were fabricated by influential Arab businessman Ali Saiun, who is said to have corrupt links to police in Paraguay. Saiun also has links to Hong Kong and is understood to have visited the Special Administrative Region (SAR) in recent years. He is involved in a trade dispute with Sabnani's company, Livstar, which sells small electronic goods made on the mainland to Paraguay and other Latin American countries. Under Paraguayan law, state prosecutors had until January 26 to press charges, although there were provisions for that date to be extended.
Source: http://www.igeo.ufrj.br/fronteiras/pesquisa/drogafoz.htm

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Montoya, Mario Daniel. “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, no. 12 (December 2001): 13-14.
Montoya, Mario Daniel. “War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay’s Triple Border,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, no. 12 (December 2001): 12-15.
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Financing terrorism

2006-06-20T11:33:00.000Z

FINANCING OF TERRORISM

Conceptual and Legal Issues
1. In general, money laundering involves the processing of the proceeds of crimes already committed so as to disguise their illegal origin, while the financing of terrorism involves the processing of funds (often legitimately acquired) to be used in future crimes. As a result, many of the measures to deter money laundering, especially those that involve identifying criminal proceeds, are not effective in deterring terrorism. However, while what constitutes “laundering” and “financing” are understood and broadly accepted, what constitutes a predicate crime to money laundering and what constitutes the crime of terrorism are not. Terrorism involves certain actions, such as kidnapping, extortion, assault, murder, or the destruction of property, that are themselves already serious crimes. The concept of terrorism as a separate crime relates to the reason or purpose for which these already serious crimes are carried out.

2. The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly but is not yet in force (ratified by only four countries), contains extensive provisions on international cooperation against financing for terrorism. The Convention’s definition of terrorism is based on two alternative criteria: terrorism is either an offense within the scope of one of the treaties listed in the annex to the Convention (e.g., hijacking of aircraft, bombings, taking of hostages) or “any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

3. International law has generally recognized that governments need not cooperate in criminal matters when the act was also political in nature; this is because governments may differ as to whether a violent act might be acceptable due to a compelling political justification. The Convention would exclude this political exception.

4. The Convention also establishes a duty to investigate persons suspected of financing terrorism, to avoid the risk of flight by an offender (or alleged offender), to make terrorism an extraditable offense, and to refer for domestic prosecution those offenders who are not extradited. Prosecutorial discretion is maintained. The Convention provides no sanctions for countries if they fail to cooperate.

5. The Security Council’s Resolution No. 1373 (2001) of September 28, 2001 requires the adoption by all States of certain measures against terrorism, and creates a Committee, chaired by the United Kingdom, to report within 90 days on compliance with the Resolution. The Resolution includes no definition of terrorism.

6. With respect to the financing of terrorism, paragraph 1 of the resolution requires each state to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalize the willful financing of terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and related entities, and prohibit payments to terrorists and related entities. Moreover, the resolution imposes an obligation on all States to “bring to justice” terrorists or persons assisting or funding terrorist activities; although the concept of “bringing to justice” is not defined by the resolution, it would seem that this obligation may be performed either by extraditing the offender or prosecuting the offender in local courts. The same resolution calls upon—but does not require—all states to become parties to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of December 9, 1999.

FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
The following statement was issued following the FATF extraordinary plenary meeting:

7. Recognizing the vital importance of taking action to combat the financing of terrorism, FATF has agreed these Recommendations, which, when combined with the FATF 40 Recommendations on money laundering, set out the basic framework to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts.

Ratification and implementation of UN instruments

8. Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.Countries should also immediately implement the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.

Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering

9. Each country should criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations. Countries should ensure that such offenses are designated as money laundering predicate offences.

Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets

10. Each country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.

11. Each country should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, which would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations.

Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism

If financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organizations, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.

International cooperation

12. Each country should afford another country, on the basis of a treaty, arrangement or other mechanism for mutual legal assistance or information exchange, the greatest possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.

13. Countries should also take all possible measures to ensure that they do not provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations, and should have procedures in place to extradite, where possible, such individuals.

Alternative remittance

14. Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and nonbank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions.

Wire transfers

15. Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address, and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent, and the information should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment chain. Countries should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds transfers, which do not contain complete originator information (name, address, and account number).

Nonprofit organizations

16. Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Nonprofit organizations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
(i) by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities;
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and
(iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organizations.

Conflicts in June 2006 around all world

2006-06-11T15:20:00.000Z

CENTRAL AFRICA

Burundi Replacing Tanzania, new South African mediator Nqakula visited President Nkurunziza and FNL rebel representatives in Bujumbura early May. Stalled government-FNL talks began in Dar es Salaam 29 May. But overall political situation in country deteriorated. Ruling CNDD-FDD party faced growing accusations of corruption and authoritarianism. Freedom of expression an issue as former MP/peace activist Terence Nahimana, who left FNL political wing in 1990, arrested for “compromising state security” after questioning government’s tactics delaying peace negotiations.
“Government, rebel group begin peace talks”, IRIN, 29 May 2006.
“Free expression under threat”, Human Rights Watch, 19 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°31, Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-Up of the Political Landscape, 25 Aug. 2005.

Central African Republic 3,000 marched in Bangui against increasing violence in northwest and bad governance.
“Thousands protest widespread violence”, IRIN, 19 May 2006.

Democratic Republic of Congo Tensions increased substantially in Kinshasa as a third of 33 presidential candidates called for new electoral commission head and talks to renegotiate 30 July election date. Government cracked down on opposition as forces loyal to President Kabila harassed other candidates, and restrictions placed on 3 radio stations for inflammatory broadcasts. 10,000 Kabila supporters marched in Kinshasa 31 May against opposition call for negotiations. 52 rebels, 6 government soldiers, 1 UN peacekeeper killed in clashes in Ituri, where joint DRC-MONUC operation continued to flush out illegal armed groups responsible for near-daily attacks. FDLR rebels attacked 2 villages and army base in North Kivu. In Katanga, Mai Mai warlord Gedeon Kyungu and 350 fighters surrendered to take part in DDR program.
“Coup crackdown a show of force”, Mail & Guardian, 26 May 2006.
“Militia attacks spread terror in DRC in run-up to polls”, Mail & Guardian, 11 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°108, Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, 27 Apr. 2006; and N°104, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 13 Feb. 2006.

Rwanda Government published list of 171 genocide suspects said to be abroad. Despite cool relations with Uganda, President Kagame attended Museveni’s presidential inauguration. 800 of 20,000 Rwandans, who feared local gacaca courts, returned after Burundi refused asylum.
“Who gave Rwandan rebels Ugandan passports?”, The Monitor, 15 May 2006.
“Govt publishes list of genocide suspects still on the ‘run’”, Hirondelle, 11 May 2006.

Uganda LRA announced ready for talks during meetings with southern Sudanese SPLM, presenting real possibility for breakthrough. But President Museveni at odds with International Criminal Court, after giving LRA leader Kony until August to end 20-year insurgency and saying would guarantee safety. Senior U.S. diplomat said new Bush administration priority to “get rid” of LRA by end 2006. Museveni and parliament officially took office mid-month after February election, as controversial treason trial for opposition leader and presidential runner-up Besigye continued.
“Uganda, rebel LRA to start talks next week in Sudan’s Juba”, Sudan Tribune, 1 June 2006.
“Uganda swears in first multi-party parliament in 20 years”, Mail & Guardian, 16 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°35, A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, 11 Jan. 2006.

HORN OF AFRICA

Chad Despite rebel threats of violence, peaceful presidential elections held 3 May. President Déby reelected with 65% of vote; opposition boycotted, claiming poll rigged. Mid-month Chad accused Sudan of organising new alliance of Chadian rebels to oust Déby, called on international community to intervene. Security situation in east dire as armed raiders from Darfur, including Janjaweed militias, forced thousands to flee and threatened aid workers.
“Deby win confirmed, but revised down to 64.67 pct”, IRIN, 29 May 2006.
“Sudanese militia massacre Chadian civilians”, Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2006.

Crisis Group Africa Report N°111, Chad: Back Toward War?, 1 June 2006. The internal situation in Chad is deteriorating rapidly, and spill-over from the Darfur crisis is only part of the reason. Sudan’s deliberate use of Chadian warlords in its counter-insurgency strategy in Darfur and as a tool in its attempts to topple President Idriss Déby is just one aspect of Chad’s woes. The ever deeper convergence of the two crises underlines the difficulty of settling one independently of the other. But Chad’s troubles are equally the result of Déby’s brittle semi-authoritarian regime, and the charade of the 3 May presidential election only made things worse. The April 2006 rebel offensive brought Chad to the brink of all-out civil war. The victory Déby ultimately achieved in pushing rebels back from the gates of the capital, N’Djamena, settled nothing militarily and highlighted the political fragility of the regime.

Ethiopia Alliance for Freedom and Democracy created 22 May in Netherlands, including diaspora members of 5 different groups united by opposition to government. Latest in series of unexplained explosions killed 4 in Addis Ababa 12 May and injured 42 in Jijiga 29 May. Government nominated interim city council to run Addis Ababa after April failure by CUD opposition to fill positions to run administration, prompting CUD parliament walkout. Treason and genocide trial for 111 opposition leaders continued.
“At least 42 wounded in Ethiopian blasts”, Mail & Guardian, 29 May 2006.
“Ethiopia party in rebel alliance”, BBC, 22 May 2006.

Ethiopia/Eritrea UN extended UNMEE peacekeeping mandate for 4 months 31 May but nearly halved number of authorised troops, after Boundary Commission talks 18-19 May in London failed to break deadlock. Ethiopia dropped longstanding precondition of further negotiation before border demarcation can start, demanding instead Eritrea withdraw militias from Temporary Security Zone.
“U.N. trims peacekeeping force in Ethiopia, Eritrea”, AlertNet, 31 May 2006.
“US to blame for border stalemate - Afwerki”, IRIN, 25 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°101, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War, 22 Dec. 2005.

Somalia Heavy fighting between Islamic Courts militia and U.S.-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism spread throughout Mogadishu, after collapse of temporary ceasefire that ended 7-14 May clashes; over 200 killed in month. Alliance accused Courts of links to al-Qaeda, while Courts accused U.S. of funnelling cash to warlords. PM Gedi gave 3 cabinet ministers (also Alliance members in Mogadishu) until early June to come to Baidoa or face dismissal, while cabinet supported inviting Ugandan and Sudanese peacekeepers to improve security. UN Security Council monitoring group reported weapons inflow from increasing number of states, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Italy and Saudi Arabia; all denied violating embargo.
“Somali Islamists seize rival base”, BBC, 31 May 2006.
“U.S. secretly backing warlords in Somalia”, Washington Post, 17 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 Dec. 2005.

Somaliland (Somalia) Somaliland celebrated fifteenth anniversary of self-declared independence from Somalia 18 May. President Royale held talks with AU Commission Chairman Konare on request for AU admission; visited Ethiopia to discuss growing bilateral ties. Somali transitional parliament condemned Ethiopian trade liaison office in Hargeysa. In contentious move, government extended term of council elders (upper house) to 2010 with endorsement of constitutional court, bypassing legislature. 11 killed in fighting between rival subclans in Buhoodhle district.
“Somaliland president sacks minister over police protests”, Reuters, 30 May 2006.
“Controversy over extension of elders’ term of office”, IRIN, 16 May 2006.

Crisis Group Africa Report N°110, Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, 23 May 2006. The dispute between Somaliland and Somalia will become an increasing source of friction, and possibly violence, unless the AU engages in preventive diplomacy. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland is marking 15 years since it proclaimed independence from Somalia. If Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government expands its authority across the shattered country, the dispute over Somaliland’s status is likely to increase bilateral tensions. The AU should appoint a Special Envoy to consult all relevant parties and report on the legal, security and political dimensions of the dispute and offer options for solutions within 6 months. Its Peace and Security Council should organise an informal consultation round with eminent scholars, political analysts and legal experts. Pending final resolution of the dispute, Somaliland should be granted interim observer status at the AU.

Sudan Under intense international pressure, government and largest SLA rebel faction led by Minawi signed Darfur Peace Agreement 5 May in Abuja. Plan calls for creation of temporary regional authority with rebel participation, Janjaweed disarmament, incorporation of rebels into army and Sudanese government funds for reconstruction and compensation. But SLA faction headed by Abdel Wahid and smaller JEM rebel group refused to sign, despite AU urging to do so by 31 May or face possible sanctions. UN Security Council unanimously passed 16 May resolution under Chapter VII supporting peace plan and created team to assess transfer of AU mission to UN, despite Khartoum’s ongoing opposition to UN force. Violent demonstrations by refugees protesting agreement and calling for international protection: AU interpreter killed during UN humanitarian chief Egeland visit to Kalma camp, South Darfur. Rebels accused government of attacking villages in South Darfur, killing dozens. In southeastern state Jonglei, several killed in clashes between SPLA and armed civilians of Lou Nuer community over forced disarmament.
“Split between rebels undercuts Darfur pact”, International Herald Tribune, 31 May 2006.
Comment by Suliman Baldo (Crisis Group), “Darfur’s peace plan: The view from the ground”, openDemocracy, 24 May 2006.
For background on Darfur, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, 31 Mar. 2006.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Swaziland Major donor EU announced suspension of direct funding to pressure government to practice good governance and accountability.
“Unfriendly media laws reviewed”, Media Institute of Southern Africa, 16 May 2006.

Zimbabwe Opposition continued to rally support as government maintained crackdown on protests. Decisive win by main faction of opposition MDC led by Tsvangirai in 21 May Harare by-election over ruling ZANU-PF and smaller MDC faction. Police banned rallies marking first anniversary of Operation Murambatsvina throughout country, arrested 100. Leaked draft of suspected UN initiative on Mugabe succession failed to have impact; government blocked UNSG Annan’s proposed July trip to Harare. Economic crisis deepened as inflation topped 1000%.
“Mugabe moves ‘to crush dissenting views’“, Mail & Guardian, 31 May 2006.
“Annan studies Zimbabwe crisis; official calls Mugabe retirement talk ‘premature’”, Voice of America, 25 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Africa Report N°97, Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?, 17 Aug. 2005; for background, see Africa Report N°93, Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next?, 7 June 2005.

WEST AFRICA

Côte d’Ivoire Twin processes of ex-rebel disarmament and voter identification underway in preparation for October elections. Disarmament pre-regroupment phase will see combatants return to barracks. Government offices began 1-week trial phase to identify estimated 3 million Ivorians without identity papers.
“Bid to hand out ID cards ahead key vote kicks off”, IRIN, 18 May 2006.
“Combatants begin pullback in first step to disarmament”, IRIN, 23 May 2006.

Crisis Group Africa Report Nº109, Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option, 17 May 2006. With progress towards presidential elections, meant to occur before 31 October, the four-year crisis in Côte d’Ivoire could finally end. However, no political actors have yet given up the capacity for violence or committed themselves irrevocably to elections they may lose. The government should embark on a nationwide campaign to inform the public of necessary preparations, including identifying citizens entitled to vote and disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants. Major donor support is needed for all these steps. PM Banny should continue an inclusive dialogue with all political actors and social sectors to mobilise opinion behind the government and should continue working with President Gbagbo, who may be tempted to delay elections to prolong his power.

Guinea President Conté reshuffled cabinet, appointing loyal allies, and cancelled planned medical trip to Switzerland. Social unrest continued as government’s announcement of petrol price hike led unions to call for general strike early June.
“Conte reshuffles government, gives trusted aide top job”, IRIN, 30 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°37, Guinea in Transition, 11 Apr. 2006.

Liberia Demonstration by armed men, many ex-combatants, in Ganta forced inhabitants to flee, after rumours ethnic Mandingo refugees would return to Nimba county and reclaim lands by force. UNMIL forces intervened to stem further unrest. Government reported improvement in fiscal management as part of crackdown on corruption. ECOWAS called for UN to lift sanctions on diamonds and timber.
“What’s happening in Nimba?”, Inquirer, 29 May 2006.
“Ethnic tension high as returnees claim homes, land”, IRIN, 22 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°107, Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System, 6 Apr. 2006; and Briefing N°36, Liberia: Staying Focused, 13 Jan. 2006.

Mali Tuareg rebels occupied 2 military bases in north eastern town of Kidal 23 May, and reportedly stole military equipment before retreating. Government forces retook control but growing tensions in town prompted fears of more violence.
“Mali rebels say fighting to save nomadic culture”, AlertNet, 29 May 2006.
“‘Tuareg rebels’ attack Mali army”, BBC, 23 May 2006.

Nigeria Affirmation of constitutional process as President Obasanjo announced would step down in 2007 after senate rejected constitutional amendment to allow controversial third term. Obasanjo later reshuffled senior security staff. Shell refused to pay $1.5 billion environmental damages to Ijaw community in Niger Delta, as ordered by court in February, pending appeal. Violence continued in region, with alleged militants killing U.S. oil worker and 6 police in separate incidents, as Ijaw rebel groups threatened joint attacks.
“A huge ‘no’ to Africa’s big-man politics”, Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 2006.
“Shell contests huge Nigeria fine”, BBC, 22 May 2006.

Sierra Leone Transfer of former Liberian President Taylor to The Hague on hold as no country willing to house him if convicted. Justice George Gelaga King from Sierra Leone elected to succeed Justice Fernando as president of Special Court. Presidential candidates began to prepare for 2007 elections; police announced impartiality.
“In the court room - the state of the courts today”, Standard Times, 18 May 2006.
“Taylor prison location holding up trial”, IRIN, 4 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°87, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, 8 Dec. 2004.

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan “For a Just Kazakhstan” opposition alliance activist Zhumabaev sentenced to 5 years prison on charges of causing civil disorder 15 May. Alliance also alleged leader Zhaqiyanov prevented by authorities from travelling to Astana to meet visiting U.S. Vice President Cheney.
“Apparent rift opens within Nazarbaev family”, RFE/RL, 19 May 2006.
“Cheney visit spotlights pivotal Kazakh role”, ISN, 9 May 2006.

Kyrgyzstan President Bakiev rejected resignations of 13 ministers after parliamentary resolution criticised cabinet, but he later made series of senior appointments to government and administration 10 May. Same day alleged organised crime boss, and winner of April parliamentary by-election, Ryspek Akmatbayev shot dead by unknown assailants: supporters called for resignation of PM and deputy interior minister but backed down after meeting Bakiev. Gunmen from Tajikistan breached border, clashing with Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards 12 May: 13 reported dead. Authorities linked attack to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Government concern over Islamic radicalism appeared connected to arrests of influential clergymen and moratorium on activity of Tabligh movement in Batken province. “For Reform!” movement held large demonstration 27 May, demanding progress on reform and against corruption.
“Kyrgyzstan’s leaders face pressure from multiple sources”, Eurasia Insight, 26 May 2006.
“Kyrgyz-Tajik border raid stokes fears”, IWPR, 19 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°109, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, 16 Dec. 2005.

Tajikistan Islamic Renaissance party said government targeting members after activist died in police custody 4 May; 3 police officers arrested in connection with death. Gunmen breached border and entered Kyrgyzstan, clashing with Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards; 13 reported dead. Authorities linked attack to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and stepped up border security.
“President Rahmonov is taking no re-election chances”, Eurasianet, 17 May 2006.
“Clock ticking for Tajik opposition campaign”, IWPR, 12 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°33, Tajikistan’s Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, 19 May 2004.

Turkmenistan Central Bank Chairman Jumaniyaz Annaorazov dismissed 12 May; observers connected recent high turnover in Bank leadership with investigations into dubious gas deals. EU Parliament delayed decision on trade deal with Turkmenistan to July.
“Turkmenistan’s hidden travails”, openDemocracy, 9 May 2006.
“Proposed EU deal sparks criticism”, ISN, 2 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°85, Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy, 4 Nov. 2004.

Uzbekistan Anniversary of 2005 Andijan massacre marked by demonstrations outside country including by exiles on Kyrgyz side of border 3 May. Government released video depicting event as Islamic militant uprising; EU condemned continuing resistance to independent inquiry. Court rejected appeal by rights activist Mutabar Tojiboyeva, arrested after Andijan, against 8-year sentence. Opposition activist Nodira Hidoyatova released from prison after sentence suspended.
Comment by Andrew Stroehlein (Crisis Group), “We must prepare for the coming crisis in Uzbekistan”, Financial Times, 12 May 2006.
“Uzbekistan’s relentless downward slide”, IWPR, 12 May 2006.
Crisis Group media release, “One Year after the Massacre in Andijan”, 10 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°45, Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, 16 Feb. 2006.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan Month saw worst violence since 2001, while in Kabul new parliament asserted its authority. 350 insurgents, civilians and security personnel killed across southern provinces. Resurgent Taliban used large units, reportedly teaming up with drug traffickers and other anti-government elements, to attack coalition troops and Afghan security forces. U.S. military-truck accident in Kabul 29 May sparked mass anti-U.S. riots, killing 8. UK began deployment of 3,500 troops as part of NATO-led peacekeeping expansion in south and formally assumed command from U.S.-led troops in Helmand 1 May. 20 members of new cabinet, including ministers of defence, foreign affairs, interior and finance, sworn in 2 May after approved by parliament; 5 positions remain to be filled. Parliament rejected renomination of conservative head of Supreme Court, seen as major impediment to judicial reform.
“Afghanistan, unraveling”, New York Times, 1 June 2006.
“Afghan parliament rejects prez nominee for Supreme Court chief justice”, Boston Herald (AP), 27 May 2006.

Crisis Group Asia Report N°116, Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, 15 May 2006. The fledgling National Assembly can play a vital role in stabilising Afghanistan and holding President Karzai’s administration accountable by giving voice to the country’s diverse population. The parliament has potential to draw the regions to the centre in an unprecedented way but if it is considered impotent, citizens are likely to lose faith in democratisation. Unfortunately the Karzai administration appears to calculate that a weak, fragmented body would mean more power for itself rather than a loss for the country.

Bangladesh Dispute over Election Commission continued. Supreme Court rejected draft voter list published by Commission while Bureau of Statistics stated list contains extra 11 million voters, leading to opposition Awami League (AL) demonstrations against “election engineering”. Separate AL protests demanded end to water and power shortages. Journalists in Kushtia reportedly attacked by cadres of ruling BNP. 2 leaders of banned Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen group, and 10 accomplices sentenced to death for November 2005 murder of 2 judges.
“Heinous attack on journalists”, Daily Star, 31 May 2006.
“One dead after Bangladesh protest”, BBC, 23 May 2006.

India (non-Kashmir) Maoist violence and religious clashes continued. Maoists attacked refugee camp in Chhattisgarh killing 4 surrendered rebels 13 May. 12 killed by suspected Maoist landmine in Maharashtra state 16 May. Hindu-Muslim clashes in Uttar Pradesh state killed 2 after local BJP leader shot dead 28 May, while 7 killed in western Gujarat state after authorities tried to demolish Muslim shrine in Vadodara 1 May. “Positive” talks between New Delhi and northeastern National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM) rebels 18 May; next round within month. Talks with National Democratic Front of Bodoland rebels 27 May led to 6-month ceasefire extension.
“Curfew continues in Aligarh, police official removed”, Outlook India (PTI), 30 May 2006.
“NSCN-IM talks in Amsterdam end on positive note”, newKerala (IANS), 21 May 2006.
“Northeast echoes”, The Telegraph (Calcutta), 23 May 2006.

Kashmir Violence continued in Indian-controlled Kashmir in apparent reaction to positive talks between Indian PM Singh and main moderate faction of APHC that set up unprecedented framework for future talks. Violence increased before 24-25 May roundtable in Srinagar with grenade attacks and suicide bomber killing 15. Militants attacked Congress party rally in Srinagar while warning given to APHC of “dire consequences” for participation in roundtable prompting APHC withdrawal 22 May. Police reportedly found bodies of 4 Muslims in Baramulla district, allegedly killed for being police informers. Separate India/Pakistan talks on Siachen glacier and Sir Creek border disputes ended without breakthrough.
“Kashmir attack overshadows rivals’ anti-terror talk”, AlertNet, 31 May 2006.
“Indian PM sees ‘ray of hope’ after Kashmir talks”, The Scotsman, 25 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°79, India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps toward Peace, 24 June 2004.

Maldives Police clashed with opposition MDP demonstrators calling on President Gayoom to remove 29 unelected members of law-making chambers. Over 100 reportedly arrested, prompting EU call for more accommodating approach to opposition. MDP chair Nasheed trial on terrorism and sedition charges resumed 28 May.
“Maldivian government calls on MDP to ditch militancy for diplomacy”, newKerala, 29 May 2006.
“Arrests ‘cast serious doubts on commitment to reform’ - EU”, Minivan news, 28 May 2006.

Nepal New government and Maoists met for first peace talks since 2003. Sides agreed to ceasefire and code of conduct which commits both to multi-party system, elections for constituent assembly and end to provocations. Talks due early June. Previously government dropped terrorism charges against Maoists and released hundreds from prison. Parliament voted unanimously to restrict royal powers 18 May, putting Nepal Army under control of parliament, calling for royal family to pay taxes, parliament to name heir to throne and country to be secular state - but did not abolish monarchy. 18 members of PM Girija Prasad Koirala’s cabinet named after intense internal debate. Government scrapped curbs on press freedom and NGOs, and set up panel to investigate excesses of royal government. 9 top security officials suspended, but not head of army. Major OHCHR report released 25 May, detailing torture, illegal detention and suspected mass murder carried out by former Royal Nepal Army in 2003.
“Nepal mulls UN peace process role”, BBC, 30 May 2006.
“‘Army committed to Nepal government’”, Kantipur Online, 29 May 2006.

Crisis Group Asia Report N°115, Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, 10 May 2006. The defeat of King Gyanendra’s absolute rule marks only the first step in Nepal’s long road to peace. The pro-democracy movement was a victory not only for the mainstream political parties and their tactical alliance with the Maoist insurgents, but above all for the Nepali people. Donors must now understand their role as one of safeguarding the difficult transition to peace. The interim administration faces 4 immediate challenges: keeping the peace process with the Maoists on track; containing the king and controlling the army; planning for constitutional change; and responding to calls for transitional justice. The outside world must help the government as it tackles these challenges in a precarious environment, and it should coordinate an approach that makes stability and peace the priority.

Pakistan Tensions continued to rise in Balochistan following 8 April government ban of Balochistan Liberation Army. Attacks on gas infrastructure and security forces continued: at least 10 killed in pipeline explosion in Sui; and 8 police in separate attacks. Renewed clashes in and around Miranshah, North Waziristan killed 10 militants and police while 3 pro-government tribal leaders killed in separate incidents. In South Waziristan, 2 officials shot dead by militants 12 May. Former PMs Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed “Charter of Democracy” in first attempt to forge common platform against military government.
“The way it was: Some call it the Magna Carta”, Daily Times, 27 May 2006.
“Baloch insurgents escalate attacks in Pakistan”, ISN (Jamestown Foundation), 24 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°46, Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, 15 Mar. 2006.

Sri Lanka Security continued to deteriorate. Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission admitted “low-intensity war” and ruled government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) violated truce and security forces involved in extrajudicial retaliatory killings of Tamil civilians. Widespread violence included 11 May clash between navies killing 17 sailors and 50 LTTE. Rebels accused military of killing commander in Batticaloa. Attacks also targeted humanitarian workers: employee of Norwegian Refugee Council killed. Rebels and government agreed to talks in Norway to discuss security of peace monitors but LTTE insist not part of peace negotiations. Donor “Co-chairs” (Japan, U.S., EU, Norway) condemned both sides for deterioration. EU placed LTTE on terrorist list despite earlier rebel warning move would provoke “hardline individualist path”.
“Co-chairs get tough with LTTE, Lanka”, Hindustan Times, 30 May 2006.
“Between peace and war”, openDemocracy, 15 May 2006.
NORTH EAST ASIA

North Korea Nuclear negotiations remained on hold and North-South engagement suffered setback. Pyongyang stopped testing railway reconnection leading Seoul to reconsider cooperation projects. Previously South President Roh Moo-hyun had stated desire to meet Kim Jong-il with offer of increased economic aid. UN resumed limited food aid ending 6-month dispute with government over monitoring of distribution. North’s FM Paek Nam-sun visited Beijing 30 May.
“North Korea steps up criticism of South”, Boston Globe, 28 May 2006.
“A nuclear test for diplomacy”, Washington Post, 16 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Asia Report N°112, North Korea and China: Comrades Forever?, 1 Feb. 2006; for background, see N°108, North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, 15 Dec. 2005.

Taiwan Strait President Chen Shui-bian ceded control of cabinet to PM after scandal involving family member; remains in charge of foreign and defence policy, and ties with China. Taiwan unveiled first formal national security policy 20 May, pledging to increase defence spending by 20% and urging China to cooperate in establishing military buffer zone. Policy asserts China set on long-term military expansion to control Taiwan. According to annual Pentagon report China increased number of ground troops in straits area by 25,000.
“Taiwan leader surrenders powers”, BBC, 1 June 2006.
“Taiwan sets self-defense objectives”, Washington Post, 21 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°42, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, 21 Sept. 2005.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Indonesia State of emergency declared in Yogyakarta after 5.9 magnitude earthquake 27 May killed 6,000 and displaced 650,000. Draft law on Aceh governance still being debated in parliament with human rights provision, extent of Islamic law application and other issues unresolved. Thousands protested delays, calling for quick approval to allow provincial elections - now not likely before 15 September. EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission’s mandate extended until mid-September to oversee polls. Dissension within GAM reportedly growing over election participation. Relations with Australia thawed after Papua asylum issue tension; FMs Wirayuda and Downer met 15 May and announced Indonesia’s ambassador, recalled in March, would return to Canberra. Tensions remained in Papua: trials of suspects in Abepura riots began 17 May. In Central Sulawesi, police arrested several men led by JI member on suspicion of October 2005 beheading of 3 Christian schoolgirls; later aired taped confession. Further trials in connection with 2005 Bali bombs began 9 May.
“Noordin’s support structure needs dismantling”, paras indonesia, 24 May 2006.
“Anti-pornography rally in Jakarta”, BBC, 21 May 2006.

Crisis Group Asia Report N°114, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, 5 May 2006. Police are closing in on Noordin Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist, but the problem of his support structure must still be tackled. Noordin’s personal networks based around an inner circle of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, are gradually expanding to build a following committed to al-Qaeda style attacks - even though many in JI disapprove. Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to plan operations as he loses his closest colleagues to police dragnets. The network of JI schools, administrative structures, family and business contacts remains. For four years, Noordin has worked the jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others even if he is arrested.

Myanmar/Burma Military junta continued campaign in Karen state “to clear up terrorist resistance”; over 10,000 ethnic Karens reported displaced. Unexpected visit by UN envoy Gambari and rare meeting with detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi raised hopes for her release; UN suggested forthcoming aid and UNSG Annan made direct appeal, but junta ordered 1-year extension of Suu Kyi’s house arrest.
“US seeks UN action on Myanmar over Suu Kyi arrest”, AlertNet, 31 May 2006.
“Burmese delusions”, Washington Post, 29 May 2006.

Philippines Despite initial optimism, informal MILF-Manila talks stalled over territorial delimitation and jurisdiction of ancestral homeland on Mindanao. MILF also stated serious opposition to renewed government interest in foreign mining investment. Muslim envoys visiting Mindanao to revive lapsed 1996 peace deal between Manila and MNLF called for better implementation by Manila of autonomy provisions, release of leader and MILF-MNLF cooperation. Communist rebels threatened more attacks on mining facilities in northern Luzon. implementation by Manila of autonomy provisions, release of leader and MILF-MNLF cooperation. Communist rebels threatened more attacks on mining facilities in northern Luzon.
“Manila sees delays in striking a deal with rebels”“Manila sees delays in striking a deal with rebels”, AlertNet, 27 May 2006. , AlertNet, 27 May 2006.
“OIC working on MNLF, MILF unity, says envoy”“OIC working on MNLF, MILF unity, says envoy”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 May 2006. , Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°110, Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic ConvertsPhilippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, 19 Dec. 2005. For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°110, , 19 Dec. 2005.

Thailand Political uncertainty in Bangkok and violence in south continued. Constitutional Court annulled 2 April election and called for new ballot. Election date set for 15 October, allowing MPs 90 days to change parties before contesting seats. No defections expected from ruling TRT party. Caretaker PM Thaksin returned to office 23 May after 6-week break; still head of TRT but might not contest election. People’s Alliance for Democracy, anti-Thaksin group, to transform into political party. New Muslim party established by southern academics welcomed by locals as possible channel to address southern conflict but unlikely to make impact at national level. Several hostage-taking incidents in Narathiwat, including 2 female teachers 19 May; national outcry led to temporary closure of more than 200 schools in “red zone”. Thailand Political uncertainty in Bangkok and violence in south continued. Constitutional Court annulled 2 April election and called for new ballot. Election date set for 15 October, allowing MPs 90 days to change parties before contesting seats. No defections expected from ruling TRT party. Caretaker PM Thaksin returned to office 23 May after 6-week break; still head of TRT but might not contest election. People’s Alliance for Democracy, anti-Thaksin group, to transform into political party. New Muslim party established by southern academics welcomed by locals as possible channel to address southern conflict but unlikely to make impact at national level. Several hostage-taking incidents in Narathiwat, including 2 female teachers 19 May; national outcry led to temporary closure of more than 200 schools in “red zone”.
“Return of the thick-skinned one”“Return of the thick-skinned one”, The Nation, 25 May 2006. , The Nation, 25 May 2006.
“Thailand closes 100 schools after teacher hostage crisis”“Thailand closes 100 schools after teacher hostage crisis”, AFP, 22 May 2006. , AFP, 22 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°105, Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, 18 Nov. 2005; and N°98, Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not JihadThailand’s Emergency Decree: No SolutionSouthern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, 18 May 2005. For background, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°105, , 18 Nov. 2005; and N°98, , 18 May 2005.
Timor-Leste Security collapsed as 600 renegade soldiers, dismissed in April after strike over perceived discrimination against western recruits and led by Maj. Alfredo Reinado, clashed with security forces. 30 killed since late April, including 10 disarmed police under UN protection, leading to deployment of over 2,000 mostly Australian troops 25-29 May at request of government. Arson attacks and looting throughout capital as urban gang members contributed to chaos, along with protests calling for resignation of PM Alkatiri. President Gusmao imposed emergency powers of full presidential control 30 May; defence and interior ministers resigned 1 June. Timor-Leste Security collapsed as 600 renegade soldiers, dismissed in April after strike over perceived discrimination against western recruits and led by Maj. Alfredo Reinado, clashed with security forces. 30 killed since late April, including 10 disarmed police under UN protection, leading to deployment of over 2,000 mostly Australian troops 25-29 May at request of government. Arson attacks and looting throughout capital as urban gang members contributed to chaos, along with protests calling for resignation of PM Alkatiri. President Gusmao imposed emergency powers of full presidential control 30 May; defence and interior ministers resigned 1 June.
“From bad to worse in East Timor”“From bad to worse in East Timor”, International Herald Tribune, 31 May 2006. , International Herald Tribune, 31 May 2006.
“In East Timor, refugees born of chaos, carnage and fear”“In East Timor, refugees born of chaos, carnage and fear”, New York Times, 29 May 2006. , New York Times, 29 May 2006.

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°50, Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, 4 May 2006. Closer border cooperation between Indonesia and Timor-Leste is needed to help reduce a legacy of tension. Timor-Leste has other significant security problems - particularly in Dili - and fears of significant violence along the border with Indonesian West Timor are largely unfounded. Smuggling and illegal crossings, rather than militia incursions, have emerged as the main border security issues. A soft-border regime is needed to establish an infrastructure for legal cross-border trade and improving security cooperation. Other recommended measures include investing in road works and deploying more police. The two countries should also work with donors to address serious justice issues related to the 1999 violence and devise a lasting solution for ex-refugees and on livelihood- and income-generation projects. Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°50,, 4 May 2006. Closer border cooperation between Indonesia and Timor-Leste is needed to help reduce a legacy of tension. Timor-Leste has other significant security problems - particularly in Dili - and fears of significant violence along the border with Indonesian West Timor are largely unfounded. Smuggling and illegal crossings, rather than militia incursions, have emerged as the main border security issues. A soft-border regime is needed to establish an infrastructure for legal cross-border trade and improving security cooperation. Other recommended measures include investing in road works and deploying more police. The two countries should also work with donors to address serious justice issues related to the 1999 violence and devise a lasting solution for ex-refugees and on livelihood- and income-generation projects.

PACIFIC PACIFIC

Fiji Power-sharing agreement reached after Laisenia Qarase, PM and leader of mainly ethnic Fijian SDL party, won narrow victory over Labour party, mainly representing ethnic Indian population. Labour, after internal disagreements, agreed to 9 portfolios offered by Qarase but party leader Chaudhry opted to stay out of government. Fiji Power-sharing agreement reached after Laisenia Qarase, PM and leader of mainly ethnic Fijian SDL party, won narrow victory over Labour party, mainly representing ethnic Indian population. Labour, after internal disagreements, agreed to 9 portfolios offered by Qarase but party leader Chaudhry opted to stay out of government.
“Elections accentuate racial divide”“Elections accentuate racial divide”, Asian Tribune, 28 May 2006. , Asian Tribune, 28 May 2006.
“Labour MPs vote to join Fiji government”“Labour MPs vote to join Fiji government”, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 2006. , Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 2006.

Solomon Islands Situation improved after opposition leader Sogavare won secret parliamentary ballot 4 May, following April mass riots which forced resignation of Snyder Rini. Australia to scale down troop presence from 400 to 140. Solomon Islands Situation improved after opposition leader Sogavare won secret parliamentary ballot 4 May, following April mass riots which forced resignation of Snyder Rini. Australia to scale down troop presence from 400 to 140.
“Australian forces will stay in Solomon Islands: Downer”“Australian forces will stay in Solomon Islands: Downer”, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 2006. , Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 2006.
“New PM elected in Solomon Islands”“New PM elected in Solomon Islands”, BBC, 4 May 2006. , BBC, 4 May 2006.

BALKANS

Albania Parliament set up committee to investigate Chief Prosecutor Sollaku on allegations of organised crime ties.
“Cheney: Balkan countries would rejuvenate NATO”, RFE/RL, 7 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°153, Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, 25 Feb. 2004.

Bosnia & Herzegovina Republika Srpska PM Dodik urged Bosnian Serbs be given right to self-determination referendum following 21 May Montenegrin independence vote; NGOs collected over 50,000 signatures in support. High Rep. Schwarz-Schilling sharply denounced Dodik and ruled out referendum. Second round of Stablisation and Association Agreement (SAA) technical negotiations with EU held 12 May, but EU warned implementation of failed constitutional amendments and police reform main conditions of progress towards SAA. Leaders of 6 main parties issued statement reiterating commitment to constitutional changes, despite April failure to pass reforms. General elections set for 1 October.
“EU spurns calls from Bosnian Serbs for referendum”, Financial Times, 30 May 2006.
“Montenegro vote spurs Bosnia Serb referendum calls”, Reuters, 29 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°164, Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, 6 Sept. 2005.

Kosovo Fourth round of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina in Vienna ended without agreement on decentralisation 5 May. Fifth round, on protection of cultural and religious heritage, produced agreement although some differences remained 23 May. 31 May talks on assigning property and debt produced sharp disagreement. Contact Group met in Paris 26 May; discounted request from Serbia for talks to focus immediately on defining Kosovo’s status. Serbia presented reformulated status proposal: 20-year agreement with UN for autonomy. Shooting near Mitrovica wounded 2 Serbs 11 May. UN police fired teargas on Krusha e Vogel/Mala Krusa villagers who stoned UN convoy escorting defence lawyers of Hague tribunal indictee Dragoljub Ojdanic 25 May; charges against Ojdanic include killing of more than 100 men from village in 1999. PM Ceku held talks with Macedonian PM Buckovski to diffuse tension over border demarcation dispute; agreed only “technical” issue. NATO announced completion of KFOR command structure “streamlining” to enhance force’s capacity to respond to ethnic violence.
“Agreement on Kosovo decentralisation still elusive”, Southeast European Times, 19 May 2006.
“NATO streamlines command structure in Kosovo”, Reuters, 10 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°170, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, 17 Feb. 2006.

Macedonia President Crvenkovski and major party leaders signed Declaration on Fair and Democratic Elections ahead of 5 July polls. Parliament approved defence reforms creating professional army, condition of NATO membership. Pristina-Skopje tension over border demarcation eased after sides agreed “technical” not political issue.
“Macedonia-Kosovo border talks confusion”, IWPR, 10 May 2006.
“EC to launch negotiations with Macedonia on visa regime”, Southeast European Times, 5 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°41, Macedonia: Wobbling toward Europe, 12 Jan. 2006.

Montenegro 21 May referendum resulted in victory for independence movement with 55.53% of vote - exceeding EU-imposed 55% hurdle - and 86% turnout. Some unionists, backed by Belgrade, refused to recognise outcome: Serbia n President Tadic recognised result, but Serbia n PM Kostunica remained silent. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, welcomed referendum conduct and recognised outcome.
“EU gives Montenegro hope of deal”, BBC, 29 May 2006.
“Enter Montenegro”, The Economist, 25 May 2006.

Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°42, Montenegro’s Referendum, 30 May 2006. Montenegro’s successful independence referendum should on balance increase stability in the western Balkans. After the pro-independence victory, Podgorica still faces transition challenges, but none should affect regional stability, and all can be resolved as the country moves forward with the Stabilisation and Association process toward EU membership. International actors should do everything possible to speed its accession to international institutions. Most neighbouring countries are openly pleased with the outcome, in their view marking the end of the Greater Serbian project. In Bosnia, however, there is loose talk about holding a similar referendum, but the international community must continue to make it absolutely clear that partition of Bosnia is not an option. Meanwhile, Belgrade is still in shock from the referendum loss and struggling to formulate rational policy.

Serbia EU suspended Stabilisation and Association talks 3 May after government failed to meet deadline for handing over war crimes suspect Mladic to Hague tribunal; U.S. announced aid cut 31 May. Deputy PM Labus resigned over arrest failure; his party, junior coalition member G17 Plus, threatened to withdraw from government if no arrest by September. Government in disarray after Montenegrin independence vote: with questionable parliamentary majority must now reconstitute itself and appoint new ministers.
“Serbs greet independence vote with shrugs”, BIRN, 22 May 2006.
“EU halts entry talks over Mladic”Serbia, The Guardian, 3 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°39, Serbia: Spinning its Wheels, 23 May 2005 and Briefing N°42 Montenegro’s Referendum, 30 May 2006.

CAUCASUS

Armenia Speaker of Parliament Baghdasarian resigned, pulling his Orinats Yerkir Party out of ruling coalition. Baghdasarian’s earlier remarks in favour of NATO accession and critical of Russia for impeding process, rebuked by President Kocharian, were seen as reason for rift.
“Outgoing parliament speaker now ‘in opposition’“, RFE/RL, 23 May 2006.
“Coalition breaks up, but government remains stable”, Eurasia Insight, 22 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°158, Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead, 18 Oct. 2004.

Azerbaijan Repeat of November 2005 parliamentary elections held 13 May in 10 constituencies with 36.5% turnout. Ruling New Azerbaijan Party gained 5 seats, remaining 5 went to independents and “soft” opposition. OSCE/ODIHR observers noted some improvement but ongoing need for electoral reform. Bahaddin Haziyev, editor of opposition paper, severely beaten by unidentified assailants 19 May. Third round of ENP Action Plan talks with EU postponed.
“OSCE condemns ‘brutal’ attack on Azeri journalist”, RFE/RL, 20 May 2006.
“International observers give Azerbaijan’s repeat elections stamp of approval”, Eurasianet, 16 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°40, Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity, 21 Nov. 2005.

Chechnya (Russia) Russian President Putin intervened to defuse mounting power struggle between Chechen President Alkhanov and PM Kadyrov by holding 5 May Moscow meeting. Kadryov’s involvement in rights violations under scrutiny after Council of Europe anti-torture watchdog prevented from visiting Kadyrov’s home village, suspected site of prisoner abuse, and rights group alleged secret prison network used to detain and torture civilians. 9 soldiers reported killed in insurgent ambushes 17, 23 May.
“Alleged secret prisons in Chechnya”, ISN, 22 May 2006.
“Chechen power struggle hots up”, IWPR, 11 May 2006.

North Caucasus (non-Chechnya) Insecurity continued throughout region. In Ingushetia, Deputy Interior Minister Dzhabrail Kostoyev among 7 killed in car-bomb attack 17 May; 3 rebels and policeman killed in clash near Chechen border. In Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, prison governor shot by unknown gunmen. In Daghestan, clash between security services and rebels, who authorities say were planning to seize a school, killed 3; at least 14 police, 3 suspected militants and civilian reported dead in other incidents in republic.
“Violence flares in Russia’s Caucasus”, International Herald Tribune, 17 May 2006.
“South Russia blast kills minister”, BBC, 17 May 2006.

Georgia Following April import ban on Georgian wine and brandy, Russia banned mineral water, one of Georgia’s biggest exports. First convoy of Russian military equipment moved from Akhalkalaki base to Armenia 18 May. Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council met in Tbilisi 15 May, first time since 2001; sides exchanged peace initiatives. UNSG’s Group of Friends for Georgia visited Tbilisi and Sukhumi 22-23 May. International Consortium of Black Sea Railways set up to address restoration of Abkhaz section of Russian-Georgian railway. Joint Control Commission meeting on South Ossetia held 11-12 May; sides agreed to 14 June donor conference. Georgia criticised arrival of 500 Russian troops in South Ossetia without visas as illegal; Russia said standard rotation.
“Georgia commission reviews possible secession”, ISN, 22 May 2006.
“Abkhazia resolution group holds first meeting since 2001”, RFE/RL, 15 May 2006.
For most recent report, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°173, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, 20 Mar. 2006.

Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Azeri and Armenian FMs met with OSCE Minsk Group in Strasbourg 18 May, but failed to agree on proposed 4-6 June date for 2 presidents to meet in Bucharest. Minsk Group chairmen held talks with President Kocharian in Yerevan 25 May.
“Armenia shows support for Karabakh”, IWPR, 11 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°167, Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, 11 Oct. 2005.

EASTERN EUROPE

Belarus EU froze assets of President Lukashenko and 35 officials, supplementing April travel ban, while U.S. also imposed travel ban. Friction between government and opposition continued. May Day demonstrators protested against April imprisonment of opposition leader Milinkevich who was released after 15-day sentence. Authorities temporarily detained opposition leader Lyabedzka prior to another rally 10 May. Businessman Levaneuski released after 2-year jail term for alleging government corruption.
“EU to freeze president’s assets”, RFE/RL, 18 May 2005.
“Opposition seeks direction after presidential election”, RFE/RL, 3 May 2006.

Moldova Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov said would hold independence referendum by September, citing Montenegrin example; Russia supported move. OSCE Chairman De Gucht visited Chisinau and Tiraspol 31 May, urging return to talks. U.S. reportedly issued first explicit signal will not ratify 1999 Agreement adapting 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty until Russia withdraws 1,500-strong force from Transdniestria.
“Talks on Moldova separatism must resume - mediator”, AlertNet, 31 May 2006.
“Separatist Moldovan region deals new blow to talks”, AlertNet, 24 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°157, Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria, 17 June 2004.

Ukraine New parliament convened 25 May but voted to postpone first session to 7 June following proposal by Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine, and Socialist Party to allow them time to form coalition; efforts so far hampered by disagreement over PM post.
“New parliament convenes, sets deadline for coalition”, RFE/RL, 25 May 2006.
“Our Ukraine suspends talks with Tymoshenko”, RFE/RL, 16 May 2006.

WESTERN EUROPE/MEDITERRANEAN

Basque Country (Spain) Spanish PM Zapatero said on visit to region he would announce start of direct talks between government and ETA in June.
“Spain’s PM seeks dialogue with ETA”, ISN, 22 May 2006.
“Spain ‘ready to begin ETA talks’”, BBC, 21 May 2006.

Cyprus Parliamentary elections held 21 May. Poll, in which President Papadopoulos’ Diko Party improved standing with 18% vote and its coalition partner AKEL Party gained most votes with 31%, seen as endorsing ruling coalition and its anti-Annan Plan position. Pro-reunification opposition Disy Party followed AKEL with 30%.
“Greek Cypriots back centrist party”, International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2006.
“Cyprus ruling coalition wins poll”, BBC, 21 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°171, The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?, 8 Mar. 2006.

Northern Ireland (UK) Stormont Assembly reconvened 15 May for first time since October 2002 suspension, but has no legislative power until it elects multi-party government; must do so within 6 weeks or face temporary suspension. Sinn Fein head Gerry Adams nominated DUP leader Ian Paisley as First Minister; Paisley refused. PUP leader David Ervine joined Ulster Unionist Party Group, now second largest in assembly; latter criticised for ignoring PUP link to militant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Mark Haddock, leading UVF member, critically injured after shot by unknown assailants 30 May. Catholic boy killed in sectarian attack in Ballymena 8 May.
“Paisley nomination ‘smart tactics’”, BBC, 22 May 2006.
“NI politicians return to Stormont”, BBC, 15 May 2006.

Turkey Political turmoil followed gunman’s attack on High Court that killed judge 17 May. Suspected assailant and accomplices quickly arrested. Opposition alleged government provoked attack with its criticism of February court ruling against teacher who wore headscarf en route to school, but ongoing investigation into suspects suggest ultra-nationalist rather than radical-Islamist links. Tensions escalated as judiciary and military led 20,000-strong pro-secularist anti-government demonstration in Ankara, and ministers assaulted at judge’s funeral. Landmark trial of 2 military police officers accused over November 2005 Semdinli incidents began. At least 12 killed in military-PKK clashes in southeast. 18 May French parliamentary vote to criminalise denial of Armenian genocide delayed to October; followed recall of ambassadors from France and Canada over issue. Greek and Turkish FMs sought to defuse tensions after 2 jets collided during mock “dog-fight” in disputed Aegean airspace, killing Greek pilot.
“A Byzantine plot in Turkey”, Eurasia Insight, 24 May 2006.
“Rehn urges Turkey to step up reforms”, Southeast European Times, 18 May 2006.

Bolivia President Morales continued nationalisation of energy sector: announced takeover of natural gas sector 1 May, giving foreign-owned companies 6 months to negotiate new contracts or leave; ordered foreign financial firms to cede control over pension fund effectively granting government oversight in 3 large companies. Morales and Venezuelan President Chavez signed 200 far-reaching economic and cultural accords.
“Bolivia leader claims assassination attempt”, Washington Post, 30 May 2006.
“Some are worrying Bolivia has sold soul to Venezuela”, Miami Herald, 27 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N°15, Bolivia at the Crossroads: The December Elections, 8 Dec. 2005.

Brazil Orchestrated, week-long clashes between notorious Sao Paolo gang First Capital Command and police claimed 170. Violence against police ordered by jailed leaders after 8 transferred away from Sao Paolo. Deaths included 40 police; officials denied police heavy-handed but gave no explanation for deaths of up to 107 “suspects”.
“Calm returns to shocked Sao Paulo”, BBC, 20 May 2006.
“Scattered violence continues in Brazil as police strike back at gangs”, CP, 17 May 2006.

Colombia Incumbent President Uribe won 28 May presidential election with 62% of vote, reinforcing his strong stance against rebels and move toward stability; leftwing Carlos Gaviria came second with 22%. Polls relatively peaceful though FARC stepped up attacks prior to vote: bombed power installations and organised grenade attacks in main port city of Buenaventura, blew up part of second most important pipeline, and attacked army patrol in Cauca in south. Constitutional court altered key provisions of controversial Justice and Peace Law, basis for peace process with AUC paramilitaries, after declaring original terms unconstitutional. AUC warned decision major blow to talks but later agreed to continue peace process.
“Colombian president wins 2nd term”, International Herald Tribune, 29 May 2006.
“Ruling may jeopardize Colombia peace deal”, CNN, 19 May 2006.
Crisis Group Latin America Report N°16, Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?, 14 March 2006.

Ecuador U.S. free-trade negotiations on hold after government seized assets of U.S. oil firm. Presidential candidates argued legal justification for seizure while government sought to smooth ties with Washington. President Palacio broadened energy ties with Venezuela during visit from President Chavez 30 May.
“Ecuador ‘was right to revoke Occidental licence’”, Financial Times, 21 May 2006.
“Ecuador seeks to soothe U.S. ties amid asset feud”, International Herald Tribune, 18 May 2006.

Haiti In positive move toward peace, René Préval inaugurated as president 14 May and parliament sworn in 9 May. Préval nominated close political ally Jacques Edouard Alexis as PM; senate and chamber of deputies approved appointment. Security continued to improve, but tensions remained, particularly in Cité Soleil slum.
“Former premier back in familiar role in Haiti”, Miami Herald, 23 May 2006.
“A cloudy dawn in Haiti”, Time, 15 May 2006.

Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°10, Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Préval’s First 100 Days, 11 May 2006. If René Préval, who is to be inaugurated as president on 14 May, acts decisively in his first 100 days and receives international backing, he can capitalise on an improved security situation to address some of the underlying causes of violence and crime. His government needs to disarm and demobilise gangs and strengthen the Haitian National Police by professionalizing it and purging it of corrupt officers and politically-linked cells. The judicial system must also be overhauled, beginning with establishment of a joint international/national panel to review the cases of prisoners detained for long periods without trial. Haitians have high expectations of the newly elected government and Préval needs to take advantage of this rare optimism or the country could become the hemisphere’s first permanently failed state.

Peru Presidential runoff to be held 4 June between nationalist candidate Humala and former President Garcia, top 2 after first round 9 April. Campaigning by candidates continued amidst allegations of foul play on both sides; 5 killed in clashes between supporters. Relations with Venezuela remained tense. Chile’s Supreme Court released former Peruvian President Fujimori on bail pending extradition decision.
“A false dichotomy”, The Guardian (Comment is Free), 30 May 2006.
“Peru accuses Chavez of meddling”, BBC, 30 May 2006.
Venezuela Parliament issued report recommending state assume majority control of key oil projects, as President Chavez doubled taxes on oil firms to support social programs abroad. Chavez solidified leftist block by signing economic and cultural accords with Bolivia and Ecuador. Tensions with U.S. continued with U.S. ban on arms sales.
“Chavez and Morales in trade deals”, BBC, 26 May 2006.
“Neighbors grow impatient with Chávez”, International Herald Tribune, 19 May 2006.

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Israel/Occupied Territories Mounting violence in Gaza fuelled by power struggle between Fatah and Hamas loyalists raised fears of civil war. Rivalries focused on respective control of Palestinian President Abbas and Islamist Palestinian Authority (PA) government over security forces. Abbas sent police to Gaza in response to Hamas deployment of 3,000-strong force provoking clashes from 17 May; 10 killed before “national dialogue” to resolve differences commenced 25 May. Abbas gave Hamas 10 days to agree to borders’ framework negotiated among Palestinian imprisoned leaders or call referendum. Israeli air strikes on Gaza killed 15 militants, senior Islamic Jihad leader and several civilians. Israel’s parliament voted 65-49 in favour of PM Olmert’s government 4 May. Olmert received implicit U.S. backing for “bold ideas” for West Bank: removal of remote settlements, keeping larger enclaves and imposing border if political negotiations not resumed by end 2006. U.S. House of Representatives backed legislation to brand PA “terrorist sanctuary” severing all contacts with PA and further restricting assistance. Quartet (U.S., Russia, EU, UN) agreed in principle to endorse “temporary mechanism” to channel aid to Palestinian people while bypassing government. Air strikes and clashes with Lebanon-based militants followed rocket attack 28 May.
“Israel seeks US seal on West Bank plan”, The Guardian, 23 May 2006.
“Rival factions set Palestinians on brink of war”, AlertNet, 22 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°49, Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration, 18 Jan. 2006.

Lebanon Worst cross-border fighting in 6 years erupted 28 May after rockets fired into Israel in apparent response to killing of Islamic Jihad group leader in south. Israeli air strikes targeted Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine camps, leading to exchange of artillery fire, and border skirmishes with Hizbollah: 3 guerrillas reportedly killed before truce brokered by UN. Political leaders held seventh round of “national dialogue” talks 16 May but failed to find consensus on future of pro-Syrian President Lahoud or disarmament of Hizbollah: talks to continue 8 June. Rival leaders’ March pledge to peacefully disarm guerrillas outside camps within 6 months yet to be implemented. Lebanese soldier killed in skirmish with pro-Syrian Palestinian guerrillas 17 May. UN Security Council called for disbandment of all militias inside Lebanon.
“Lebanon seeks way to disarm Palestinian militia groups”, New York Times, 1 June 2006.
“UN faults Lebanon for rocket attack that set off border clash”, Daily Star, 30 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°48, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, 5 Dec. 2005.

Syria UN Security Council called on Syria to delineate common border, establish full diplomatic relations with and reduce arms flow into Lebanon. EU issued statement against harassment of human rights defenders after 9 reportedly detained for calling for better relations with Lebanon. U.S. extended sanctions citing support for terrorism, interference in Lebanon, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining Iraq reconstruction.
“Syria’s silent purge”, The Guardian, 31 May 2006.
“Security Council calls on Syria to take steps against arms movements into Lebanon”, UN News Centre, 17 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°39, Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria, 12 Apr. 2005.

GULF

Iran FM Mottaki said Iran ready for talks with EU3 (UK, France, Germany) “without preconditions” 30 May. U.S. offered to join direct multilateral talks on condition Iran suspends uranium enrichment 31 May. Iran responded positively to discussing “mutual concerns” but said not ready to give up enrichment. Previously UN Security Council permanent members failed to agree on proposed U.S., UK and France resolution, to threaten sanctions. In response, EU3 devised new deal offering nuclear power through access to imported enriched uranium and light-water reactors that do not produce plutonium waste: includes security guarantees and economic and technological aid, but threatens sanctions if not accepted. FMs of UNSC permanent members and Germany due to meet 1 June to finalise incentive plan; if approved, to be presented to Iran before 21-June EU-U.S. summit. U.S. working toward UNSC resolution, said would agree to language ruling out threat of immediate military force. In letter to U.S. President Bush, Ahmadinejad criticised U.S. foreign policy and Israel. Although first such communication since 1979, dismissed by U.S. as irrelevant.
“Iran ready to talk but won’t halt nuclear programme”, Financial Times, 1 June 2006.
Testimony of Karim Sadjadpour (Crisis Group) to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Iran’s political/nuclear ambitions and U.S. policy options”, 18 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°51, Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?, 23 Feb. 2006.

Iraq After 5 months’ negotiations, parliament approved 37-member “unity government” 20 May. 3 main posts of security, defence and interior only with caretaker occupants - including PM Maliki as interior minister - but new government commended for inclusion of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. 30 May talks aimed at finding defence and interior ministers ended with no agreement. Security continued to deteriorate with daily car bombs, suicide blasts and discoveries of executed bodies. Violence-related deaths reportedly over 1,100/month in Baghdad with many bodies showing evidence of torture, indicating sectarian revenge killings. 9 UK troops killed amid widespread unrest in south leading Maliki to order month-long state of emergency 31 May.

“Iraqi leader visits Basra”, International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2006.
“Could it prevail?”, The Economist, 25 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°52, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, 27 Feb. 2006.

Yemen Army rearrested al-Qaeda militant Abdullah Ahmad al-Raymi who escaped from prison in February.
“When cultural norms underpin gun ownership”, IRIN, 21 May 2006.

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) threatened to attack U.S. military bases in North and sub-Saharan Africa. 18 children and 3 women found dead in Jijel cave: police killed 5 suspected GSPC militants during raid. In separate police operation 10 GSPC rebels killed. President Bouteflika appointed close ally Abdelaziz Belkhadem new PM.
“Algeria replaces premier”, Al-Jazeera, 24 May 2006.
“Algerian group threatens US facilities in Africa”, Reuters, 12 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°29, Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page, 30 July 2004.

Egypt Internal situation remained tense as police beat and detained hundreds of protestors supporting 2 senior judges facing disciplinary action after alleging 2005 election fraud; EU and U.S. condemned police conduct. Hearing cleared Judge

Mekki but reprimanded and blocked promotion of Judge Bastawisi. 300 judges staged further protest for judicial independence 25 May. Leader and second-in-command of al-Tawhid wa ‘l-Jihad group, accused of April Dahab bombings, killed during arrest attempts. Court upheld December 2005 5-year conviction of former presidential candidate Ayman Nour on forgery charges, which supporters say are politically motivated. Muslim Brotherhood said 23 members arrested while protesting against extension of 1981 state of emergency.
“Egyptian court rulings hit reform hopes”, Financial Times, 18 May 2006.
Comment by Mahmud Mekki and Hisham Bastawisi “When judges are beaten”, The Guardian, 10 May 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°46, Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy, 4 Oct. 2005.

Mauritania EU announced would resume aid in June, withheld since 2005 coup.
“EU to resume Mauritania aid frozen after coup”, AlertNet, 19 Amy 2006.
For background, see Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°53, Political Transition in Mauritania: Assessment and Horizons, 24 Apr. 2006.

Western Sahara UN High Commission for Human Rights delegation made first exploratory visit to region. Think tank suggested UN Security Council may refuse to extend mandate of peacekeeping MINURSO in October.
“UN Security Council might change tack, think-tank”, IRIN, 18 May 2006.
“Update report No.4”, Security Council Report, 17 May 2006.

The Patriot act

2006-06-03T08:53:00.000Z

The clumsily-titled Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, or USAPA) introduced a plethora of legislative changes which significantly increased the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in the United States. The Act did not, however, provide for the system of checks and balances that traditionally safeguards civil liberties in the face of such legislation.
Legislative proposals in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were introduced less than a week after the attacks. President Bush signed the final bill, the USA PATRIOT Act, into law on October 26, 2001. Though the Act made significant amendments to over 15 important statutes, it was introduced with great haste and passed with little debate, and without a House, Senate, or conference report. As a result, it lacks background legislative history that often retrospectively provides necessary statutory interpretation.
The Act was a compromise version of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (ATA), a far-reaching legislative package intended to strengthen the nation's defense against terrorism. The ATA contained several provisions vastly expanding the authority of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor private communications and access personal information. The final legislation included a few beneficial additions from the Administration's initial proposal: most notably, a so-called sunset provision (which provides that several sections of the act automatically expire after a certain period of time, unless they are explicitly renewed by Congress) on some of the electronic surveillance provisions, and an amendment providing judicial oversight of law enforcement's use of the FBI's Carnivore system.
However, the USA PATRIOT Act retains provisions appreciably expanding government investigative authority, especially with respect to the Internet. Those provisions address issues that are complex and implicate fundamental constitutional protections of individual liberty, including the appropriate procedures for interception of information transmitted over the Internet and other rapidly evolving technologies.
History
One of the most striking features of the USA PATRIOT Act is the lack of debate surrounding its introduction. Many of the provisions of the Act relating to electronic surveillance were proposed before September 11th, and were subject to much criticism and debate. John Podesta, White House Chief of Staff from 1998 - 2001, has questioned what has changed since then.
The events of September 11 convinced ... overwhelming majorities in Congress that law enforcement and national security officials need new legal tools to fight terrorism. But we should not forget what gave rise to the original opposition - many aspects of the bill increase the opportunity for law enforcement and the intelligence community to return to an era where they monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were merely exercising their First Amendment rights. Nothing that occurred on September 11 mandates that we return to such an era.
- John Podesta, USA Patriot Act - The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset (Winter, 2002)
When the legislative proposals were introduced by the Bush administration in the aftermath of September 11th, Attorney General John Ashcroft gave Congress one week in which to pass the bill -- without changes. Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, managed to convince the Justice Department to agree to some changes, and members of the House began to make significant improvements. However, the Attorney General warned that further terrorist acts were imminent, and that Congress could be to blame for such attacks if it failed to pass the bill immediately.
Extensive and hurried negotiation in the Senate resulted in a bipartisan bill, stripped of many of the concessions won by Sen. Leahy. Senator Thomas Daschle, the majority leader, sought unanimous consent to pass the proposal without debate or amendment; Senator Russ Feingold was the only member to object.
Minor changes were made in the House, which passed the bill 357 to 66. The Senate and House versions were quickly reconciled, and the Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001.
Overview
The USA PATRIOT Act introduced sweeping changes to U.S. law, including amendments to:
Wiretap Statute (Title III):
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute
Money Laundering Act
Immigration and Nationality Act
Money Laundering Control Act
Bank Secrecy Act
Right to Financial Privacy Act
Fair Credit Reporting Act
Russ Feingold, the only Senator to oppose the Act, was particularly concerned with the effects the Act might have on the civil liberties of immigrants. Feingold expressed his concern and certainty that the enhanced authority to profile and engage in electronic surveillance would be disproportionately wielded:
Now here is where my caution in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and my concerns over the reach of the anti-terrorism bill come together. To the extent that the expansive new immigration powers that the bill grants to the Attorney General are subject to abuse, who do we think that is most likely to bear the brunt of the abuse? It won't be immigrants from Ireland. It won't be immigrants from El Salvador or Nicaragua. It won't even be immigrants from Haiti or Africa. It will be immigrants from Arab, Muslim and South Asian countries. In the wake of these terrible events out government has been given vast new powers and they may fall most heavily on a minority of our population who already feel particularly acutely the pain of this disaster.
- Senator Russ Feingold, Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill (Oct. 25, 2002)
The implications for online privacy are considerable. For example, the Act increases the ability of law enforcement agencies to authorize installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices (a pen register collects the outgoing phone numbers placed from a specific telephone line; a trap and trace device captures the incoming numbers placed to a specific phone line -- a caller-id box is a trap and trace device), and to authorize the installation of such devices to record all computer routing, addressing, and signaling information. The Act also extends the government's ability to gain access to personal financial information and student information without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply by certifying that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Surveillance and Privacy Laws Affected
The USA PATRIOT Act significantly expanded law enforcement authority to surveill and capture communications. There are three major laws that create the framework for the government interception of communications:
Title III: Requires probable cause, a high legal standard to meet, from a judge for real-time interception of the content of voice and data communications. See EPIC's Wiretapping Page.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA): Governs government access to stored email and other electronic communications. Within ECPA, the Pen Register statute governs real time interception of "numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached." Although the use of such devices requires a court order, it does not require probable cause: there is no judicial discretion, and the court must authorize the surveillance upon government certification. A government attorney need only certify to the court that the "information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Therefore, the Pen Register and Trap and Trace statute lacks many of the privacy protections found in the wiretap statute.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): Authorizes the government to carry out electronic surveillance -- against any person, even Americans -- in the United States upon obtaining a judicial order based upon probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. FISA, which applies primarily to the government's power in foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence cases, therefore does not offer many of the protections required under the federal wiretap statute. See EPIC's FISA Page.
Title III governs the "contents" of communications, defined as "any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." The Supreme Court has held that the contents of a communication are entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection. Therefore, the government's access to "content" information is limited by constitutionally imposed search and seizure requirements. In order to abide by these constitutional restrictions, Title III imposes strict limitations upon the government's ability to obtain communication content:
a law enforcement agency may intercept content only pursuant to a court order issued upon findings of probable cause to believe that
an individual is committing one of a list of specifically enumerated crimes,
communications concerning the specified offense will be intercepted, and
"the pertinent facilities are commonly used by the alleged offender or are being used in connection with the offense."
Only designated officials can authorize such interception,
The interception is authorized for a limited time period.
Interception is subject to a statutory exclusionary rule: any information intercepted in violation of the wiretap statute cannot be admitted into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutionally recognized privacy interest in the telephone numbers intercepted by a pen register or trap and trace device. In U.S. v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the Supreme Court emphasized the limited information captured by pen register devices: "neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers." This is reflected in the ease with which law enforcement officers are able to obtain trap and trace/pen register installation: upon the certification by an attorney that pen register information is likely to be relevant, the judge must approve the installation of the device.
Analysis of Specific USA PATRIOT Act Provisions
Pen Registers, the Internet and Carnivore
Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the statute authorizing the use of "pen register" and "trap and trace" devices governed real time interception of "numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached." Although the use of such devices requires a court order, it does not require a showing of probable cause. There is, in effect, no judicial discretion, as the court is required to authorize monitoring upon the mere certification by a government attorney that the "information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Therefore, such procedures lack almost all of the significant privacy protections found in Title III, the statute governing the interception of the actual "content" of a communication (e.g., a phone conversation or the text of an e-mail message).
Section 216 of the Act significantly expanded law enforcement authority to use trap and trace and pen register devices. Prior law relating to the use of such devices was written to apply to the telephone industry, therefore the language of the statute referred only to the collection of "numbers dialed" on a "telephone line" and the "originating number" of a telephone call. The new legislation redefined a pen register as "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted." A trap and trace device is now "a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source or a wire or electronic communication."
By expanding the nature of the information that can be captured, the new law clearly expanded pen register capacities to the Internet, covering electronic mail, Web surfing, and all other forms of electronic communications. The full impact of this expansion of coverage is difficult to assess, as the statutory definitions are vague with respect to the types of information that can be captured and are subject to broad interpretations. The fact that the provision prohibits the capture of "content" does not adequately take into account the unique nature of information captured electronically, which contains data far more revealing than phone numbers, such as URLs generated while using the Web (which often contain a great deal of information that cannot in any way be analogized to a telephone number). Although the FBI, prior to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, compared telephone calls to Internet communications to justify invocation of the existing pen register statute to authorize the use of its controversial Carnivore system, whether the law as then written in fact granted such authority remained an open and debatable question. The amendment made by Section 216 codified the FBI's questionable interpretation of the pen register statute, thereby closing the door to fully informed and deliberate consideration of this complex issue.
When the FBI's use of Carnivore was first revealed in July 2000, there was a great deal of concern expressed by members of Congress, who stated their intent to examine the issues and draft appropriate legislation. To facilitate that process, former Attorney General Reno announced that issues surrounding Carnivore would be considered by a Justice Department review panel and that its recommendations would be made public. That promised report had not been released when Ms. Reno left office, and Attorney General Ashcroft announced that a high-level Department official would complete the review process. That review, however, was not completed prior to September 11, 2001. As a result of the delay, Congress did not have the benefit of the promised findings and recommendations when it enacted the USA PATRIOT Act. Because Carnivore provides the FBI with access to the communications of all subscribers of a monitored Internet Service Provider (and not just those of the court-designated target), it raises substantial privacy issues for millions of law-abiding American citizens.
The USA PATRIOT does contain a provision requiring law enforcement to file under seal with the court a record of installations of pen register/trap and trace devices. This amendment may provide some measure of judicial oversight of the use of this enhanced surveillance authority.
Addition of Terrorism and Computer Crimes as Predicate Offenses Permitting Interception of Communications Under the Wiretap Act
Section 201 added crimes of terrorism or production/dissemination of chemical weapons as predicate offenses under Title III, suspicion of which enable the government to obtain a wiretap of a party's communications. Because the government already had substantial authority under FISA to obtain a wiretap of a suspected terrorist, the real effect of this amendment is to permit wiretapping of a United States person suspected of domestic terrorism.
Section 202 added "a felony violation of section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse)" as a crime providing the predicate for a Title III wiretap application. Felony offenses under Section 1030 are: intentional, unauthorized access to a protected government computer to obtain and communicate classified information for clandestine foreign "with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation"; access to a protected computer causing more than $5000 damage; access to a protected computer with the intent to extort; or any second offense.
Neither Section 201 nor Section 202 changes the definition of communications subject to intercept, or the standard that the government must reach in order to obtain an intercept.
Expanded Dissemination of Information Obtained in Criminal Investigations
Section 203 amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit disclosures of "matters occurring before the grand jury" when the matters "involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" to "any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties." Rule 6(e)(3)(c) governs the permissive disclosure and use of information revealed in a grand jury proceeding, which prior to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act could be disclosed only when directed by a court in connection with a judicial proceeding; when permitted by a court upon the request of the defendant or upon a showing that the information discloses a violation of a state criminal law; or when disclosed by the prosecutor to another grand jury. The new law requires that a disclosure made under the new exception be revealed, under seal, to the court. The term "foreign intelligence information" is defined as information that "relates to the ability of the United States to protect against" an actual or potential attack, hostile act, sabotage, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities conducted by a foreign power or its agent, as well as information relating to the national defense, security, or conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.
Section 203 also amended 18 U.S.C. 2517, which governs the permissive disclosure and use of intercepted communications. Under the new law, intercepted information related to "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" can be disclosed to "any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official" to the extent that "such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure," and the information can be used by any officer properly in possession of the information to assist "in the performance of his official duties."
Section 203, as codified, was an improvement from the equivalent amendment initially proposed by the Administration in the ATA. The ATA would have permitted broad disclosure of sensitive information gathered by law enforcement agencies with any employee of the executive branch, including the intercepts of telephone conversations, without any safeguards regarding the future use or dissemination of such information. The USA PATRIOT Act amendments limit the use of the information to a proper investigation (subject to legal sanctions as defined by Section 223 upon misuse or misdisclosure of the information). However, while such sharing may be appropriate in the case of international terrorism investigations, the limitation permitting sharing only of "foreign intelligence information" is insufficient to limit disclosure to information relating to investigations of terrorist activities.
Interception of "Computer Trespasser" Communications
Prior law prohibited anyone from intentionally intercepting or disclosing the contents of any intercepted communications without complying with the requirements of the wiretap statute, unless such interception and disclosure fell within one of several statutory exceptions. The USA PATRIOT Act, Section 217, creates a new exception, permitting government interception of the "communications of a computer trespasser" if the owner or operator of a "protected computer" authorizes the interception. The new exception has broad implications, given that a "protected computer" includes any "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication" (which, with the Internet, includes effectively any computer). The "authorization" assistance permits wiretapping of the intruder's communications without any judicial oversight, in contrast to most federal communication-intercept laws that require objective oversight from someone outside the investigative chain.
The new law places the determination solely in the hands of law enforcement and the system owner or operator. In those likely instances in which the interception does not result in prosecution, the target of the interception will never have an opportunity to challenge the activity (through a suppression proceeding). Indeed, such targets would never even have notice of the fact that their communications were subject to warrantless interception. However, the USA PATRIOT Act does include an exception prohibiting surveillance of someone who is known by the owner of the protected computer "to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected computer." The ATA, which did not contain such an exception, was so vague that the provision could have been applied to users downloading copyrighted materials off the Web. However, even with this fix, the amendment has little, if anything, to do with legitimate investigations of terrorism.
New Treatment of Voice-Mail Messages
Section 204 amended Title III and the Stored Communications Access Act so that stored voice-mail communications, like e-mail, may be obtained by the government through a search warrant rather than through more stringent wiretap orders. Section 204 also brings voice mail under the authority of Section 209, which permits nationwide search warrants. Messages stored on an answering machine tape remain outside the scope of either statute.
Application of Cable Companies to Electronic Surveillance
Section 211 amended Title III to provide that where a cable company provides telephone or Internet services, it must comply with the laws governing interception and disclosure of communications by other telephone companies or ISPs. This subjects cable companies acting in this capacity to 18 U.S.C. chapters 119 (Title III), 121, and 206, laws governing the interception and disclosure of real time wire, oral or electronic communications, pen register/trap and trace information, and stored communications. The new law supercedes the original provisions of the Cable Act relating to obligatory and voluntary disclosure of subscriber information, although the amendment would provide an exemption for "customer cable television viewing activity" (an undefined term, but one meant to address what channels are watched by the customer). However, the stringent privacy protections prohibiting release of customer information to non-governmental entities absent customer consent are left in place.
Nationwide Application of Surveillance Orders and Search Warrants
Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the laws relating to both wiretaps and pen register/trap and trace devices authorized execution of a court order only within the geographic jurisdiction of the issuing court. The Act (sections 216 and 219) expands the jurisdictional authority of a court to authorize the installation of a surveillance device anywhere in the United States. The availability of nationwide orders for the interception and collection of electronic evidence would remove an important legal safeguard by making it more difficult for a distant service provider to appear before the issuing court and object to legal or procedural defects. Indeed, it has become increasingly common for service providers to seek clarification from issuing courts when, in the face of rapidly evolving technological changes, many issues involving the privacy rights of their subscribers require careful judicial consideration. The burden would be particularly acute for smaller providers -- precisely those, for instance, who are most likely (according to the FBI) to be served with orders requiring the installation of the Carnivore system.
Section 219 amends the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to expand the jurisdictional authority of a court to authorize search warrants outside of the judicial district in an investigation of domestic or international terrorism. Although permitting nationwide application of search warrants creates the same problem as expanding the scope of surveillance orders -- making it harder for those served by such warrants to object to legal or procedural defects -- this provision, because it applies only to investigations of domestic or international terrorism, was more narrowly tailored to apply only to the anti-terrorism investigations.
Authority to Conduct Secret Searches ("Sneak and Peek")
Section 213 eliminates the prior requirement that law enforcement provide a person subject to a search warrant with contemporaneous notice of the search. The new "secret search" provision applies where the court "finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse effect." Although the Administration's "Field Guidance on New Authorities Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation" states that the new authority "is primarily designed to authorize delayed notice of searches," the amendment permits seizure of any tangible property or communications where the court finds "reasonable necessity" for this seizure. The law requires that notice be given within a "reasonable period," which can be extended by the court for "good cause." "Reasonable period" is undefined, and the Administration's Field Guidance advises that this is a "flexible standard."
This significant change in the law applies to all government searches for material that "constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States" and is not limited to investigations of terrorist activity. Prior law authorized delayed notification of a search only under a very small number of circumstances (such as surreptitious electronic surveillance). The expansion of this extraordinary authority to all searches constitutes a radical departure from Fourth Amendment standards and could result in routine surreptitious entries by law enforcement agents.
Expanded Scope of Subpoenas for Records of Electronic Communications
Under prior law, law enforcement could use a subpoena to obtain "the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service or a subscriber to or customer of such service and the type of services the subscriber or customer utilized" from an internet service provider. Section 210 expands the type of information that a provider must disclose to law enforcement to include, among other things, records of session times and duration; any temporarily assigned network address; and any means or source of payment. This heightened authority to use subpoenas (rather than court orders) for a broader (and more revealing) class of information is not be limited to investigations of suspected terrorist activity.
Lowered Standard for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Section 218 expands the application of FISA to those situations where foreign intelligence gathering is merely "a significant" purpose of the investigation, rather than, as prior FISA law provided, the sole or primary purpose. "Significant" is not defined, and this vagueness could lead to inconsistent determinations and potential overuse of the FISA standards. The more lenient standards that the government must meet under FISA (as opposed to the stringent requirements of Title III) are justified by the fact that FISA's provisions facilitate the collection of foreign intelligence information, not criminal evidence. This traditional justification is eliminated where the lax FISA provisions are applicable, at least in part, to the interception of information relating to a domestic criminal investigation. The change seriously alters the delicate constitutional balance reflected in the prior legal regime governing electronic surveillance.
Multi-Point ("Roving Wiretap") Authority
Section 206 expands FISA to permit "roving wiretap" authority, which allows the interception of any communications made to or by an intelligence target without specifying the particular telephone line, computer or other facility to be monitored. Prior law required third parties (such as common carriers and others) "specified in court-ordered surveillance" to provide assistance necessary to accomplish the surveillance. The amendment extends that obligation to unnamed and unspecified third parties.
Such "generic" orders could have a significant impact on the privacy rights of large numbers of innocent users, particularly those who access the Internet through public facilities such as libraries, university computer labs and cybercafes. Upon the suspicion that an intelligence target might use such a facility, the FBI can now monitor all communications transmitted at the facility. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the recipient of the assistance order (for instance, a library) would be prohibited from disclosing the fact that monitoring is occurring.
The "generic" roving wiretap orders raise significant constitutional issues, as they do not comport with the Fourth Amendment's requirement that any search warrant "particularly describe the place to be searched." That deficiency becomes even more significant where the private communications of law-abiding American citizens might be intercepted incidentally.
Liberalized Use of Pen Register/Trap and Trace Devices under FISA
Section 214 removes the pre-existing statutory requirement that the government prove the surveillance target is "an agent of a foreign power" before obtaining a pen register/trap and trace order under the FISA. Therefore, the government could obtain a pen register/trap and trace device "for any investigation to gather foreign intelligence information," without a showing that the device has, is or will be used by a foreign agent or by an individual engaged in international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. The amendment significantly eviscerates the constitutional rationale for the relatively lax requirements that apply to foreign intelligence surveillance. That laxity is premised on the assumption that the Executive Branch, in pursuit of its national security responsibilities to monitor the activities of foreign powers and their agents, should not be unduly restrained by Congress and the courts. The removal of the "foreign power" predicate for pen register/trap and trace surveillance upsets that delicate balance.
However, The USA PATRIOT Act includes a provision prohibiting use of FISA pen register surveillance under any circumstances against a United States citizen where the investigation is conducted "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment." This exemption was not contained within the ATA, and limits to some extent the potential overreach of this expanded authority.
Access to "Any Tangible Things"
Section 215 grants the FBI the authority to request an order "requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)" relevant to an investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Although the amendment is entitled "Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations," the scope of the authority is far broader and applies to any records relevant to the individual. This amendment, which overrides state library confidentiality laws, permits the FBI to compel production of business records, medical records, educational records and library records without a showing of "probable cause" (the existence of specific facts to support the belief that a crime has been committed or that the items sought are evidence of a crime). Instead, the government only needs to claim that the records may be related to an ongoing investigation related to terrorism or intelligence activities. Individuals served with a search warrant issued under FISA rules may not disclose, under penalty of law, the existance of the warrant or the facts that records were provided to the government. The final version of this provision contains an important clause -- which was not in the Administration's original bill -- restricting the potential misuse of the law. Although the USA PATRIOT Act deleted the requirement that any records requested pertain to an agent of a foreign power (or a foreign power), the Act prohibits investigation of a United States person solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. A second change from the ATA was the infusion of judicial involvement into the process. The ATA's proposed amendment would have allowed access to such records under a subpoena issued by investigators. The USA PATRIOT Act retains the requirement of pre-existing law, permitting access to records only upon court order.
Sunset Provision
The USA PATRIOT Act contains a sunset provision, terminating several of the amendments enhancing electronic surveillance authority on December 31, 2005. Because the law gives government much increased surveillance capability, a sunset is crucial to determine how well the tools work, how effective they havebeen, and how responsibly they have been applied. Of the provisions outlined above, the sunset provision does not apply to the expansion of pen register/trap and trace authority to the Internet; authority to share grand jury information; expansion of law enforcement authority over cable providers; expanded scope of subpoenas for electronic evidence; authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant; and expansion of jurisdictional authority of search warrants for terrorism investigations.
Additional Amendments Providing Government the Authority to Combat Terrorism
Section 205 of the Act provides for increased employment of translators by the FBI and designated five more judges to sit on the FISA Court (raising the number from seven to eleven seats on the court). These provisions are intended to increase the human intelligence capacities of the FBI and to provide additional judicial oversight of the enhanced FISA authority. Both amendments are commendable in their efforts to aid the government in preventing terrorist acts while maintaining a system checking intrusion onto citizens' civil liberties. In addition, Section 223 provides civil liability for unauthorized disclosure of information obtained through surveillance, which serves to limit misuse of communications captured through lawful surveillance.
Amendments to Immigration Laws
The Act contains significant amendments to immigration and other laws. These sections are not discussed here. For further information on such provisions, see:
The ACLU's analysis of the immigration provisions
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act Immigration Provisions (Oct. 26, 2001)
Resources
News Articles
N.Y. City Council Passes Anti-Patriot Act Measure, Washington Post (Feb. 5, 2004)
Federal Judge Rules Part of Patriot Act Unconstitutional, CNN.com (Jan. 26, 2004)
Bush Wants Patriot Act Renewed, CNET News.com (Jan. 20, 2004)
FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance, Washington Post (Dec. 13, 2003)
Patriot Act Hearings Sought By Democrats, Boston Globe (Dec. 12, 2003)
9/11 Commission Hears Debate on Patriot Act, Newsday (Dec. 9, 2003)
Anti-Patriot Measure Dropped From Bill, but Author Promises to Try Again, San Francisco Chronicle (Dec. 2, 2003)
Patriot Act Has Ashcroft Under Fire, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Oct. 19, 2003)
Senate Republicans Warn That Patriot Act Will Not be Renewed Unless Changes are Made, San Francisco Chronicle (Oct. 14, 2003)
Legislative Battle Predicted for Patriot II, Fox News.com (Oct. 11, 2003)
FBI Bypasses the First Amendment to Nail a Hacker, The Register (Sept. 29, 2003)
Congressional Opponants Lash Out at Patriot Act, Ashcroft, Cybercast News Service (Sept. 25, 2003)
A Guide to the Patriot Act (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4), Slate (Sept. 8-11, 2003)
Prosecutors are Urged to Press Congress, Washington Post (Aug. 22, 2003)
ACLU Files Suit Against Patriot Act, CNN.com (July 30, 2003)
Patriot Act Report Documents Civil Rights Complaints, CNN.com (July 22, 2003)
Speaking Out About Wiretaps, Washington Post (Aug. 30, 2002)
Recognition of Patriot Act Urged, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2002)
He Knows What You've Been Checking Out, salon.com (Mar. 6, 2002)
States Declare Open Season On Public Access, Stateline.org (Mar. 1, 2002)
Anti-Terror Bill Becomes Law, abcNews.com (Oct. 26, 2001)
Patriot Act Draws Privacy Concerns, CNET News.com (Oct. 26, 2001)
USA PATRIOT Act Resources
EPIC's analysis of the Anti-Terrrorism Act of 2001, Sept. 24, 2001.
Special EPIC Alert (Sept. 24, 2001) urging contemplation and debate before passage of enahanced anti-terrorism authorities. Includes quotes from editorials and articles around the world advocating democratic process even in the face of unprecedented challenges.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): Legislative Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, Oct. 2001.
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT): Response to September 11th, 2001 Terrorist Attacks.
American Library Association (ALA): Libraries and the Patriot Legislation.
The Association of Research Libraries: "The Search and Seizure of Electronic Information: The Law Before and After the USA Patriot Act" (PDF), Jan. 18, 2002.
Center for National Security Studies: USA-Patriot Act.
The Center for Constitutional Rights: The USA PATRIOT Act--What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of Rights?, Nov. 2001.
OMBWatch: Access to Government Information Post September 11th, Feb. 02, 2002.
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that Relate to Online Activities, Oct. 31, 2001.
Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc (IRE): Security vs. Open Records.
Department of Justice, Field Guidance on New Authorities Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation (PDF).
Department of Justice, Report From the Field: The USA PATRIOT Act at Work (PDF), July 2004.
Senator Feingold's Floor Statement on the USA-PATRIOT Act, Oct. 25, 2002.
Senator Leahy's Section-by-Section summary of USA-PATRIOT Act
USA Patriot Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire December 31, 2005 (PDF), CRS Report for Congress RL32186, January 2, 2004.
Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (PDF), CRS Report for Congress 98-326, updated January 13, 2003.
Personal Privacy Protection: The Legislative Response (PDF), CRS Report for Congress RL30671, updated May 24, 2001.
Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act (PDF), CRS Report for Congress RL31200, updated December 10, 2001.
The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government (PDF), CRS Report for Congress RL31289, updated March 4, 2002.
The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis (PDF), CRS Report for Congress RL31377, April 15, 2002.
Tools and Tips for Organizing Resolutions in Defense of the Bill of Rights, Bill of Rights Defense Committee.
Campaign for Reader Privacy.
Previous Top News
PATRIOT Act Renewal Bill Would Expand FBI Powers . Reuters reports that Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) plans to introduce legislation that would not only reauthorize sunsetting provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, but also expand the government's investigative powers to permit the FBI to demand health, library, and tax records in intelligence investigations without judicial approval. Today the committee had planned to hold a closed sesseion to vote on whether to send the legislation to the Senate floor. The session was cancelled, but is expected to be held next week. For more information, see EPIC's USA PATRIOT Act page. (May 19, 2005)
EPIC Sues For Data on Use of USA PATRIOT Act Powers. In a complaint (pdf) filed this week, EPIC asked a federal court to force the FBI to disclose information about its use of expanded investigative authority granted by sunsetting provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. The agency agreed (pdf) to quickly process EPIC's Freedom of Information Act request (pdf) for the data, but has not complied with the timeline for even a standard FOIA request. The lawsuit comes amid numerous congressional hearings reviewing controversial sections of the USA PATRIOT Act. Many of these provisions are slated to expire at the end of the year unless the administration makes the case for renewal. For more information, see EPIC's USA PATRIOT FOIA page. (April 29, 2005)
House, Senate Hold USA PATRIOT Act Oversight Hearings. Beginning this week, Congress will hold numerous hearings to review controversial sections of the USA PATRIOT Act that gave the government greater investigative powers. Many of these provisions are slated to expire at the end of the year unless the administration makes the case for renewal. Last month, EPIC submitted a FOIA request (pdf) to the FBI asking how the agency has used expanded investigative powers under sunsetting provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. (April 6, 2005)
Report: USA PATRIOT Act Threatens Canadians' Privacy. British Columbia's Information and Privacy Commissioner has released a report (pdf) finding that the USA PATRIOT Act violates British Columbian privacy laws, and that personal information about Canadians may be accessible to the U.S. government under the Act. The report concludes that changes to privacy law and other measures are necessary to protect British Columbians' personal information against seizure under the controversial American law. (Nov. 1, 2004)
EPIC Urges Appeals Court to Reverse Ruling on USA PATRIOT Records. EPIC has filed a brief (pdf) asking a federal appellate court to reverse a lower court's refusal (pdf) to expedite the processing of a Freedom of Information Act request (pdf) seeking information about efforts of federal prosecutors to oppose legislative revisions to the controversial USA PATRIOT Act. EPIC argues that it is entitled to expedited processing because there was, at the time of the request, an urgency to inform the public about the matter. EPIC also argues that the prosecutors' activities were a matter of widespread and exceptional media interest and raised questions about the government's integrity. For more information about the case, see the EPIC v. DOJ Page. (July 13, 2004)
EPIC Obtains Information on USA PATRIOT Act Surveillance Authority. EPIC has received two sets of documents revealing that the scope of the FBI's powers under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act is broader than what government officials have publicly acknowledged. Among other things, the documents show that the controversial provision can be used to collect information about innocent people and state that Section 215 may authorize law enforcement to obtain an individual's apartment keys. The documents are available at EPIC's PATRIOT Act FOIA Litigation page. (June 24, 2004)
2003 Surveillance Report: Secret Warrants Surpass Standard Warrants. The 2003 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Annual Report (pdf) reveals that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court granted 1724 applications for secret surveillance last year, more than in any previous year. The report shows that 2003 was the first year ever that more secret surveillance warrants were granted than federal wiretap warrants, which are issued only under a more stringent legal standard. The PATRIOT Act significantly expanded the government's authority to make use of secret surveillance, including in circumstances where part of the investigation is unrelated to an intelligence investigation. The report also reveals that a small number of applications for secret surveillance were denied in 2003 for the first time ever. For more information, see EPIC's FISA Page. (May 7, 2004)
Petition Drive Launched to Protect Reader Privacy. The Campaign for Reader Privacy has been launched by booksellers, authors and librarians. The campaign, which urges concerned citizens to sign a petition to Congress, seeks to amend Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to "restore the privacy of our bookstore and library records." (April 1, 2004)
New York City Passes Resolution Against USA PATRIOT Act. The New York City Council has passed a resolution against the USA PATRIOT Act, criticizing the law's infringement on privacy rights. New York City, target of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, is the 247th community in the United States to approve a measure condemning the law. (Feb. 5, 2004)
Ashcroft Asks Senate to Leave USA PATRIOT As Is. Attorney General John Ashcroft has sent a letter to members of the Senate urging them not to revoke controversial law enforcement surveillance powers granted by the USA PATRIOT Act. The letter refers specifically to the Security and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act), a bipartisan bill currently in the Senate that would limit the USA PATRIOT Act's surveillance and search powers. (Jan. 29, 2004)
Judge Strikes Down Part of USA PATRIOT Act. A federal judge has ruled that a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act that prohibits providing "expert advice or assistance" to designated international terrorist organizations violates the First and Fifth Amendments because it is overly vague. This is the first court decision striking down a provision of the controversial law. (Jan. 27, 2004)
Bush Calls for Renewal of USA PATRIOT Act. In his annual State of the Union address, President Bush urged Congress to renew key provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act scheduled to sunset in December 2005. Two of the more controversial provisions of the Act set to expire next year allow the government to seize library patron’s records without giving notice and conduct Internet surveillance without a warrant. (Jan. 21, 2004)
Congress Approves Expansion of FBI Powers. Congress has added a provision to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 that grants the FBI greater authority to seize records in terrorism investigations. The provision permits the FBI to obtain records without judicial approval from car dealers, pawnbrokers, travel agents, casinos, and other businesses. (Nov. 19, 2003)
EPIC Seeks Release of DOJ Patriot Lobbying Info. In court papers (pdf) filed this week, EPIC is seeking the expedited release of Justice Department records concerning the lobbying efforts of federal prosecutors to oppose revisions to the controversial USA PATRIOT Act. Despite widespread media coverage of the lobbying campaign, and questions as to its legality, DOJ has refused to expedite EPIC's disclosure request. (Oct. 15, 2003)
SAFE Act Introduced in Senate. A bipartisan bill that would significantly limit a number of controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act has been introduced in the Senate. Read the text of the Security and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act) and follow its progress here. (Oct. 2, 2003)
Ashcroft Tours Country to Defend USA PATRIOT Act. Attorney General John Ashcroft has concluded a cross-country tour to defend the legitimacy of the USA PATRIOT Act and other anti-terrorism measures. Read the speech he delivered in Washington, D.C. on August 19 and his September 9 address in New York. (Sept. 15, 2003)
Justice Department Urges Prosecutors to Lobby Congress. The Washington Post has reported that the Director of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys has issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors asking them to contact members of Congress who voted to deny funding for "sneak and peek" warrants, which are authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act. (Aug. 22, 2003)
EPIC/ACLU Challenge PATRIOT Act Secrecy. In a legal memorandum (pdf) filed with the federal court in Washington, EPIC and the American Civil Liberties Union challenge the Justice Department's refusal to disclose basic, statistical information concerning implementation of the controversial USA PATRIOT Act. For background information and copies of DOJ and FBI documents that have been obtained, see EPIC's PATRIOT Act FOIA Litigation page. (Mar. 24, 2003)
EPIC Files Lawsuit Seeking PATRIOT Act Info. EPIC, joined by the ACLU and library and booksellers' organizations, has filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking the disclosure of information concerning implementation of the controversial USA PATRIOT Act. The lawsuit covers some of the information the Justice Department recently withheld from the House Judiciary Committee. See the PATRIOT Act FOIA Litigation page for details and links to relevant documents. (Oct. 24, 2002)
DOJ Releases PATRIOT Act Info, Withholds Some Data. The House Judiciary Committee has released the Justice Department's response [PDF, 3.4MB) to the committee's June 13 letter seeking information about implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. The response sheds some light on the use of the new law, but DOJ has classified a large amount of important information required for proper public oversight. EPIC and the ACLU are seeking this information through the Freedom of Information Act. (Oct. 18, 2002)
Free Speech Groups Cite Post-9/11 Info Restrictions. EPIC has joined with other free expression and open government advocates in a statement marking the six-month anniversary of Congress' passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. The groups detail the legislation's chilling effect on speech and other government efforts to restrict public access to information. The statement was released by the Free Expression Network at a Capitol Hill press conference that featured Sen. Russel Feingold and Rep. Patsy Mink, both vocal critics of the legislation. (Apr. 25, 2002)
Related EPIC Policy Pages
EPIC Air Travel Privacy Page
EPIC Attorney General's Guidelines Page
EPIC Biometrics Page
EPIC Counter-terrorism Page
EPIC Face Recognition Page
EPIC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Page
EPIC National ID Cards Page
EPIC PATRIOT II Page
EPIC Profiling Page
EPIC Public Records and Privacy Page
EPIC Video Surveillance Page
EPIC Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Page