Terrorism mooves in Georgia
. • In the past two years, narcotics trafficking routes established in Georgia in the 1990s have seen an increased volume.
. • The narcotics trade in Georgia has been contested between conventional crime organizations and Chechen guerrilla forces; the latter group seems to have gained the advantage.
. • The Georgian government has offered increasingly ineffective resistance to narcotics trafficking.
. • Narcotics trafficking in Armenia and Azerbaijan has been less than in Georgia, but conditions exist for a substantial increase in both countries.
. • Recent events in Afghanistan have not reduced the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West.
. • Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus continue to diversify and expand, fueled by Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries.
. • Members of several ethnic groups are major participants in the narcotics trade emanating from Central Asia, and Russian criminal organizations appear to play a diminishing role.
. • The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is known to rely heavily on narcotics trafficking over a number of Central Asian routes to support its military, political, and propaganda activities. That trafficking is based on moving heroin from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, into Russia, and then into Western Europe.
. • As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has been able to adjust its military and trafficking activities to respond to interdiction in given areas.
. • The effect of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU’s narcotics activity is yet unknown, in part because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear.
. • The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. To this point, HT has relied on peaceful means to propagate its central idea of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia.
. • HT’s decentralized structure conceals its activities very effectively. Although HT has funded its widespread educational and propaganda network primarily from overseas contributions, individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking.
. • HT’s expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong base for potential terrorist activity, and ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive at least some parts of the organization to respond violently.
. • The narcotics trade in Georgia has been contested between conventional crime organizations and Chechen guerrilla forces; the latter group seems to have gained the advantage.
. • The Georgian government has offered increasingly ineffective resistance to narcotics trafficking.
. • Narcotics trafficking in Armenia and Azerbaijan has been less than in Georgia, but conditions exist for a substantial increase in both countries.
. • Recent events in Afghanistan have not reduced the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West.
. • Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus continue to diversify and expand, fueled by Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries.
. • Members of several ethnic groups are major participants in the narcotics trade emanating from Central Asia, and Russian criminal organizations appear to play a diminishing role.
. • The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is known to rely heavily on narcotics trafficking over a number of Central Asian routes to support its military, political, and propaganda activities. That trafficking is based on moving heroin from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, into Russia, and then into Western Europe.
. • As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has been able to adjust its military and trafficking activities to respond to interdiction in given areas.
. • The effect of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU’s narcotics activity is yet unknown, in part because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear.
. • The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. To this point, HT has relied on peaceful means to propagate its central idea of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia.
. • HT’s decentralized structure conceals its activities very effectively. Although HT has funded its widespread educational and propaganda network primarily from overseas contributions, individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking.
. • HT’s expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong base for potential terrorist activity, and ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive at least some parts of the organization to respond violently.
posted by A.D.E.S.G. Europe at
10:57 AM
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